Craig Blomberg Misrepresents Naturalistic Morality

Blomburg, Craig. Can We Still Believe in God? Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2020.

 

"Ethicists rightly point out that if a person rejects the existence of an all-powerful, all-loving being, they still have no satisfactory explanation for evil in the universe." (2)

 

No citation for this is given. Which ethicists point this out? I can't think of any. I'm sure Christian philosophers claim this. The use of the term 'ethicists' is suspicious, because it makes it sound like this is a common belief among even secular philosophers who specialize in ethics. But without a citation, I have no reason to believe this, and I suspect that all, or nearly all, secular philosophers who specialize in ethics would disagree with this on multiple levels.

 

Even worse, even if it were the case that ethicists claim this, they wouldn't be rightly pointing anything out. They would be confused and mistaken.

 

Even worse still, I can think of at least one secular philosopher that specializes in ethics, Russ Shafer-Landau, who would argue that it's divine command theory, the common metaethical view of Christians, that fails to give a satisfactory explanation of evil in the universe. (See The Fundamentals of Ethics, Fifth Edition, Chapter 5.)

 

Even worse still, I can think of at least one Christian philosopher who specializes in ethics, Anne Jeffrey, who says that you don't need God for objective morality. See: https://soundcloud.com/capturingchristianity/cc021-if-god-does-not-exist-why-be-a-moral-person

 

At 8:15 she says:

 

"My view turns out might have more in common with an atheistic Kantianism than with a certain form of Orthodox Judaism." 

 

At 12 minutes, she says "It could be wrong to rape and torture even if God didn't exist."

 

(At around 15 minutes she speaks about how divine command theory is a view taken seriously by theistic ethicists, but Catholic theists will gravitate more toward natural law theory.) 

 

She even suggests that sophisticated naturalistic systems of objective morality could show God's concern for our actions. 

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVsCgf_GmEQ. Timestamp 1:04:45. 

 

She says:  

"I think that there's a lot to be said for how the reason that God has given us to come up with very good explanations for morality. . . . It's actually more evidence that God is good and gracious that God provides us with the sorts of cognitive faculties that can come up with naturalistic arguments for real, objective morality, because objective moral obligations are so important for us to believe in . . . that it's better, for all of us, if more people believe in it. And if belief in certain varieties in theism is waning, all the better that these arguments are available. . . . I think [naturalistic explanations for morality are] impressive stuff and important . . . it's nice to have a sort of backup theory, that your moral beliefs are not so precarious . . . even if God didn't exist, I think I still shouldn't kill innocent people and it doesn't depend on what I care about or what I'm committed to . . ." 

Additionally, Christian philosopher Dustin Crummett has criticized William Lane Craig's moral argument, and instead argues on behalf of theism from moral knowledge.   

 

Even worse still, it's unclear what a "satisfactory explanation for evil" means. Does this mean an explanation of where evil comes from? Or what makes something evil? Or how we can know that there is evil? And are we speaking about axiological evils, or moral evils, or both? It doesn't matter; naturalism has excellent explanations of all of this, even better explanations than Christianity, because the naturalist doesn't have to worry about challenges to divine command theory, to natural law theory, and to Christianity in general.

 

Here's where the author might help us, a few sentences later:  

"But where do the concept of evil and the idea that it is something to be alleviated come from in the first place? If neither revealed religion nor natural theology (ultimate truths that can be inferred from what exists) points to a transcendent God who concerns himself with the affairs of humanity, from where do the ideas of good and evil originate?" (2)

The answer is our experiences: Badness and goodness are phenomenal concepts, as I have explained elsewhere. See: https://benstowell.blogspot.com/2026/02/response-to-lance-bush-on-certainty-of.html

Badness is worth eliminating for its own sake. Though some badness gives rise to greater goodness; that badness is a good deal. Discipline is painful, but that pain is worth the benefits of discipline.

It's not exactly an honest thing to say that God is concerned with the affairs of humanity. I don't see that at all. But even worse, I don't see how it's relevant that there be a transcendent God when it comes to the origins of the ideas of axiological and moral goodness and badness. Even if God existed, it would still be the case that axiological goodness and badness are phenomenal categories that we have direct access to, and that moral goodness and badness can be explained in light of axiological goodness and badness. Adding God doesn't do anything, except make the world far more mysterious given the problem of evil.

This is page two of the book. Given mistakes this egregious right out of the gate, is it worth reading more?

Liz Jackson on Romans 1

Liz Jackson writes ("Permissivism About Religious Belief", https://philpapers.org/rec/JACPAR-11):

 

In Romans 1:20, St. Paul writes, “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—God’s eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.” Given passages like this one, those in the Christian tradition might argue that theism is not a permissive case. Paul seems to be arguing God is clearly seen from creation (and in a later passage, the moral law). From this, some conclude that theistic belief is rationally required of most or all of us, given the evidence.

 

In reply, my arguments in this chapter are consistent with a relatively straightforward reading of Paul in this passage (and similar passages). In Paul’s time, people had drastically different evidence that more clearly pointed toward theism. When Paul was writing, belief in God and/or the supernatural was extremely common and widespread (perhaps the divine hiddenness problem wouldn’t have gained much traction in the first century!) People spent much more time in nature, staring at starry skies and breathtaking sunsets; today, much more time is spent walking around concrete jungles and staring at computer screens. Furthermore, as Charles Taylor (2017) argues, the Reformation, Enlightenment, and Romanticism involved deep cultural and intellectual transformations that gave rise to a much more secular society. My arguments in this chapter regard our current evidential situation, and while I maintain that permissivism about theism is supported by the widespread historical disagreement about God’s existence, I don’t claim that permissivism about theistic belief extends to all historical periods, places, and times.

 

I see a few issues with this response to Romans 1. First, Christians usually believe in some form of inerrancy and inspiration: Because the Bible is inspired by the Holy Spirit, anything it teaches to be true is true. (I acknowledge Randal Rauser's thesis of providential errantism and set that aside.) Combine this with the interpretation that Paul is teaching us that those with non-belief are without excuse and you arrive at the interpretation that this is an inspired and therefore inerrant teaching of the Bible.

 

Even if Paul is saying something from the point of view of his time and place, the Holy Spirit can inspire teachings that are applicable well into the future, and modern Christians usually see themselves as reading something that was in a sense meant for them. Very few Christians, in fact this is probably a heresy, see the Bible as a fossil or snapshot of a particular time and place—this would basically be a rejection of inspiration.

 

There's two aspects of the Holy Spirit view of scripture: The Holy Spirit guides the authors of the Bible to write from their own perspective in a way that includes layers of meaning and timeless truths applicable to future generations, and the Holy Spirit guides the modern Christian to the knowledge that a particular interpretation of a passage applies to the modern Christian and their life despite the gap in time and culture. Viewing the Bible as a fossil would mean to jettison both aspects of the Holy Spirit view of scripture. So a very natural and Christian way of interpreting Romans 1 is that its teaching applies for all time.

 

Second, Paul says since the creation of the world . . . from what has been made . . . This kind of language has a universality to it. We look at the time interval from the creation of the world to Paul's time; Paul says God's attributes have been obvious in that interval. It would be strange for God's attributes to be obvious for such a long interval, but suddenly change in the comparatively negligible interval of Paul's time to ours. (And sure, Paul's phrasing of "since creation" need not be literal, but this applies even if we think of it as "since human civilization" or "since humans began believing in gods".)

 

Plus, if God's attributes are made obvious by "what has been made", then there is no relevant difference from Paul's time to ours. Paul is surely citing objects of creation like the starry sky, the planets, the trees, the animals, the sun and moon, and humanity. We have all these today, but it's not at all obvious that any of this were made by a perfectly loving God. For some of us, it's painfully obvious that a perfectly loving God almost certainly does not exist because of what has been made: death, war, disease, murder, poverty, and so on. While Christians view these as accidents of sin, for some of us it's apparent that the systems of our world systematically produce these evils. This is perhaps most apparent with the evils of evolution, and the predation, starvation, parasitism, and mass amounts of death it took to create us.

