Part 1: https://benstowell.blogspot.com/2025/10/inseparable-subjectivity-part-1-bundle.html
Part 2: https://benstowell.blogspot.com/2025/10/inseparable-subjectivity-part-2.html
Part 3: https://benstowell.blogspot.com/2025/11/inseparable-subjectivity-part-3.html
Part 4: Response to inseparable subjectivity
So there are two objections, one about the legitimacy of the distinction between Person(2a) and Person(2b) and one about the causal role of Person(2a). We can describe each objection like so:
Objection 1: Inseparable subjectivity
In Part 3 I said:
“Imagine the feeling of being judged. It's a sharp pain, which makes it vivid and easy to imagine. Is it possible to separate the feeling of being judged from the subjectivity? No. The experience is necessarily experiential. There is no pain floating around out there without a person to feel it. Pain is by its essence felt. Likewise, there is no subjectivity floating around out there without other properties characterizing that experience. Subjectivity is by its essence a particular kind of experience. So for a painful feeling, like being judged, you can't have the pain without the subjectivity, and you can't have the subjectivity without the pain. The subjectivity is replete and inseparable.
But if a person per se is identical to their subjective properties . . . then any criticism or praise directed to the ugly or admirable aspects of the subjective property are directed to the person per se . . .
If this is right, and if our choices come with a subjective property (the quale of making a choice), then we are our choices, just as we are our pains and pleasures and any other subjective property. If by ‘person’ we mean a collection of subjective properties that all have the same subjectivity in common, then our experiences (including experiences of making choices) are straightforwardly part of us.
Far from eliminating free will, this might provide the very resources to build an account of how free will works! Namely, that . . . because a*) our choices are caused by our phenomenal choice, and because b) wherever there is phenomenology there is personhood, therefore c*) our choices are caused by our personhood (i.e., by us). So d) the goodness or badness of the consequences of our choices reflects the goodness or badness of the phenomenal choice that caused them, which just is to reflect the goodness or the badness of the personhood that caused them.”
Objection 2: Pure subjectivity plays a causal role in choices
We first must distinguish between the pure subject as an abstraction versus the subject as a concrete first-person property. Abstract properties are not causal. So it’s trivially true that the abstract self does not play a causal role. But when it comes to praising and blaming persons, we are praising and blaming real, concrete persons, not abstractions. We praise and blame you, not the concept of you. Because persons are concrete and causal, we must, as Objection 1 gets at, treat “pure subjectivity” as concrete and causal (more precisely, there is no such thing as personhood qua “pure subjectivity”; all personhood is concrete). As mentioned in the previous post:
“If I have stressful experiences, and those stressful first-person properties cause my body to produce stress hormones like cortisol and adrenaline, then the ‘pure subjectivity’ of being on the receiving end of experience actually does play a role in causal relationships. Plus, presumably pure experiences cause me to remember having those experiences. So pure subjectivity causes memory. Furthermore, memories reveal patterns that affect future actions. By remembering the pain of touching a hot stove, I avoid touching hot stoves in the future. So by causing memories, not only does pure subjectivity play a causal role, but a causal role with respect to our actions.”
“Pure subjectivity” here really refers to concrete first-person properties that are passive in the sense of not being those first-person properties that directly correspond to the making of choices. If the badness of Y reflects the badness of the cause of Y, and if these passive first-person properties play an indirect causal role in bad actions, then the badness of these bad actions caused in part by these passive first-person properties reflects to that degree the badness of these properties, and thus reflects to that degree the badness of the personhood corresponding to these properties. So even “passive” subjectivity is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and thus the personhood that corresponds to this subjectivity is not only praised or blamed, but praised or blamed in a direct, immediate way. That is, because you are your experiences, the goodness and badness of the consequences of your experiences—experiences that are directly or indirectly involved in your making choices with good or bad consequences—directly reflect the goodness or badness of you.
Reply: Insofar ‘you’ picks out something abstract
Can essential properties be abstract? Not only yes, but this must be the case, because identifying essential properties requires abstraction. What gives rise to essential and non-essential properties in the first place is the act of bundling – bundling properties under labels. There’s a bundle of properties referred to by the word ‘mountain’, a different bundle of properties referred to by the word ‘lake’, and so on, for every word. Essential properties are those properties that make or break your inclusion within a label. Where a mountain is located is non-essential; you can have mountains in Colorado, Mexico, Mars; your location won’t get you kicked out of the mountain club. But your size will: too small and you will be called a hill. When does a mountain become a hill? No one knows and it doesn’t really matter. Words are vague. What matters is how people react to what you say. If you point to an average-sized mountain and say, “That’s the biggest hill I’ve ever seen!”, you will be promptly corrected that it’s an average-sized mountain. Conversely, if you point at a hill and call it a tiny mountain, you will be corrected that it’s a hill. A similar conversation could take place about rivers versus creeks, and so on. Often, with a bit of thought, we can abstract out one or more of the make-or-break properties of an object. If something does not produce heat, then whatever it is, we will not consider it to be a lit bonfire, lit furnace, or any lit object. So producing heat is an essential property of lit objects.
