Showing posts with label Liz Jackson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Liz Jackson. Show all posts

Thursday, April 23, 2026

Liz Jackson on Romans 1

Liz Jackson writes ("Permissivism About Religious Belief", https://philpapers.org/rec/JACPAR-11):
 
In Romans 1:20, St. Paul writes, “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—God’s eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.” Given passages like this one, those in the Christian tradition might argue that theism is not a permissive case. Paul seems to be arguing God is clearly seen from creation (and in a later passage, the moral law). From this, some conclude that theistic belief is rationally required of most or all of us, given the evidence.
 
In reply, my arguments in this chapter are consistent with a relatively straightforward reading of Paul in this passage (and similar passages). In Paul’s time, people had drastically different evidence that more clearly pointed toward theism. When Paul was writing, belief in God and/or the supernatural was extremely common and widespread (perhaps the divine hiddenness problem wouldn’t have gained much traction in the first century!) People spent much more time in nature, staring at starry skies and breathtaking sunsets; today, much more time is spent walking around concrete jungles and staring at computer screens. Furthermore, as Charles Taylor (2017) argues, the Reformation, Enlightenment, and Romanticism involved deep cultural and intellectual transformations that gave rise to a much more secular society. My arguments in this chapter regard our current evidential situation, and while I maintain that permissivism about theism is supported by the widespread historical disagreement about God’s existence, I don’t claim that permissivism about theistic belief extends to all historical periods, places, and times.
 
I see a few issues with this response to Romans 1. First, Christians usually believe in some form of inerrancy and inspiration: Because the Bible is inspired by the Holy Spirit, anything it teaches to be true is true. (I acknowledge Randal Rauser's thesis of providential errantism and set that aside.) Combine this with the interpretation that Paul is teaching us that those with non-belief are without excuse and you arrive at the interpretation that this is an inspired and therefore inerrant teaching of the Bible.
 
Even if Paul is saying something from the point of view of his time and place, the Holy Spirit can inspire teachings that are applicable well into the future, and modern Christians usually see themselves as reading something that was in a sense meant for them. Very few Christians, in fact this is probably a heresy, see the Bible as a fossil or snapshot of a particular time and place—this would basically be a rejection of inspiration.
 
There's two aspects of the Holy Spirit view of scripture: The Holy Spirit guides the authors of the Bible to write from their own perspective in a way that includes layers of meaning and timeless truths applicable to future generations, and the Holy Spirit guides the modern Christian to the knowledge that a particular interpretation of a passage applies to the modern Christian and their life despite the gap in time and culture. Viewing the Bible as a fossil would mean to jettison both aspects of the Holy Spirit view of scripture. So a very natural and Christian way of interpreting Romans 1 is that its teaching applies for all time.
 
Second, Paul says since the creation of the world . . . from what has been made . . . This kind of language has a universality to it. We look at the time interval from the creation of the world to Paul's time; Paul says God's attributes have been obvious in that interval. It would be strange for God's attributes to be obvious for such a long interval, but suddenly change in the comparatively negligible interval of Paul's time to ours. (And sure, Paul's phrasing of "since creation" need not be literal, but this applies even if we think of it as "since human civilization" or "since humans began believing in gods".)
 
Plus, if God's attributes are made obvious by "what has been made", then there is no relevant difference from Paul's time to ours. Paul is surely citing objects of creation like the starry sky, the planets, the trees, the animals, the sun and moon, and humanity. We have all these today, but it's not at all obvious that any of this were made by a perfectly loving God. For some of us, it's painfully obvious that a perfectly loving God almost certainly does not exist because of what has been made: death, war, disease, murder, poverty, and so on. While Christians view these as accidents of sin, for some of us it's apparent that the systems of our world systematically produce these evils. This is perhaps most apparent with the evils of evolution, and the predation, starvation, parasitism, and mass amounts of death it took to create us.
 
If anything, because we have more rigorous philosophical arguments for God from fine-tuning, the inference from "what has been made" to God's existence should be more powerful than ever, and so all the more are modern humans without excuse in their non-belief in God. And yet we also have more rigorous philosophical arguments from evil, and for some of us the problem of evil trumps the argument from fine-tuning, and it's not a remotely close contest.
 