 

If anything, because we have more rigorous philosophical arguments for God from fine-tuning, the inference from "what has been made" to God's existence should be more powerful than ever, and so all the more are modern humans without excuse in their non-belief in God. And yet we also have more rigorous philosophical arguments from evil, and for some of us the problem of evil trumps the argument from fine-tuning, and it's not a remotely close contest.

 

Third, what Paul says is arguably false even in his own time. For much of human history, humans believed in multiple gods, and didn't necessarily believe in a singular all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator. So it's just not true that most groups of people have clearly seen the workings of a singular God; many, maybe most, interpret creation as the workings of multiple gods.

 

Plus, even for Jewish people and Christians, who both believe in a singular God, they strongly disagree who this God is. Christians believe Jesus is God incarnate, while Jewish people strongly disagree. God's invisible qualities have been clearly seen – including the invisible qualities of begetting the Second Person of the Trinity or "spirating" the Third Person of the Trinity? Not at all.

 

Even Christians disagree among themselves, with some viewing the Holy Spirit as a person in some sense separate from the Father and Son, and others viewing the Holy Spirit as something more like a force or essence that is not separate from the Father or Son; or some viewing Jesus as purely man while others view Jesus as both man and divine. How many heresies were there in the first few centuries leading up to the Councils and Creeds?

 

Even if you extend the idea of God to the Greeks like Plato and Aristotle, it's obvious from the Greek texts that this conception of God is radically different from the God that Christians believe. So it's very misleading to say everyone in antiquity believed in God or gods as if there were anything resembling a consensus as to what that means.

 

If the conception of God or gods is radically different between cultures, and Christians are the only ones who got it right, then it's not true that since the creation of the world God's attributes have been known. It's only thanks to the events of the Old Testament and the recent events of the Gospels that we now know the most important attributes of God, namely that God incarnated and died for our sins and you must have faith in Jesus, the incarnation of the Father (if you are a binitarian) or the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity (if you are a trinitarian) or a man who is somehow special enough to die for our sins but whose righteousness only imputes to us if we have faith in him? (if you are a unitarian?). God's attributes are related to our salvation, and so the lack of consensus among Christians as to how salvation works means even Christians haven't seen God's attributes. Invisible qualities indeed. Besides, many Christians emphasize God's ineffability; no one has a mind great enough to grasp God to any serious degree, which just is to say that God's invisible qualities have not been clearly seen at all.

 

Because Christians made up a tiny minority in Paul's time, Paul must have had a broader understanding of God when orating what became Romans 1. But if that's right, then Paul is not speaking from this local perspective, but is speaking universally; God's eternal power and divine nature have been seen by everyone, so that everyone is without excuse. Why assume that Paul is making an exception for future generations? And if you're not assuming this, then you grant that Paul could be, for all you know, applying what he's saying to future generations too, and so you should at least be agnostic with respect to whether Romans 1 is committing Christians to impermissivism.

 

Regardless, because of the problem of evil, God's eternal power and divine nature, even in some broad sense, haven't been seen by everyone. If anything, what has been seen by everyone is either God's non-existence or God's permitting of evils that for the life of us we cannot figure out why he'd permit. And when Christians, or even ex-Christians like me, try to come up with plausible theodical goods, we fail, and in my case I'm more convinced than ever that there are evils—unbearable suffering—for which there could not possibly be justifying theodical goods.

 

But putting Paul's mistakes aside, the question is whether Romans 1 commits Christians for all time to an impermissivistic attitude about the rationality of belief in God, and there's an interpretation where yes, it does, and this interpretation appears at least as solid as any other.

The Nietzschean critique goes both ways

The Nietzschean critique of Christian values goes like this: Christians find themselves poor, oppressed, and, basically, losers in this world. Christianity is an attractive worldview for losers because with Christian belief you get forgiveness for your sins and you get the promise of a good afterlife. So if you're miserable in this life, you have the next one to look forward to.

 

In other words, the values of Christians are suspiciously convenient. In the parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man, the rich man gets to have his fun in this life but then is tortured in punishment in the next life. It's a power fantasy for the oppressed. Actually, it's the rich and powerful who are losers! They are evil, greedy, selfish, blind to the spiritual truths we have access to, concerned about silly worldly things like material goods. Christians, following the teachings of Jesus, flip the script: power, money, and material happiness are bad while weakness, poverty, and spiritual happiness are good. The rich and powerful are at once happy, but too easily, demonstrating their shallowness and impoverished spirituality and virtue (C.S. Lewis' notes in The Weight of Glory come to mind when he mentions how too easily satisfied we are by boring things like worldly success), and yet at the same time the rich and powerful are secretly miserable because true happiness comes from closeness to God. Christians get to delight in their perceived moral superiority and superior happiness.

 

The critique is an accusation of dishonesty. If Christians were honest about how pathetic their lives are, about how awful it is to be poor and oppressed, then Christians would be miserable. To avoid that misery, Christians choose values that place them on top in some way, allowing them to feel good about themselves when otherwise they would feel bad about themselves.

 

The Rick and Morty moment comes to mind when Hologram Rick gets the opportunity to become real. When Morty says, "I thought you were proud to be a hologram?", Hologram Rick says "That's because I had to be one!"

 

Right. If Christians were to suddenly come into money, says the critique, they would stop lying to themselves, radically change their behavior and language, and would be honest about their true values, because now they have the option to be honest when they didn't before – not without incurring great pain.

 

Problem 1: Not universal

 

The first problem with this critique is that it won't apply to every Christian. There are wealthy, successful Christians who don't shed their "intellectually dishonest values" and adopt their true secular values. Rather, they use their wealth and influence to support churches, missionaries, Christian programs, and Christian politics. Their Christian values are not held out of convenience, but conviction.

 

Problem 2: Undergenerating reasons

 

The second problem with this critique is that it assumes there are no good reasons to hold Christian values, and thus the only explanation for why Christians do hold their values is because it protects their egos and avoids the pain of facing up to difficult truths.

 

But there are good reasons to hold to various Christian values, and these explain why these values are held. Greed is evil. Oppressing others is wrong. The "conqueror's mentality" of the rich and powerful is a stupid mentality. The way the rich and powerful do great evils and get away with it is not something to be admired, but abhorred. The beliefs and behaviors of the rich and powerful are failures of understanding of the goodness and badness of things, failures to maximize flourishing. This leads into Problem 3.

 

Problem 3: The critique goes both ways

 

The rich and powerful don't believe that greed is evil. Or if they do, they don't believe that their particular excess counts as greed. The rich and powerful conveniently rationalize their own greed and entitlement and refusal to help others. If the rich and powerful took a step back and viewed their exploitation of others, their Darwinian cynicism of "the poors", their insatiable greed, their cruel delighting in their domination of others, their egotistical competitiveness, their psychopathic lack of empathy for those in need, their hateful "I got mine" and "pull yourself up by your own bootstraps" attitudes toward those less fortunate, and their lack of contentment with anything less than absurd gluttonous excess, then maybe they would feel something vaguely resembling guilt or a desire to put away the embarrassing ego-driven nonsense and instead do the right thing and help others. But that doesn't happen. The rich and powerful are just as guilty, if not more so, of arriving at suspiciously convenient beliefs and values that allow them to feel good about themselves when otherwise they would feel bad about themselves were they to look at things more honestly and objectively.

 

The critique is completely right that if your values are suspiciously convenient, then you should introspect and ask yourself why you hold the values you do. If you discover that you hold onto them purely to protect your own ego, then you will have discovered that your values are nonsense. If you discover that you hold onto them for reasons that have nothing to do with protecting your own ego, but are grounded in facts outside of yourself, then the Nietzschean critique does not apply to you, and someone who tries to apply such a critique against you is making the mistake of undergenerating reasons leading to a mistaken psychoanalysis.

 

This applies to the topic of virtuous despair as well. The idea is that despair can be virtuous if the despair is caused by virtues such as the virtues relating to the refusal to conveniently dismiss or ignore difficult truths. The Nietzschean critique says that for the person who views their despair as virtuous, this is a convenient belief; you want your despair to be virtuous so you can feel good about yourself. If you were given a position of success, your despair would disappear, showing that your despair wasn't caused by your virtue.