So could my essential property be abstract? If everyday objects have abstract essential properties—and indeed if the very notion of an essential property depends on abstracting out the properties that explain why an object falls under a particular label—then I don’t see why not.
When I experience pain, the subjective property identical to me is present. When I experience happiness, the subjective property identical to me is also present. But my pain and my happiness are not the same thing, despite the shared subjectivity. So it cannot be that both properties are identical to me, as then they would be identical to each other, and what could be more certain than that pain and happiness are different? So ‘me’ must pick out a subjective property that my pain and happiness share. To understand the difference between pain and happiness, while acknowledging what they have in common – me – I have no choice but to abstract out the shared property and consider it in the same way I would consider the abstract property producing heat shared by bonfires and furnaces.
But do ‘I’ and ‘me’ in fact pick out such an abstract property? If I were strapped to a device and tortured, day and night, for years and years, my existence would be perfectly, and unfortunately, real to me. Even if no one knew I was there, I would know. Even if I lost the ability to form memories, the “first” moment of pain, repeated again and again, would still be undeniable. Even if I made no choices, even if my pain caused no effects, other than perhaps the morally irrelevant effects of releasing stress hormones in my body, I would still be there, there in the pain. So I cannot deny that there is a sense of the concept of me that does not depend on a) Anyone else’s existence or awareness of me, b) On me making choices, or c) On me having any memories. A person can inspect their own moments of pain and abstract out what unites them. A person can observe the stark contrast between the moments of pain and moments of happiness and see that the same thing unites both. I am not my happiness; I experience happiness. I am not my choices; I experience my choices. I am not my pain; I experience pain. Of course Ben’s pain is essentially felt by Ben, just as this bonfire is essentially producing heat. And just as this bonfire is not equivalent to producing heat, neither is Ben’s pain equivalent to felt by Ben. Just as producing heat is what unites lit objects, felt by Ben is what unites Ben’s experiences. ‘I’ picks out this felt by me property. It sounds like a circular definition: <Ben> is <felt by Ben>. This is exactly what I expect, because my essential self is a phenomenal thing, and phenomenal things can only be defined circularly, because words can only gesture to phenomenal objects. It’s more accurate to say <Ben> is <feeler> (or: <experiencer>) where <feeler> picks out a particular feeler that we label <Ben>. So <Ben> is <feeler> is really the tautology <This feeler> is <this feeler>, and <Ben’s pain> is <felt by Ben> means <Pain felt by this feeler> is <felt by this feeler>. So the essential self is the first-person felt property abstracted out from the entire phenomenal property.
If the essential self is an abstract, non-causal property, then it immediately follows that the self does not stand in causal relations, and so the essential self cannot be attributed to be the cause of anything, even if the non-essential self is the cause of many things. But a) Surely these phenomenal properties are caused to exist (they don’t exist necessarily) and b) Surely these phenomenal properties cause (if we grant mental causation) some things, like choices, or at least bodily processes (like crying, panic attacks, or inducing stress hormones).
Sure, just as there are things that cause bonfires and furnaces. That doesn’t change the fact that producing heat is one of the essential properties of lit bonfires and lit furnaces. This particular heat from this particular bonfire is causal – it causes the surrounding air to heat up. And this particular heat was caused by chemical properties giving rise to combustion, and so on. Likewise, this particular subjective property—a bundle of properties surrounding the state of being sad—causes the body to produce tears. And this particular subjectivity was caused by a particular brain in such and such state, and so on. Just as this particular heat is inseparable from the other properties of the bonfire, this particular subjectivity is inseparable from other properties of the phenomenal property. To get one property, or bundle of properties, you need the other. To get the particular heat from the bonfire, you need the particular wood, and so on. To get the particular subjectivity, you need the particular feelings of sadness, and so on.
So the inseparability between particular essential and particular non-essential properties is nothing new, a feature of all objects. When identifying the property that is essential of an object, that requires abstracting out the property the lack of which precludes your inclusion under the label being considered. When the label being considered is <(lit) bonfire>, I see that lacking producing heat precludes your inclusion under the label. While producing heat considered in the abstract is an abstract property, that doesn’t mean the heat of this bonfire right here is abstract. Particular heat is concrete, being both caused by various other properties and causing changes in properties outside itself. This concrete, particular heat is inseparable from other concrete particular properties whose existence are co-dependent with the heat.
When the label being considered is a pronoun like ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘you’, and so on, I find myself abstracting out the property of subjectivity – of having a particular, unique, first-person experience. If something possesses a particular subjectivity that we can only gesture toward with the word ‘me’, then that thing is me. If something lacks that particular subjectivity, then that thing is not me.