Third, what Paul says is arguably false even in his own time. For much of human history, humans believed in multiple gods, and didn't necessarily believe in a singular all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator. So it's just not true that most groups of people have clearly seen the workings of a singular God; many, maybe most, interpret creation as the workings of multiple gods.
 
Plus, even for Jewish people and Christians, who both believe in a singular God, they strongly disagree who this God is. Christians believe Jesus is God incarnate, while Jewish people strongly disagree. God's invisible qualities have been clearly seen – including the invisible qualities of begetting the Second Person of the Trinity or "spirating" the Third Person of the Trinity? Not at all.
 
Even Christians disagree among themselves, with some viewing the Holy Spirit as a person in some sense separate from the Father and Son, and others viewing the Holy Spirit as something more like a force or essence that is not separate from the Father or Son; or some viewing Jesus as purely man while others view Jesus as both man and divine. How many heresies were there in the first few centuries leading up to the Councils and Creeds?
 
Even if you extend the idea of God to the Greeks like Plato and Aristotle, it's obvious from the Greek texts that this conception of God is radically different from the God that Christians believe. So it's very misleading to say everyone in antiquity believed in God or gods as if there were anything resembling a consensus as to what that means.
 
If the conception of God or gods is radically different between cultures, and Christians are the only ones who got it right, then it's not true that since the creation of the world God's attributes have been known. It's only thanks to the events of the Old Testament and the recent events of the Gospels that we now know the most important attributes of God, namely that God incarnated and died for our sins and you must have faith in Jesus, the incarnation of the Father (if you are a binitarian) or the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity (if you are a trinitarian) or a man who is somehow special enough to die for our sins but whose righteousness only imputes to us if we have faith in him? (if you are a unitarian?). God's attributes are related to our salvation, and so the lack of consensus among Christians as to how salvation works means even Christians haven't seen God's attributes. Invisible qualities indeed. Besides, many Christians emphasize God's ineffability; no one has a mind great enough to grasp God to any serious degree, which just is to say that God's invisible qualities have not been clearly seen at all.
 
Because Christians made up a tiny minority in Paul's time, Paul must have had a broader understanding of God when orating what became Romans 1. But if that's right, then Paul is not speaking from this local perspective, but is speaking universally; God's eternal power and divine nature have been seen by everyone, so that everyone is without excuse. Why assume that Paul is making an exception for future generations? And if you're not assuming this, then you grant that Paul could be, for all you know, applying what he's saying to future generations too, and so you should at least be agnostic with respect to whether Romans 1 is committing Christians to impermissivism.
 
Regardless, because of the problem of evil, God's eternal power and divine nature, even in some broad sense, haven't been seen by everyone. If anything, what has been seen by everyone is either God's non-existence or God's permitting of evils that for the life of us we cannot figure out why he'd permit. And when Christians, or even ex-Christians like me, try to come up with plausible theodical goods, we fail, and in my case I'm more convinced than ever that there are evils—unbearable suffering—for which there could not possibly be justifying theodical goods.
 
But putting Paul's mistakes aside, the question is whether Romans 1 commits Christians for all time to an impermissivistic attitude about the rationality of belief in God, and there's an interpretation where yes, it does, and this interpretation appears at least as solid as any other.

Tuesday, July 8, 2025

Isn't the Lockean Thesis clearly false?