 

But the first and second responses to the critique apply here as well: This psychoanalysis will prove false for those whose despair sticks even with success, and someone can introspect and see their despair sticking because the despair is attached to permanent factors beyond the self, such as cynicism about human nature, pessimism about the fate of the world, and the fact that the foundation of the world is imperfect, and so the rampant injustice and tragedy we see in the world is baked into the very fabric of the universe.

 

The third response also applies: It's impossible to participate in this world or to be happy in this world without in some sense accepting this world and celebrating it. But how can someone accept or celebrate this world knowing the injustice and suffering that makes up its bricks and mortar? You are not happy because you are a winner, but because you are too small-minded to see the big picture, because you care more about protecting your own happiness than about believing what's true, and because you have thrown empathy out the window and have refused to acknowledge and empathize with the sheer suffering of our world. When a great deal of empathy leads to despair, it's predictable that there would not be a great deal of empathy.

 

Both psychoanalyses look ridiculous to me, and the truth is in the middle: Some of your despair comes from your virtue, and some of it comes from your failure in life; some of your happiness comes from your failure to contend with difficult truths, and some of your happiness comes from your success. You must introspect, throw away any self-deception, and with brutal self-honesty see for yourself to what extent the Nietzschean critique truly applies to you. How suspiciously convenient are your beliefs and values?

Do children have special theological insights?

Matthew 11:25 (NRSVUE) says: 

At that time Jesus said, “I thank[h] you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and the intelligent and have revealed them to infants;

Problem 1: Many translations of this verse use the term 'children' instead of infants. But νηπίοις is arguably better translated as 'infants' or 'babies', which is presumably why we find that translation here in NRSVUE. But why would other translations use 'children'? Maybe because while it's hard enough to believe that children have special theological insights, it's even harder to believe that infants have special theological insights.

 

But maybe 'infant' is a metaphor for a new believer? New believers have insights from the Holy Spirit. 

 

Problem 2: Revealed what to infants? What does 'these things' refer to? The text doesn't say, and none of the surrounding verses are helpful.

 

Problem 3:  

 

Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13:11 (NRSVUE):

When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child. When I became an adult, I put an end to childish ways.

Children are poor at truthseeking because, as Paul says, thinking and reasoning like a child is something to be cast off.

Jesus does not merely say that we ought to be child-like for the sake of innocence, humility, and dependence – or, what I get from Paul's  verse, accepting the Kingdom of God with the kind of giddy joy that children have – but that things have been revealed to children. But as far as I'm aware, this just isn't true. There's no reason to believe that children have special insights or an enhanced sensus divinitatis.

Problem 4: 

 

Christians will happily say that their views on God changed dramatically from when they were children. Philosopher Josh Rasmussen, for example, says in the beginning of his book How Reason Can Lead to God that he is grateful that his childhood views of God were destroyed, because they were too simple. Many Christians report maturing in their spiritual understanding over time, and don't report having any special insights as a child, only dreadful ignorance.

 

Problem 5: 

Maybe if there were many reports of angels visiting children, but not adults, and having conversations with them, then there would be evidence of this claim. Or if there were reports of children who knew things they shouldn't be able to know, and when asked how they knew these things they would said "God told me", then that could be evidence. But there are no reports of these kinds.

 

Problem 6:

You could try to give the following kind of argument: Because of the noetic effects of sin, and because children haven't had the time to sin all that much, children are more likely to have a stronger sensus divinitatis and thus believe in God.

I don't know of the empirical research on children's belief in God. For all I know, there are more children than not that don't believe in God, or maybe it's 50/50. That would discredit the idea that children are specially positioned to "know" that God exists.

Even if research showed that children do disproportionately believe in God, there could be naturalistic explanations for this. Children raised by parents who believe in God will disproportionately believe in God not because of an enhanced sensus divinitatis, but because humans are wired to believe testimony, especially testimony in trusted individuals such as your parents.

There is much disbelief in the Christian God in China, Japan, India, southeast Asia, northeastern Europe, and the Middle East. If children in those countries had a tendency to believe in the Christian God despite their social environment, then that would be powerful evidence that yes, God reveals Himself to children. But as far as I know, children in these countries tend to believe what their parents believe, exactly as naturalism predicts.

 

Problem 7:

Another confounding variable could be that children struggle to delineate imaginary figures with real life. So even if humans tend to lose belief in God as they age, this might not be due to the noetic effects of sin but rather to the adult ability to sort imagination from reality, and, more generally, due to the adult ability to examine one's beliefs and scrutinize them.

The meek shall not inherit the earth

One of the fastest ways to know that Christianity is false is to point out things Jesus said that are undeniably false. Here's an example of something Jesus says that is undeniably false:

 

Matthew 5:5 - "Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth." (NRSVUE)

 

It is obvious that the meek do not, now, inherit this earth. This seems to be acknowledged in the quote (assuming the translation accurately captures this), as Jesus says the meek will inherit the earth, implying that Jesus is aware that the meek do not, now, in Jesus' time, inherit the earth.

 

So I guess no one can say that this is undeniably false. For all I know, in the future AI will take over and turn all power over to the meek. But I highly doubt this. It's way more likely that the non-meek will control AI forever and use it to dominate others, just as how tyrants have always used technologies to dominate others. And even if AI did somehow wrest control from tech tyrants, AI is more likely to deem the meek too unsure and indecisive to be worthy of that power. Not to mention that there may be many contradicting philosophies within the so-called meeks, so AI couldn't hand over power to the meeks without creating conflict.

 

But maybe inheriting the earth doesn't mean having authority over everyone on earth, but just that you get whatever you want on earth, and AI will grant the meek whatever they want knowing that the meek will want good things. But reading AI into Jesus' teachings here feels so silly and anachronistic.

 

If we interpret Revelation to be about future events yet to pass, there's nothing in there about the meek inheriting the earth. You have Christ's reign of 1,000 years, but that's Christ inheriting the earth. The meek are not shown to have any special place of authority.

 

Also, does 'the meek' include non-believers who are meek? Or do only Christian meek people count?

 

How far into the future are we talking? Isn't it a bit cruel to give people a promise that the meek will inherit the earth as if it's right around the corner, when really it's like thousands and thousands of years from now? Effectively it's like a false promise for that duration. It's strange to give an irrelevant teaching to your immediate audience, and stranger still to give an irrelevant teaching to basically all audiences ever.

 

If it's too far into the future to the point of Christ's second return, then again it's Christ, and all followers of Christ, who inherit the earth in some sense. The meek again have no special status. Christ is certainly not depicted as meek when he's judging earth.

 

Maybe Jesus meant to say that the meek shall inherit the second earth. After this earth is destroyed and a new earth is made, maybe "the meek" (however deemed by God) will somehow, collectively, be... in charge? Of second earth?

 

There are problems with this. First, it's misleading of Jesus to say the meek will inherit the earth knowing that the plain interpretation of that is this earth. He should have specified to prevent confusion.

 

Second, what does it even mean for a group of people to "inherit the earth"? Are the meek politicians in charge of writing laws? The meek in contrast to whom? Is it introverts versus extroverts? Does God hate extroverts? And what if the meek don't want to be leaders or authorities? They are meek, after all. Do they have their personalities forcefully changed?

 

Third, if by 'inherit' we really just mean 'receive' like in the sense of 'inheritance', then it's simply false that the meek shall uniquely inherit eternal life. Both the meek and non-meek will be saved.

 

Maybe Jesus is emphasizing the fact that while the meek are oppressed in this life, they will be glorified in the next when they inherit (receive) life on the second earth. Okay, well, in that case, say that instead. As such, the text doesn't say this.

 

Does the Greek give us any clues as to what Jesus really means (according to Matthew)?

 

According to Greek Bible, it says the following (https://www.greekbible.com/matthew/5/5):

 

"μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσιν τὴν γῆν."

 

Alternative translation: "Happy [are] the meek, because they obtain the land."

 

Funnily enough, no translation is given by Greek Bible for our keyword meek, or πραΰς.

 

According to Wiktionary (https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Special:Search?go=Go&search=%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%B0%CF%82&ns0=1), πραΰς means: gentle, mild, amiable, soft, kind, tender, pleasant. Meek sounds like a good translation.