While this might sound like the contradiction of a “universal particular”, the word ‘particular’ here picks out specificity, just as other abstracted properties refer to something more or less specific. The issue is distinguishing between my subjectivity, which all my phenomenal properties share (and thus is multiply instantiated), and subjectivity in general, which all persons share.
While a specific subjectivity considered in the abstract (i.e. divorced from other phenomenal properties) is an abstract property, that doesn’t mean this particular subjectivity right here is abstract. Particular subjectivity is concrete, being both caused by various other properties and causing changes in properties outside itself (allowing for mental causation). This concrete, particular subjectivity is inseparable from other concrete particular properties whose existence are co-dependent with the subjectivity.
So bundling seems to work differently for ordinary objects versus persons. Different objects can share essential properties. But different persons cannot share essential properties. Only different phenomenal properties that share the same subjectivity can share essential properties.
Reply 2: Insofar ‘you’ picks out something concrete
You might reject the idea that essential properties for particular objects can be abstract. Sure, in general, an object cannot lack producing heat and still be a lit bonfire. But when it comes to this bonfire right here, it’s not enough for this bonfire to produce just any heat, and certainly it can’t be producing the heat of some other object. To be included under the reference this bonfire right here, you must produce this heat. In other words, we have universal, abstract essential properties for abstract objects, and particular, concrete essential properties for concrete objects.
So if I am convinced that my essential self cannot be something abstract, but must be concrete, then I cannot accept that my essential properties are abstract. If it’s true that wherever you find my phenomenal properties, you find me, then it’s true that wherever you find my phenomenal properties pertaining to emotions, pains, joys, sights, rememberings, making choices, and so on, you find me. Because subjectivity is inseparable from other phenomenal properties, and because I am my subjectivity, it follows that I am my phenomenal properties. So I am my happiness, my pain, and so on. This runs into the objection that happiness and pain cannot be the same, but set that aside for now. My essential self must not be abstract, as that would mean my essential self does not stand in causal relations. But surely I was caused to exist, and surely I cause other things to exist (unless we want to parse out meanings of ‘I’ and suggest that ‘I’ is being used to mean one thing in one context and another thing in another context).
Even still, I don’t see how this rescues moral responsibility. The collection of first-person properties that a person has is incidental to factors beyond their control. It’s painfully obvious to me that someone who wins the lottery at 18 years old and spends that money improving themselves and removing sources of stress in their lives will turn out much differently than that same person who doesn’t have access to those privileges and is forced into miserable conditions for years on end. The psychology of the two persons is radically different, and the activities they in fact spend their time on are radically different. So it’s not morally interesting that a person would have one set of phenomenal properties versus another, when we can so easily imagine that set radically changing by a few simple changes to the person’s circumstances that they could not have controlled for.
I will return to this topic of personhood at a later point. I think the bottom line for me for now is that:
Pronouns are ambiguous, and I see different bundles of properties picked out by words like ‘you’. The illustration of the sleepwalker shows this. ‘You’ can refer to: You(1a): The private experiences of others about you; You(1b): Your public properties that cause others to have experiences of you (and causes you to have experiences of your public properties); You(2a): Your subjectivity that unites all your phenomenal properties; You(2b): The properties that distinguish one of your phenomenal properties from another (assuming subjectivity is in fact separable).
There are other distinctions we could make: You as in your body; You as in the location of your visual field; You as in some combination of above meanings.
There’s an unmistakable sense of self that remains even when you remove 1a and 1b. Because the properties of 2b cannot be identical to each other (happiness cannot be the same thing as pain), and yet you are identical to yourself, you cannot be 2b either. So that leaves 2a as the essential self. When I engage in the abstraction process for identifying that property the lack of which precludes something’s being referenced by the word ‘me’ (the same abstraction process for identifying essential properties for any object), 2a comes out as the essential property of me. The torture device illustration shows this.
But I’m not sure about the exact relationship between concreteness and abstractness, between those and causality, between essential properties and concreteness, or what abstraction really is and how to tell when it is occurring. Countless other questions are left open, like the nature of mental causation, the nature of causation more broadly, the nature of properties, existence, and facts more broadly, the relationship between properties and time and thus the relationship between mental properties and time, how personhood survives through time, how personhood relates to eternalism versus presentism theories of time, and how this Bundle Theory of the Self and properties relates to substance dualism, neutral monism, or other monisms (versions of physicalism or versions of idealism), or to property dualism and arguments for and against property dualism (or arguments that property dualism entails this or that view about substances). Thus far I've basically assumed a substance nihilist position. There are objections to bundle theory / substance nihilism more broadly that have yet to be addressed as well. There are many alternative views of the self, that the essential self is a non-physical substance, that it is a physical substance, that it is a brain, that it is an animal or organism, that it is a partition of God's necessary mind, that it is a weakly emergent thing via a panpsychist interpretation, that there is no concrete self at all via an epiphenomenalist interpretation, and probably a dozen other views besides.