Liz Jackson writes ("The relationship between belief and credence", Philosophy Compass, 2020): 
Lockean Thesis (traditional): S ought to believe p iff S has a rational high credence in p. 
    On this version of the Lockean thesis, a rational high credence is necessary and sufficient for rational belief. This does justice to the intuition that rational agents are confident in the propositions that they believe. 
    Nonetheless, worries loom. The first is the lottery paradox (Chandler, 2010; Douven, 2012; Douven & Williamson, 2006; Kyburg, 1961; Leitgeb, 2014b; Smith, 2010a; Weintraub, 2001; Weisberg, 2015, Section 5). Suppose you have a lottery ticket; uncontroversially, you should have a high credence your ticket will lose (a fair 100-ticket lottery puts your credence at 0.99, and we can increase the number of tickets). If the threshold for belief is any value short of one, then, according to the traditional Lockean thesis, there are lotteries in which you ought to believe your ticket will lose. But your ticket is not special: by the same reasoning, you should believe, of each ticket, that it will lose. Further, many think that if you should believe p and you should believe q then you should believe p and q; this is an example of a closure principle (Kvanvig, 2006; Luper, 2016). Given certain closure principles, you should believe a large conjunction: ticket 1 will lose and ticket 2 will lose and...ticket n will lose. Nevertheless, you know one ticket will win, and thus you should also believe the negation of this conjunction. But intuitively, you should not believe contradictions. In response, some have suggested that the traditional Lockean thesis is false, and you ought not believe lottery propositions, such as my ticket will lose, even though you have a rational high credence in them (Douven, 2002; Jackson, Forthcoming; Kelp, 2017; Ryan, 1996; Smith, Forthcoming; Staffel, 2015). 
Let's disambiguate the thesis:
 
*Lockean Thesis (traditional): S ought to believe necessarily p iff S has a rational high credence in p.
 
Then I should believe that each ticket will necessarily lose. But that's clearly a false belief. Each ticket will not necessarily lose, only very probably. I shouldn't believe that my ticket will lose, only that it very probably will.
 
**Lockean Thesis (traditional): S ought to believe very probably p iff S has a rational high credence in p.
 
That's better, though a) terms like 'ought' and 'rational' need to be unpacked before I understand what this thesis is saying and b) arguably it's impossible to not believe very probably p while having a high credence in p. 
 
Though that implies one cannot have credences without also having beliefs. It does seem to me that credences are by far the more complex mental state between the two, with belief being a simple and common representational mental state. Anecdotally I see folks admit to believing something (say, God's existence) much quicker than admitting to a specific confidence level in that belief.
 
Kevin Harris: Here is another question, Dr. Craig:

Greetings. In your debate with Christopher DiCarlo, he asked if you could estimate your level of confidence in your belief in God, and that if your belief was as likely as a universe with no God, or if it was higher. You said your belief was higher than 50/50 but that you had no way of measuring whether it was highly probable or not. Wouldn’t this seem to be of utmost importance to the question and what you have spent your life debating? How on Earth are we to accept that you find the existence of a God more probable when you have no way of knowing what more probable means?

Dr. Craig: Well, wait a minute. I never said I don’t have any idea of what more probable means. For something to be more probable than not means you have a greater than 50% chance of being true. Right? That’s what it means to be “more probable.” What I’ve refused to do is to quantify it and to say I am 75% certain or it is 83% certain that God exists or 99% certain. I think anybody who does try to put those kind of numbers on it is being disingenuous, and you ought to be very suspicious. The fact is we can talk, I think, in only rough terms about this, and saying “I think it is very probable that God exists” or “more probable than not.” Things of that sort. I think that is quite acceptable.

So Craig is happy to say that he believes in God and is happy with vague language like "It's more likely than not that God exists" or "It is almost certain that God exists", but Craig doesn't like giving specific numbers to it, because of how arbitrary that would be.

KEVIN HARRIS: . . . The first thing that kind of struck me that I wanted to run past you is he said, “We should be formulating theism and atheism in terms of confidence levels from zero percent to 100 percent, not in terms of belief.” Kevin really complimented you on building systems.[3] He wants to build a system here it seems – a philosophical system, systematic theology, systematic philosophy. But the argument itself is going to require confidence. Are you confident in the confidence?

DR. CRAIG: I'm not! And I made that point over and over again. I have no confidence whatsoever in his claim that in order to believe in God I need to have a probability significantly higher than 51%. He gave no argument for that other than just an example. He gave an illustration that he thinks it is 51% probable that Hillary Clinton will win the presidential election. But that is not enough for him to believe that she will win. Well, fine, that is just an illustration. But in many other cases, 51% might be enough for a person to believe in something, especially (as William James pointed out) if this is a pressing conclusion that imposes itself upon you and is a matter of great urgency and importance, William James argued that in a case like that you are perfectly rational to believe in something even without evidence. This is James' famous essay, “The Will to Believe.” This idea that in order to believe something you have to be significantly more than 51% confident in it, I think is person-relative and subjective. For some people that might be true, for other people it might not. For some beliefs it might be true, but for other beliefs (as James said) it may not. 
Rejecting the Lockean Thesis has the consequence that even if something is incredibly likely to happen, say a 99% chance of rain, you can't believe that it will rain. But isn't that crazy? You totally can plan as if it will rain, act as if it will rain (toss an umbrella into your car before you drive off, etc.).
 