 

So... gentle, mild, amiable, soft, kind, tender, pleasant people obtain land? What? Actually, it's warmongers, genociders, expansionists, imperialists, colonizers, lucky inheritors, and the ultra wealthy who obtain land.

 

Psalm 37:11 says: 

 

"But the meek shall inherit the land
    and delight themselves in abundant prosperity."

 

So we can see where Jesus got it from. Considering all the plain falsehoods contained in Psalm 37, I'm not sure you want to evoke it. Consider 37:32-33:

 
"The wicked watch for the righteous
    and seek to kill them.

 The Lord will not abandon them to their power
    or let them be condemned when they are brought to trial."

 

I'm sorry, how many Christians have been abandoned to anti-Christian powers? How many have been condemned when brought to trial? And if we allow 'righteous' to include non-believers who are nonetheless well-doers, then all the more is the passage false. You might try to once again retreat to the afterlife: The Lord will not abandon the righteous to the power of the unrighteous (in the afterlife), or let them be condemned when they are brought to (the ultimate trial before God). But that requires a convoluted interpretation that the author is deliberately shifting from speaking about earthly things to heavenly things despite not saying as much. Sounds like eisegesis again. I'm not even sure there's any good reason for thinking that the author of the Psalms believes in an ultimate judgment and afterlife. (Then again, if it's really the Holy Spirit who teaches through inspiration, then I could see a Christian saying that the Holy Spirit allows for authors to write teachings that would be false under the author's intended meaning, but are true under a reinterpretation that the Holy Spirit guides believers toward. But Christians often come to opposing interpretations anyway.)

 

Maybe Jesus really said blessed are the geek, prophesying the rise of tech billionaires! (There's gotta be a pastor out there that has made that joke already.)

Evan Fales on problems with the Bible

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_6b8bRUdds 

 

1 hr 14 - Creation Ex-Nihilo

 

Evan Fales mentions that Creation Ex-Nihilo, a doctrine of classical theism, is not as supported by Genesis 1:1 as Christians have historically thought. It's arguable that the more accurate translation is not that God created the heavens and earth, but that God is creating the heavens and earth (or as I've heard it, fashioning, implying pre-existing material).

 

1 hr 16 - Imago Dei

 

Fales claims that Paul says that the image of God is something humans lost, except Jesus, due to original sin. (If this is accurate, then doesn't that mean Paul repudiates the immaculate conception? If Mary is without original sin, then Paul should say Jesus and Mary are the only humans who've kept the image of God.) Fales claims that Paul says that while man is made in the image of God, women are made in the image of man. I'm not sure that's the correct interpretation of 1 Cor. 11:7. If that verse does imply that the Imago Dei doesn't apply to women, but only to men, then that sounds strange and misogynistic. But Paul has egalitarian verses elsewhere (assuming the authorship is indeed Paul in those cases).

 

"These are not clear and perspicuous. The Bible itself is a defeater of many aspects of Christian faith in which people presume that they know what God's Word is, and there's good reason, from the Bible itself, to believe that they do not." 

 

1 hr 27

 

Evan Fales suggests that if we give a skeptical theism response—like that of Stephen Wykstra—then that leaves us clueless as to the balance of goods and evils that God aims for. If God can allow massacres, genocides, mass deception, disease, starvation, and so on, then all bets are off. God can allow basically anything. For all we know, God could allow Christianity to develop as an enormous hoax. But if I have to admit that this is possible, then this provides an internal defeater for Christian belief, says Fales.

 

Fales suggests that Ezekiel 20 and Isaiah 55 suggest that God would be capable of this. I'm not exactly sure what Fales has in mind, but my guess is the following:

 

Isaiah 55 says (NRSVUE):

"so shall my word be that goes out from my mouth;
    it shall not return to me empty,
but it shall accomplish that which I purpose
    and succeed in the thing for which I sent it." 

 

When someone speaks the truth, they don't know how people will respond. Speaking the truth is good for its own sake, meaning that even if people respond poorly, it still makes sense to speak the truth.

 

But when someone speaks for the purpose of generating an effect, then they don't care about the truth of what they are saying as long as it generates the desired effect. It appears that God is saying here that God speaks power, not truth, in this way.

 

Since God knows for sure that speaking the truth will not convince everyone, in what way will the words of God accomplish God's purpose?

 

So these are some ways the Bible provides defeaters for Christian belief. 

Glen Scrivener points us toward arguments against Christianity

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3UfZ8WGwWY

 

Ironically, this points to a powerful argument against Christian belief in a number of ways.

1) Evolution and Christian failure. I grew up believing in creationism because that is what I was taught, according to the beginning of Genesis. But nowadays even Christians cannot deny the certainty of aspects of evolutionary theory, and Christian scholars like William Lane Craig even go so far as to say that Genesis 1-11 is "mytho history."

Why does this matter? Because Christians (in my tradition at least) were confidently wrong about evolution! If they were confidently wrong about evolution, then what else are they confidently wrong about? Christians and churches are not an infallible source of truth. The Holy Spirit is supposed to be a guide in truth, right? So what gives? Why are Christians, endowed with the Holy Spirit, so bad at reliably arriving at true beliefs?

This points to the more general point—one I credit to Graham Oppy—that Christians aren’t products of an evolutionary process designed by God to generate highly reliably true religious beliefs. How can we tell? Because of all the religious disagreement within Christianity! If God guided evolution so that humans would arrive with a strong sensus divinitatis, then why is there so little belief in the right God? Why is there so much disagreement over what God is? And at the very least, among Christians who are supposed to be products of a guided evolution aimed for truth AND endowed with the Holy Spirit who is meant to guide believers in truth, wouldn’t we expect to see a convergence onto a single denomination? Instead we find schisms, schisms, and more schisms—exactly what you would expect if naturalism were true.

2) If Christians admit that it’s likely we descended from ancestral species a hundred or so thousand years ago as a product of millions of years of evolution, then Christians admit that millions of years’ worth of starvation, predation, parasitism, and all manner of horrors were used by God to create us. Why? Why not create us in a better way?

3) Evolutionarily convenient beliefs (ECBs) are a problem for Christians too if evolution is true. If Christians admit that evolution is true, then they admit that they may believe in Christianity not because it’s true, but because religious belief is selected for. It is correct that we ought to be suspicious of ECBs, and that includes religious beliefs!

Indeed, thanks to evolution, naturalism has access to a beautifully simple theory that unites all religious belief under one explanation. Humans are religious for reasons such as the following:

a) Humans are fundamentally biological;

b) So humans are fundamentally sexual;

c) So humans are fundamentally social;

d) Humans need resources to survive and obtaining those resources alone is difficult if not impossible in most cases, so for this reason too humans are fundamentally social;

e) So social success is a massively valuable commodity;
 

f) Religions provide social success in a number of ways, including:

f1) A common worldview,
f2) A common way of speaking and thinking,
f3) Common rituals and social activities,
f4) A way to congregate and meet spouses and for one’s children to find future spouses,
f5) Motivations for helping the less fortunate,
f6) A favorable view of those less fortunate (this doesn’t always apply, as Christians will look down on those they view to be recipients of God’s judgment),
f7) A favorable view of human nature (Imago Dei, salvation, love of God for the world), warding off misanthropy,
f8) Emphasis on forgiveness, empathy, love, and other attitudes that help interpersonal relationships;

 

g) Confidence leads to reproduction. So anything that threatens our confidence will be selected against. Ways religious belief wards off a loss of confidence in oneself and one’s future:

g1) God loves me, so I’m pretty great,
g2) God loves the world, so the world is worth fighting for,
g3) Great Commission — I have a higher purpose, smoothing over the common frustrations of life,
g4) Death is not the end — hope for the future prevents despair, depression, and pessimism,
g5) There is ultimate justice — God will judge and set the record straight. If this weren’t the case, then it might be overwhelming how unjust our world is, promoting misanthropy and pessimism,
g6) There are spiritual rewards for your struggling and perseverance. Without that promise, the pains of life might not seem worth it.
g7) God is watching over you and protecting you supernaturally — you will be successful. If instead you believe you could die at any moment for no reason, then you might feel anxious, paranoid, and dread the future.
g8) Giving up on life is not an option, as that would mean facing God’s wrath.

