I left the following comments on Jordan Hampton's new interview on free will. It's excellent! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW0TO8bG7mg
Sometimes it's hard being a free will skeptic, because so few people take free will skepticism seriously. (Per the 2020 Philpapers survey, it's something like 77% of philosophers that believe in free will, and only 11% that deny it, with the rest undecided.) So it's nice to see some pressure against free will :)
Curious that Dr. Pendergraft denies 3 for reasons of resilience and austerity. It seems immediately arguable to me that denying 1 is better for those reasons. For resilience, we've already seen how as science has advanced, our human tendency to attribute agency where there is none is shown to mislead us. We attributed lightning strikes to gods, and seizures to demonic possession. Now we know better. So over time, more and more agency has been kicked out, with naturalistic mechanisms taking on the explanatory role. We've also advanced in our understanding in biology, psychology, and psychoanalysis. Human behavior has grown more and more explainable without need to appeal to free will. These are points Robert Sapolsky makes in his book Determined (at least something along these lines). Recently I discovered that BF Skinner denied free will exactly because he thought we can explain human behavior without appeal to it. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NeK8GNLylkc, skip to 3:00.) Denying free will is the most scientific and future-proof strategy, it seems to me.
On the side of austerity, that's simple: By positing the kind of control you need to be morally responsible, you run the risk of positing something that does not exist. The putative benefit to positing the kind of control needed for moral responsibility is to explain data, such as our moral intuitions, better than free will skepticism can. But I'm convinced that free will skepticism explains our moral intuitions better too.