But of course it's silly to believe both that there is a less than 100% chance of something happening and that it will necessarily happen. Instead, you believe that there is a 99% chance of rain or that it's very likely to rain. And such probabilistic beliefs perfectly justify the same actions, or at least extremely similar actions, as the actions justified by full belief (belief in the necessity of or certainty of). 
 
I'm not sure Craig is correct when he says the threshold for belief is context-dependent. But I think acting as if something will happen need not require belief. Craig mentions William James' idea of the leap of faith. But the person who leaps the gap to escape the avalanche does not believe that they will make the jump. All they need to believe to make sense of jumping is that jumping is better than doing nothing. It's not that the bar of belief is lowered based on context, it's just that what you believe changes based on context. The desperate skier who makes the jump doesn't jump because he or she believes they will make it or will very likely make it (like in ordinary circumstances), but, again, only that jumping is better than doing nothing.
 
A standard definition of belief is given by Liz Jackson in the article:
 
"To believe something is to regard it as true or take it to be the case . . ."
 
But this can sound like: "To regard something as true is to regard it as true" or "To believe something to be the case is to believe it to be the case", both tautologies. The point being that defining 'believe' in terms of 'regarding' or 'taking' (or 'accepting' or 'assenting to') doesn't seem helpful. (I'm not saying Liz Jackson's definition of belief is not helpful; I'm sure she could give a much better gloss on 'belief'; it's the standard definition that is not helpful.) 
 
So I lean toward the view that 1) Propositions are representational (i.e. propositions claim a match between external properties and "internal" properties; if there is a match then the proposition is true, if there is a mismatch then the proposition is false); 
 
2) Non-propositional beliefs are representational via mental states (i.e. the internal properties are internal to a mental state, not to a proposition);
 
3) Propositional beliefs are representational via propositional attitude (the internal properties are internal to the proposition that corresponds to the belief; OR the internal properties are internal to a mental state which corresponds [contains? represents? constitutes?] to a proposition);
 
4) Truth itself is representational, connecting truth and belief;
 
5) Beliefs do not come in degrees in the sense that you can partially believe something, but beliefs do come in degrees in the sense that you can believe in stronger or weaker claims;
 
6) In the case of believing p, not only do we believe p in the sense that our mental states represent (or attempt to represent) reality as described by p (details to be specified), but we also believe whether p is (epistemically) necessarily true or probably true (or lack such a belief, or only believe dispositionally that p is necessary, etc). Credences are levels of confidence, and are beliefs about how likely p is true. Beliefs and credences appear to come apart because the belief that p and the belief (or dispositional belief) that p is necessary (or 10% probable or highly probable, etc.) come apart, and because the additional modal belief or probability belief is not necessary to hold the belief (which is why Craig can believe in God without believing that God's existence is X% likely; granted, Craig probably believes it's not epistemically necessary that God exists).
 
Jordan Peterson infamously struggles to answer the question of whether God exists, and complains about vagueness over terms 'God' and 'exists'. (Which is fine as long as you proceed to offer some help in defining those terms, as otherwise you announce that you don't have anything thoughtful to say.) I suspect Craig similarly struggles to give God's existence an explicit percentage because of problems of vagueness. Precise attitudes don't fit imprecise propositions. There's also the problem of the complexity of the question. The more complicated a debate is, the harder it is to feel confident not only that one position is right, but it's harder to feel confident that you even understand what the debate really amounts to (is the debate itself based on false assumptions? e.g. like when 'nature' is falsely pitted against 'nurture' for explaining human behavior) and what it would mean to take a stand on one position versus another.