Not only is this theory plausible in its own right (and I’d say undeniably true at least in some respects), it explains all religions in a unified way.

If Christians go for this explanation to explain the existence of competing religions, but not their own, then they risk committing special pleading.

So Christians are motivated to reject this theory of religion and lose out on all its theoretical advantages to opt for something far more crude and ad hoc, like that other religions are caused by demons or by Molinism and God’s providence.

In my own personal journey, waking up to the fact that Christian beliefs were evolutionarily convenient was a major moment leading up to my loss of faith.

4) The argument from reason says that the naturalist has no reason for thinking that his beliefs aim toward truth, only survival. 

The alleged advantage of the Christian view is that if God guided evolution then he could aim our beliefs toward survival and truth. But naturalists do not have access to this divine guidance, and so naturalists have no reason to think that their beliefs are formed by a reliable truth-preserving mechanism.

First, there is no such advantage of Christian belief for reasons mentioned. Second, evolution does NOT provide any tension with naturalism in this way.

Why not? Because 

 

1) Accurate beliefs are selected for on a basic level (credit again to Graham Oppy for this point). If we didn’t have highly accurate beliefs about what is food and what is not, what is a predator and what is not, how to obtain the necessities of food, clothing, shelter, medicine, and so on, then we would have died off. Intelligence is required for these basically accurate beliefs, and so intelligence is selected for (and you could argue that humans in particular, due to their extreme dependence on socialization for survival, adapted a higher intelligence for language). Then, as the theory goes, once intelligence reaches a certain point, abstract thinking and critical thinking skills are unlocked.

 

So 2) with this comes self-evident beliefs. Because of my self-evident beliefs, I have certainty—direct sight—that my belief-forming processes are somewhat reliable at arriving at the truth, even abstract truths of logic, argument, and math. If they weren’t, then self-evident beliefs like that there are no married bachelors wouldn’t be possible.

But God and the resurrection of Jesus are not among those self-evident beliefs. So the starting point does not lie—cannot lie—with God and the heavy metaphysical commitments of any religion. A better starting point is with these self-evident beliefs, like: "The belief that none of our beliefs are reliably true cannot itself be reliably true." More basic principles of critical thinking—that’s where we start, and so trying to start with God and other religious commitments and from there build these basic building blocks of critical thinking is backwards. 

There are many secular ECBs. Racism, tribalism, emotionally convenient beliefs, the ignoring of uncomfortable truths that might erode one’s confidence, and delusional levels of confidence are all selected for by evolution. All ECBs absolutely should be subjected to scrutiny, regardless if they are religious or not. ECBs can be rational, but only after subjecting them to appropriate scrutiny and discovering independent reasons to believe in their truth.

To be an atheist, you don’t have to believe all atheists are right about all things all the time. Quite the contrary: an atheist can believe most atheists are dreadfully mistaken about a great many things! Christians are in the same boat. Catholics and Protestants believe the other’s side is mistaken despite being Christian. 

Seven Questions for Christians

1) Are you certain that Christianity is true?

2) If not, why not?

3) Do you believe that if someone has anything less than certainty in Christianity, then that implies they are not regenerate / born again / saved / baptized in the Holy Spirit (or whatever your description of a "true Christian" is)? Why or why not?

4) If you are certain Christianity is true, then do you feel intellectually satisfied with your answers to questions pertaining to the following doctrines:

a) The Doctrine of Divine Revelation and God's Covenants

b) The Doctrines of the Inerrancy, Infallibility, and Historicity of Scripture

c) The Doctrines of Biblical Canon, Sola Scriptura, and Hermeneutics

d) The Doctrines of Faith, Truth, the Rationality of Faith, Christian Epistemology, and Christian Methods for Discerning Truth

e) Doctrines surrounding God and God's attributes, including

i) God's existence and natural theology (arguments for God's existence),
ii) God's relationship to perfection,
iii) goodness (especially, God's goodness in light of the problems of evil, suffering, and divine hiddenness),
iv) transcendence vs immanence,
v) incorporeality,
vi) aseity,
vii) necessity,
viii) omnipotence,
ix) omniscience,
x) omnipresence,
xi) simplicity,
xii) impassibility,
xiii) immutability,
xiv) and time.

f) The Doctrines of the Trinity and the Holy Spirit

g) The Doctrines of the Incarnation and Christology

h) The Doctrine of Creation and Soli Deo Gloria

i) The Doctrine of Angels, Demons, Satan, and the Divine Council

j) The Doctrine of Man, the Imago Dei, and the Historical Adam

k) The Doctrine of Divine Providence and Free Will

l) The Doctrine of Sin, the Fall, and Original Sin

m) The Doctrine of Salvation and Sola Fide, Sola Gratia, Solus Christus

n) The Doctrine of the Atonement

o) The Doctrine of Eschatology ("The Last Things", including judgment, heaven, and hell)

p) The Doctrine of Ecclesiology (the authority and nature of the church, denominations, and church creeds)

q) The Doctrine of Sanctification, the Christian Life, and the Sacraments

5) If you are intellectually satisfied with your answers to all reasonable questions that could be asked about the above doctrines, then: 

 

5a) How could this be possible? How could you possibly be satisfied with your answers to all reasonable questions that could be asked about the above doctrines given the sheer complexity – the breadth and depth – of these questions? Have you comprehensively surveyed all alternative answers to yours and do you have principled reasons for preferring your answers to these alternatives? Have you had space in your life and the training, access to books, and time needed to think, read, and write enough to accomplish this?

 

5b) Where are these answers of yours? Have you written them down?

 

5c) Do others trained in philosophy or theology also find your answers to be satisfying? Do they have any critiques of your answers or penetrating questions about your answers? Have you addressed these critiques or questions?

 

6) On the other hand, if you are not intellectually satisfied with your answers to all reasonable questions that could be asked about the above doctrines, and indeed if you feel unsure about your position on some or all of these doctrines, then why are you certain that Christianity is true, or that Christianity makes sense or that Christianity is a coherent worldview?

 

Scratch that—why have the slightest bit of confidence at all that Christianity is true or that Christianity makes sense or that Christianity is a coherent worldview if you don't know that your best attempt to make sense of each of the above doctrines—and of how they coherently fit together—would result in success? For all you know, attempting to make sense of each of the above doctrines—and of how they coherently fit together—would result in your concluding that Christianity does not make sense – or even that Christianity is likely false. So until you have completed an investigation with such success, why not adopt a more cautious, agnostic, and open-minded mentality?

 

7) If you are certain that Christianity is true, are you willing to change your mind and have that certainty overturned?

 

Let's say there's a Muslim who is certain that Islam is true. You preach the Gospel to them, but they respond, "I'm certain that Islam is true; I have no need to read the Bible." In your mind, the Muslim is stuck in their false beliefs because of their certainty. Are you worried that you could be stuck in your false beliefs in the same way? What should the Muslim do to guarantee that they are not stuck in their false beliefs in this way? Perhaps they should adopt an open-minded way of thinking and be willing to change their mind, even their deepest beliefs about their own identity, heritage, and community—even their most cherished beliefs that they want more than anything to be true.

 

If you think the Muslim should adopt this radically open-minded attitude, do you adopt this same attitude? Have you read the Quran, or Hadith, or Sira? Have you read books written by naturalists defending naturalism (i.e. the view that there are no supernatural things) or challenging theism or Christianity? Wouldn't it be hypocritical to hold others to a standard of open-mindedness, investigative rigor, and internal scrutiny that you don't hold to yourself?

 

Christians always misunderstand my point here, so I'll try to spell it out: The question is not about the evidence for Islam versus the evidence for Christianity. The question is not "Why are you not a Muslim?" 

 

The point is about the mentality that the Muslim (who is certain that Islam is true) adopts. The Muslim adopts a mentality of certainty. Therefore, from the Christian point of view, the Muslim is stuck in their false beliefs because of their mentality. But if you are a Christian and you have the same mentality, then you are making the same mistake of being epistemically stuck that the Muslim is making. The Christian would recommend the Muslim—so that the Muslim does not get epistemically stuck—to adopt a mentality of radical open-mindedness. But the Christian who is certain that Christianity is true fails to adopt that same mentality of radical open-mindedness. And so the Christian who is certain that Christianity is true is guilty of epistemic hypocrisy—they expect Muslims (and atheists, etc.) to adopt a mentality that they refuse to adopt themselves.

Reacting to William Lane Craig's views on hell

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/dCmBMQEIOD8

God pours out His wrath against sinners, as we see in the Flood and on the day of judgment as described by Jesus and Revelation (and Paul mentions God's wrath in Romans 1). But why? What's so bad about sin? Because it alienates us from God? How does sin do that? When a child makes a mistake, does their loving parent disown them, or correct their behavior? 

If God is in control, then it's up to God whether we are alienated from Him or not. Even the New Testament depicts Jesus as eating and drinking with sinners, because just as the doctor comes for the sick, not the healthy, so does God come for the unrighteous, not the righteous (Mark 2:17). Far from pushing God away, our sin should draw God all the closer to us! That's when we need God the most, and a loving God would recognize that.

Maybe God pours out His wrath against sin because of how bad sin is, because of the pain and death that sin causes. But that demands the question: What greater source of pain than hell? If causing pain is so bad, then hell, the greatest pains with the greatest duration, is the worst evil (see David Lewis, "Divine Evil").

Jesus and Revelation paint a picture that forgiveness is impossible for the damned. Why? Either the damned are incapable of asking for forgiveness, in which case their free will has been robbed (and so the Christian cannot appeal to free will to defend the justice of hell or God's hiddenness), or they can ask for forgiveness but God refuses it, in which case God is not perfectly forgiving.

Bishop Robert Barron is wrong about some things

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUedSE78Mo0

 

1) 19:25 - "To be is to be good. Whatever is, is good." This is clearly mistaken. Imagine being a Boltzmann Brain popping into existence, experiencing constant agony, and being unable to die, forever. In that case, clearly being is not good, as being enables the bad of unending suffering. Being is not even pro tanto (to an extent) good in that case. How could it be? It's wholly bad. The idea that good and being are convertible is just a confusion of what goodness is (i.e. something phenomenally defined, like color experience).

 

2) 19:45 - Pain is certainly intrinsically bad (even if extrinsically good for survival), but ontologically positive. So evils (bad things) are not always privations.

 

To lack money is to not have money. To lack a lack of money is to have money. To lack pain is to not have pain. To lack a lack of pain is to have pain. So pain is positive, just like money. 

 

3) Evolution provides problems for religious belief for at least four reasons:

 

A) It's strange that a good God would use such horrific means to create life—the constant cycle of pain, death, and killing required of evolution.

 

B) I'm not sure how connected the Catholic church was to creationism, but certainly there was (and still is) a connection between Protestantism and creationism. But if creationism is mistaken, then it's embarrassing that Christians would be led by the Bible to false scientific beliefs. If Christians can be so wrong about something they're so confident in, despite being supposedly led by the Holy Spirit, then what other things might they be wrong about?

 

C) If Genesis 1-11 is basically myth, then what other parts of the Bible are myth or metaphor despite being traditionally taken as literal? The Eucharist, perhaps?

 

D) If evolution explains life, then we face the concern of debunking arguments. The Bible says be fruitful and multiply. Catholics reject contraception and abortion. Isn't it convenient to have exactly the pro-reproductive values we'd expect you to have were those values selected for not by truth, but by survival pressures? Why believe that those pro-reproductive beliefs / practices are true and not merely selected?

 

1:14:19 – "Religion keeps reasserting itself." But there are religions other than Christianity. How is Islam possible from a Christian perspective? A unified explanation of religion appeals to evolution. Of course religion reasserts itself; it's a pro-social system, and evolution selects for pro-social systems. Christians have to appeal to ad hoc spiritual explanations for competing religions — it's demonic activity or Satanic influence that causes other religions to arrive. But if Christians take advantage of common sense psychological, sociological, and anthropological explanations for competing religions, then how do they make Christianity an exception to these explanations? It's special pleading.

 

4) 35:20 - It's controversial to say that our being is conditional. See: "Metaphysical Rationalism" by Shamik Dasgupta, or The Case for Necessitarianism by Amy Karofsky. Klaas Kraay shows a way the theist can accept modal collapse without giving up common sense modal intuitions in "Theism and Modal Collapse", though whether an imaginable world is actually possible will depend on whether it is part of a best possible theistic multiverse.

 

5) 1:25:41 – I'm personally certain that euthanasia can be justified. You'd think that someone like Bishop Barron who emphasizes the relinquishing of the self and the refusal of "caving in" on oneself would understand how profoundly wrong it is to try to squeeze every last drop of life at all costs, as if the preservation of the self is the most important thing when it is not. The medical cases become absurd, with us spending $100,000 in medical costs to stay alive for one last week in agony or in a half-lucid state only to die in a lonely, cold, sterile hospital room. (Nevermind the exorbitant costs for longer care, money that could seriously set up the lives of the grandchildren for success. I'm not saying money is more important than life. I'm saying paying for torture is a bad deal.)

 

Common sense end of life care options are nearly non-existent in the US. It would be infinitely more humane and meaningful for us to die surrounded by loved ones, at home, awake and able to say goodbye, when we are ready. (There's the rub – who is ever ready to die? That takes a level of maturity that few people have.) Is it really God's will for us to die slow, agonizing deaths alone in hospitals? Really?

 

You'd also think that religious people who believe that death is not the end and that staying alive in this world is not all that important would be all the more accepting of an "early" death. (I put 'early' in scare quotes because 'early death' implies there was more life to live, but you can't call it living when additional "life" brings nothing but pain, incapacity, and indignity to the patient.)

 

Catholics would have us believe that Brittany Maynard was evil, corrupt, mistaken, irrational—even guilty of a mortal sin—for her choice to end her life "early" to avoid the horrors of dying from brain cancer. Nothing could be more obviously false. It takes a staggering bravery and emotional intelligence to face death head on and accept it rather than die kicking and screaming like most do. How darkly hilarious is it that the God who prohibits death with dignity would be the same God who allows brain cancer, ALS, dementia, Alzheimer's, and all manner of degenerative disease that make death with dignity morally essential?

William Lane Craig on why there aren't miracles today

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/6u_tx3fFuYU 

 

"God has given evidence sufficient for those with an open mind and an open heart, but it's sufficiently vague so as to not compel those whose hearts are closed."

 

This claim is problematic for a number of reasons.

 

1) If someone's heart is closed, then no amount of evidence would be sufficient. For example, if there were an absolute proof that Christianity is false, many Christians would probably just ignore it or claim it's not a proof because their hearts are closed to the possibility of Christianity being false. So if God wanted to prove that non-believers have closed hearts, God should provide such an overwhelming amount of evidence for His existence such that only a person with a closed heart could reject God. But we don't see that overwhelming amount of evidence. Indeed, given the problem of evil, we see an overwhelming amount of evidence that there is no loving God.

 

2) Belief does not compel a relationship. James 2:19 says "Even the demons believe". So God could make his existence undeniable knowing that mere belief is not enough for love, desire, allyship, and so on.

 

3) While belief in existence is not sufficient for a true relationship, it is, arguably, necessary. How can you have a relationship with someone who doesn't exist? How can you have a relationship with someone who might not exist? Even some Christians admit that God might not exist. So how can you act as if God does? You can only act as if God probably exists, but doesn't relationship require certainty in the existence of the beloved? Otherwise, you are only loving the idea of God, not the person (or persons) of God. But if that's right, then not only do Christians have to argue that Christianity is true, they have to argue that it is certainly true! That God certainly exists! No Christian can come close to meeting that standard.

 

4) A popular view in philosophy is called doxastic involuntarism, which is the view that we cannot choose what we believe. We cannot choose our intelligence, our background knowledge, or what arguments make sense to us. Since what we believe is a function of those things, we cannot choose what we believe. But if that's right, then all belief is compelled belief, compelled by circumstances beyond our control. God, who knows this, knows that by keeping the evidence for his existence vague he is compelling people to conclude that God does not exist, or probably does not exist, or just as likely exists as not, or only probably exists, depending on the exact psychology and circumstances of the person.

Intellectual Virtue #1 - Joe Schmid on Intellectual Virtue

The Majesty of Reason (2020)

 

"Tribalism is the dogmatic and weaponized adherence to the principles and beliefs of a social, political, or ideological group." (7)

 

"Tribalism underpins so many of the problems plaguing humanity. The devaluation and systematic murder of religious, social, and racial groups in parts of the world is fueled by the dehumanization of those outside one's ideological tribe. Tribalism is no trivial matter; its pernicious effects are witnessed on scales ranging from interpersonal communication to systematic genocide." (7)

 

"There is no doubt that the ingrained shortcomings of human nature are partially responsible for this tribalism." (7)

 

"We have lost sight of the very purpose for which dialogue and discussion exist in the first place, the very treasure upon which we base our intellectual pursuits: truth." (8)

 

"Without a recognition that truth is our aim, we see interlocutors not as fellow explorers on a journey towards a common treasure, but as villains with whom we must compete to gain status, pride, and ego-gratification." (8)

 

"Rather than fundamentally alter human nature, then, as an antidote to this dire ideological situation, the solution is a mutual recognition that we are fellow explorers who can learn from one another and seek the beautiful treasure of truth together as an enterprise of curiosity, respect, and love. It is only through valuing and loving others, encouraging critical and reflective thought, and aiming ourselves toward truth that we can solve the polarizing problems afflicting humanity." (8)

 

"How do we, as explorers, as seekers, proceed on this journey? . . . The first step on our journey lays the foundation for the ensuing steps. It equips you with the intellectual virtues and conversational tactics necessary for critical thinking. . . . Without cultivating the dispositions of curiosity, humility, open-mindedness, a love for truth, and more, a proficiency in argumentation is groundless and without direction." (9)

 

"The foundation of critical thinking is virtue. Virtues are (i) stable traits or characteristics that (ii) one develops through acts, habits, and character formation with (iii) some intrinsically valuable telos (end, purpose, goal). A morally virtuous person consistently strives for the telos of moral perfection through continued action and habituation towards doing good and avoiding evil. An intellectually virtuous person consistently strives for truth and greater understanding through various habits of the mind – intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, and so on." (11) (Emphasis in bold is mine.)

 

"Here is a brief survey of some of the most important intellectual virtues that will serve as the foundation for the rest of the book (and, hopefully, for the rest of your life)." (11)

 

Emphasis in bold is mine in the following quotes: 

 

"Being intellectually humble involves recognizing the limitations of your knowledge and abilities. . . . intellectual humility is the willingness to say 'I don't know,' . . . and 'I might be wrong' in the appropriate circumstances." (11)

 

"Intellectual curiosity refers to the flaming passion . . . one has for discovering truths . . ." (11)

 

". . . intellectual perseverance is a committed rejection of intellectual laziness. Those with intellectual perseverance see barriers, hardships, and obstacles in their intellectual life as challenges to be overcome and opportunities for growth. Instead of giving up their pursuit of truth when it gets tough, they dig even deeper into the issues . . ." (12)

 

"Developing intellectual responsibility is a matter of taking charge of your pursuit of truth. Intellectually responsible individuals try to minimize deferring their beliefs to the hands of authority figures; instead, they seek to equip themselves with justification, arguments, evidence, and reasons." (12)

 

"Being open-minded is not a matter of believing that every single alternative position is equally probable. On the contrary, it is the willingness to examine such alternative positions in order to critically evaluate their rational and evidential merit. Being open-minded is all about a willingness to consider alternative viewpoints and to recognize, where appropriate, that one's own position might be mistaken." (12)

 

"We are all susceptible to confirmation bias – the tendency to selectively attend to . . . evidence that support[s] . . . our pre-existing beliefs and downplay . . . evidence that contravene[s] them. But a genuine love – dare I say adoration – for truth can help combat confirmation bias. Don't make defending a position your primary aim in intellectual pursuits; instead, make discovering truth your foremost goal." (12-13)

 

Schmid goes on to give us tips for productive conversation. He writes,

 

"Intellectual virtues are, once again, the foundation of critical thinking. However, they provide little guidance on how to have productive, fruitful, truth-oriented conversations . . . Intellectual virtues are all about directing oneself . . . to the telos of truth. But conversations are a step beyond that, since they implicate others in the pursuit of truth. Intellectual virtues are about action; conversations are about interaction." (13)

 

He continues: 

 

"It stands to reason, then, that the intellectual virtues will be limited in their utility when it comes to conversations. For this reason, I've compiled a number of tips . . . useful in facilitating the productive exchange of ideas." (13)

 

I will briefly paraphrase the 22 tips given (note that when I give verbatim quotes I am not necessarily quoting the entire tip):

 

1) Don't judge people for being biased for their current views. Work to mitigate bias, but don't view it as a personal failing when bias is a universal feature of human nature.

 

2) Emphasize agreement over disagreement.

 

3) Recognize that you and your interlocutor are on the same team with the shared goal of getting closer to the truth.

 

Question: This is not always the case. If you suspect that a person is not a genuine truthseeker, what do you do then? Avoid conversation with them? In some cases that's impossible, such as when confronted by friends and family on issues. Folks who lack intellectual virtue are, by all appearances, not truthseekers. I suppose the only thing to do then is preach the good news of intellectual virtue. If that doesn't go anywhere then there's no point in conversation at that point.

 

4) Be prepared to learn from your interlocutor. Don't enter a conversation expecting only to show off your superior knowledge.

 

5) Say you don't know something when you don't know it.

 

I would add: It's okay to use language like: "I'm aware of X topic / idea / author / book / paper, but I still need to research it and think more about it." Or, "While such and such is not clear, these other things are clear, and we can deal with the unclear stuff later."

 

That way you don't let your ignorance just hang awkwardly in the air; you acknowledge it and acknowledge a path forward for how you can deal with that ignorance, and acknowledge the bits of knowledge you do have around the gaps. You can also refocus the conversation and say "I don't know X or such and such is not yet clear, but that's not relevant to the task at hand." 

 

6) "It's okay . . . to be certain on some positions, but it should be somewhat rare." (14)

 

I have wondered whether one could make sense of a certain view of certainty where you can be certain and yet still open to changing your mind. The default view is that if you are certain then that just means you are not open to having your mind changed. But on another view of certainty, to say I am certain of something is just to say that I currently cannot imagine being wrong about that thing. I'm willing to entertain arguments for an opposing view because maybe they will change my imagination.

 

This way you get to have it both ways: you can be both certain and open-minded. Example: I am certain that if you have two objects, and combine them with two more objects, then you will have four objects. I cannot imagine this not being the case. But if someone believes differently (say, a nominalist who believes that truthmaker maximalism is false and that there are no truthmakers for mathematical statements), then I'm willing to hear them out because they might change my imagination.

 

7) Create a respectful environment where truth and love take center stage.

 

8) Place yourself in the shoes of your interlocutor and humanize them, and try to take on their point of view to better understand why they believe as they do.

 

9) "Ditch the caricatures."(14) Don't let stereotypes affect the way you treat your interlocutor. Here I think of how Christians can be stereotyped as ignorant and irrational, and atheists can be stereotyped as selfish and evil.

 

Does this mean Christians have to reject Romans 1 when dialoguing with atheists? 

 

NRSVUE: "18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those who by their injustice suppress the truth. 19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. 20 Ever since the creation of the world God’s eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been seen and understood through the things God has made. So they are without excuse . . ."

 

How can Christians "ditch the caricature" when the Bible itself caricatures atheists? "God has made it plain to them"? "they are without excuse"? Also, it's straight up false that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those who by their injustice suppress the truth." If we take this meaning more generally, how much propaganda, lying, deception at the hands of businesses and governments has gone unpunished? There is a lot of suppression of truth out there, but I don't see one iota of God's wrath.

 

10) Avoid echo chambers and immerse yourself in varying viewpoints and ways of thinking.

 

11) Focus the conversation on exploring ideas rather than exposing the mistakes of your interlocutor's view. Your goal should be discovering what's true, not "defeating" an opponent.

 

12) Try not to score points or "win" a debate. Instead, aim for mutual understanding.

 

13) Modify your language to deescalate tension. I would add: avoid accusatory statements, which often begin with the word "you." Instead, use "I" statements and focus on what you believe and why. Try to avoid placing your interlocutor on the defensive or making them feel attacked.

 

14) Be virtuous and aim for truth and love.

 

15) "Try not to sew your worldview or position into the very fabric of your own being. Your value is not tied to the positions you take. If you can (at least temporarily) separate yourself from the position you take, arguments against the position in question won't be seen or felt as personal attacks." (16)

 

a) I can imagine keeping a distance to the odd philosophical argument or position. It's harder to imagine keeping a distance to your entire worldview. But that is exactly what's required – after all, your worldview could be mistaken, and to test your worldview you must step outside of it and subject it to critique as if an outsider.

 

However, there are some positions that cannot be separated from the self. The view that there is a self, for example, which is a (surprisingly) controversial view, cannot, as far as I can see, be separated from the self.

 

b) I would argue that your value is tied to the positions you take, which is exactly why so much is at stake in philosophy of religion discussions. Our value is at stake! If I am an immortal being who will live forever in a blissful heavenly realm, then my value is infinite. But if I am a mortal being who dies and stays dead forever, then my value is finite. [This is why there is so much at stake in metaethical discussions too! Some folks argue against value realism. –01 July 2025]

 

16) Be a good listener and be fully present and not distracted. "If the occasion is right, re-state the point made by your dialectical partner. This shows that you are genuinely listening to them, which de-escalates tribalism. Also be sure to ask, respectfully, 'Is this what you mean?'" (16)

 

17) Philosophy is best done slowly. I would add: it's okay to go over the same concepts, ideas, and arguments over and over again in philosophy. In philosophy ideas are worth revisiting time and time again. There's always something to add or correct.

 

18) Steelman, don't strawman. I would add: this is what it means to place yourself in your interlocutor's shoes and try to see things from their point of view. This is also known as charity, where you interpret your interlocutor's position in the best of lights. Defeating a strawman means nothing. It's only when a view, in its best form, is shown to be mistaken that you can rationally reject it.

 

19) Speaking of charity, be charitable! How extremely frustrating is it when someone construes your words to mean something horrible that you didn't mean? Don't do that.

 

20) Maintain civility and respect. If this cannot be done, then walk away from the conversation.

 

21) Do not psychologize your interlocutor. 'Psychologizing' refers to when you try to explain why someone believes what they do by psychoanalysis. This involves dismissing the reason and evidence given for their view.

 

Recently I saw an example of this mistake made by Lee Strobel, where in an interview he talked about how famous atheists had poor relationships with their fathers, suggesting that we can psychologize atheism away as a result of "daddy issues". This is a mistake because it ignores the very real arguments that atheists, and naturalists more broadly, have offered for atheism and naturalism, arguments that Lee Strobel certainly has not come close to defeating.

 

I think psychologizing is perfectly fine, and even necessary for explaining human behavior and belief. Where it becomes a "fallacy" is when the psychoanalysis is just straight up wrong. If an atheist is convinced that the problem of evil succeeds, then the correct psychoanalysis will involve the intellectual experience provided by an argument from evil.

 

Atheists make this mistake too: they will say that Christians believe what they do because of wishful thinking. That fails to account for the fact that at least some Christians believe Christianity is true because they read the New Testament and are convinced that what they are reading is true history, that Jesus really did die and raise from the dead, that Paul really was visited by God on the road to Damascus, and that the authors of the New Testament accurately recorded what happened, at least accurately enough to justify a general Christian belief that God exists, sent Jesus to die for our sins, and resurrected Jesus as a sign of the resurrection to come for those who place their faith in Jesus. [In fact, you could accuse atheists of wishful thinking – wishing that they would not be judged by God for their moral failings. -01 July 2025]

 

I would add: one of the worst mistakes you can make as an interlocutor is, sadly, one of the most common mistakes, known as 'mindreading' or 'gaslighting' (this applies to psychologizing too), which is when you assume you know someone's inner mental life better than they do, or you assert yourself as a greater authority of someone's feelings and beliefs than they are. It can be a form of gaslighting because it involves trying to make someone appear confused about their own mental states; it basically amounts to an accusation of self-deception or failure of self-understanding. It's similar to "putting words in someone's mouth".

 

Christians can make this mistake because of Romans 1, which suggests that non-believers either really believe there is a God, as creation makes it obvious that God exists such that there is no excuse for non-belief, and that non-believers are somehow deceiving themselves or failing to be honest about why they really reject God, or non-believers are just really stupid (somehow in a way that morally implicates them).

 

Again, we see how the Bible gets in the way of being intellectually virtuous. This verse in particular is problematic. It appears to commit the Christian to engage in the worst mistake you can make in informal reasoning where you assume to know your interlocutor better than they know themselves.

 

22) "Arguments are not weapons and are rarely knock-down. Recognize room for rational disagreement." (17)

 

I agree that 1) you should never use arguments as weapons to attack someone or bully them or insult them, and 2) that arguments are rarely so strong that they guarantee the truth of the conclusion, because the premises can almost always be challenged. But I'm not sure there is always room for rational disagreement, depending on our definition of 'rational.'

 

Let's say I become convinced that arguments from evil succeed in showing that it's incredibly unlikely that a perfect God exists. It would be very strange for me to admit both that 1) God very likely doesn't exist and 2) There is no mistake in believing in God. If God likely doesn't exist then of course there is a mistake in believing in God.

 

If I believed in God and then stopped believing because of arguments and evidence, then clearly I am saying to myself that there are good reasons to doubt God's existence such that it would be irrational for me to continue believing. The "for me" caveat is key. Maybe it's consistent to say that it would be irrational for me to believe in God given what I believe about arguments from evil, but I don't have to believe that it's irrational for other people to believe in God because their beliefs don't commit them to the same conclusions as mine do.

 

However, surely I believe that the reasons why I have the beliefs I do, and thus the commitments I do, are good reasons, reasons worth having. Good reasons are, perhaps among other things, true. If someone says "I believe in God because God is necessary to make sense of the origin of consciousness, the universe, and biological life", those are only good reasons to believe if it is in fact true that God is necessary to make sense of those things. If those claims turn out to be false, then they turn out to not be good reasons.

 

Whether someone is rational, on one interpretation, comes down to whether that person has actually good reasons, and thus true reasons, for why they believe as they do. If we believe philosophy allows us to discover truth, then we should be prepared to say that philosophy allows us to discover which reasons were good or bad all along, and thus which positions were reasonable or unreasonable all along. If I change my mind on God's existence, then I am admitting that the reasons for believing in God were not good even while I believed. Those reasons turned out to not be good after all, which is why I later changed my mind and lost belief in God. It just sounds to me like a straight contradiction to say both that there are no good reasons to believe in God and that belief in God is rational.

 

There is this sense in which I wasn't irrational for believing in God: When I believed in God, I wasn't believing out of wishful thinking (actually, I think that was a part of it, but not the whole story), but I was believing out of what makes sense and what I thought must be true. I thought that the idea of the world being a total accident didn't make sense and that therefore there had to be a creator. That is, in a sense, a reasonable view. I was believing on the basis of arguments, in an intellectually virtuous way, which made it more likely that I would be believing what's true or at least capable of uncovering and correcting my false beliefs.

 

I agree that there is room for rational disagreement in this sense, in the sense that you can't blame someone for believing as they do. More specifically, you can acknowledge problematic, intellectually vicious ways of believing (these are, in a sense, blameworthy) in contrast to reliable, intellectually virtuous (blameless) ways of believing. You can acknowledge that there are intellectually virtuous (blameless) people on opposing sides of a debate. But that doesn't mean one side isn't more reasonable at the end of the day. What we are trying to discover is exactly that: which side is the one with better reasons to believe. Just because you are blameless doesn't mean you are not ignorant or mistaken.

 

The problem is that 'irrational' is so often used as an insult. So for the sake of productive conversations, it's best to never accuse someone of being irrational, or to accuse someone's view as an irrational view. Instead it's best to focus on reasons: I believe such and such because... and "What reasons do you have for thinking that that must be true?"