Florence Bacus on grounding value in conscious states and on what morality is

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zjflulzeAU

 

What morality is:

 

28m: ". . . without God, what is morality? So I think morality is just rational action independent of desire. . . . There are times where the reason I ought to do something is because it achieves some further end, but then there are cases, at least if morality is real, where you ought to do something regardless of whether you antecedently desire that end."

 

29m: "If you understand morality as something else, then okay that's fine, you're answering a different question from me. But I find myself in cases where I do various things just because I want to get what I want, and I wonder are cases where I should act a certain way even if it doesn't get me what I want in any respect. So if you're gonna tell me that I ought to do something, either you're telling me I can get what I want—and then I would say yeah, that's an important question, but it's not morality—or you might say I ought to do something regardless of what I want, and I would say okay yeah, I want to figure out what that is, that's what I call morality."

 

Florence goes on to accept a form of Kantianism. I reject Kantianism quite thoroughly, so it's no surprise that my value theory would differ from Florence's value theory as discussed in the next section.

 

I don't think there can be a categorical imperative, so the core questions of morality are different for me. People, including myself, tend to live their lives believing certain things about themselves, like that they are a good person, that their beliefs are true, and so on. Part of one's self-conception is that these beliefs that one has about the world and oneself are not totally, radically incorrect. Here's the problem: Your beliefs about the world and oneself are totally, radically incorrect. At least, they might be. Mormons, Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and naturalists cannot all be right. If naturalism is true, then the beliefs of Mormons, Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims are profoundly false. There is an implicit desire present for all these people who go about believing that their beliefs about the world and about themselves are basically true: they don't want to hold profoundly false beliefs about the world and themselves. They want to believe what's true about the world and about themselves. That will include truths about the nature of morality and what it means to be a good person.

 

So many people, arguably all people, myself included, hold the following desire within themselves: "I want to believe what's true about morality. I want to believe what's true about right and wrong, so that I can do what's right and not do what's wrong. I want to desire what I ought to desire, and not desire what I ought not. I want to know what it means to be a good person so that I can become that kind of person."

 

This changes the framework quite a bit from the picture Florence paints. Morality is not about being rationally obligated to do something completely irrespective of what I want, but morality is, just like epistemology, about reconciling my beliefs to reality. If I believe rightly, I will desire and act rightly. Morality is not about acting against my desires for the sake of the greater good, but about adjusting my desires to be aligned with what the greater good actually is.

 

(Feel free to replace 'greater good' for something more deontic sounding like: for the sake of acting from a good will, or promoting the kingdom of ends, or treating people as ends unto themselves, or acting freely, or fulfilling obligations, or doing what I am rationally obligated to do, or doing what's right because it is right, or for the sake of moral goodness – basically, for the sake of right action broadly speaking.) 

 

Grounding value in conscious states: 

 

22m: "If we're going to assess the realist view that grounds [value] in the intrinsic goodness of states of consciousness, and I want to say no, [things are] only good because people prefer them, we'd want to look at a case where the two come apart. So, a case where a state of consciousness is good, but a person doesn't prefer it, or a state of consciousness is bad but a person doesn't disprefer it."

 

When Florence uses the term 'good' or 'bad', I don't know what these are supposed to mean. If these mean 'preferred' and 'dispreferred', then it's a tautology to say that good experiences are preferred experiences. Maybe the question is: Is there any analysis of good/bad on which a good experience can be dispreferred?

 

Yes. In the phenomenal analysis of good/bad where goodness/badness just are conscious states, there are cases where a state of consciousness is pro tanto good (good to a degree), but a person doesn't prefer that state because obtaining that state entails a cost that a different state doesn't.

 

There's always pro tanto desire for intrinsically good experiences, but there's also always pro tanto desire to avoid intrinsically bad experiences. There's also a pro tanto desire to obtain intrinsically better experiences; do I stay home and do something safe and comfortable, or do I go to the party and potentially have greater fun at the risk of greater discomfort?

 

So all of these calculations are warring within us, and this is why it's easy to make sense of avoidance behavior in response to something we know will feel good, and affective behavior in response to something we know will feel bad.

 

Avoidance behavior + intrinsic goodness: There are things we know will feel good but will make our lives worse in the long run. We see the intrinsic goodness and thus have a pro tanto desire for it, but we also see the cost and have a pro tanto desire to avoid that cost. Maybe this is eating junk food, procrastinating when we've got work to do, smoking a cigarette, cheating on a partner, or getting back with an ex. Despite whatever intrinsic goods these things will provide in the moment, we avoid them when we do because of the greater costs down the road.

 

Affective behavior + intrinsic badness: There are difficult conversations to be had with ourselves or with a loved one, and that pain motivates us to avoid the conversation, but we see how things will be better over all if we suck it up and push through it. Applies also to chores, self-improvement, working towards difficult and personally meaningful achievements, and undergoing medical procedures; these things can be greatly painful but we do them anyway because not doing them is even more painful in the long run.

 

Paradoxically then, I might prefer to have a difficult conversation than to eat junk food, because I know one is worth the pain while the other isn't worth the happiness. And yet the pain of having a difficult conversation is still intrinsically bad despite preferring it to eating junk food, and the happiness of eating junk food is still intrinsically good despite dispreferring it to having a difficult conversation.

 

Indeed, I don't see how to make sense of the concept of preference without first going through the intrinsic goodness / badness of experience. To prefer X over Y is to see how X is better than Y, and to see that X is better than Y is to see that X is more good than Y (however good Y happens to be). If goodness just is preference, then this is circular. But this definition of preference appears non-circular to me, which tells me that goodness isn't just preference.

 

If goodness is defined in terms of desirability, and to prefer X over Y is to have greater desire for X than Y, then I don't see how to make sense of the concept of desire without first going through the intrinsic goodness / badness of experience. To desire X is not to see X as desirable, as that's a circular definition, but to see X as good. Why do we desire? Because we experience intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness, and we desire intrinsic goodness because of what it is, and we desire to avoid intrinsic badness because of what it is. It is only because intrinsic goodness / badness have the essences they do that explains how it could be that desire exists at all.

 

Returning to preference, I don't see how to explain why my preference would be what it is without intrinsic goodness and badness. Experiences happen first, then preferences later. So preference depends on experience. But preference also depends on what I see as good or bad. So preferences depend on my good and bad experiences.

 

You might try to say that my preferences depend on what I take to be my good or bad experiences, but this just kicks the can down the road a step. Why would I take something to be good or bad? Because of the intrinsic goodness or badness that this thing constitutes as or causes. There is a difference between experiencing badness and judging something to be bad. Experiences come first, and preferences and judgments come later based on experiences. Desires qua judgments of goodness come later, but desire as affective intending is simultaneous with intrinsically good experience; you can't have a good feeling without at the same time having an affective intentionality towards that feeling, meaning having a pro tanto desire for, like, conation, motivation for, or intending toward that feeling. As discussed here (https://benstowell.blogspot.com/2026/03/there-is-conceptual-connection-between.html), while affective behavior and intrinsically good experience can come apart, affective intentionality or intending toward is conceptually connected to intrinsic goodness. We intend to pursue happiness. Why? Because of what happiness is, and that intention begins the same moment the happiness is experienced.

 

P.S. - Florence mentions being a Christian, but became an ex-Christian as of a year ago (so roughly March 2025). Being an ex-Christian myself, starting sometime in early-ish 2022, I understand what it's like to be a Christian for a long time and to feel the internal violence of being gutted of your entire worldview, being left to pick up the pieces. It's not easy, and it's traumatic, and I feel great sympathy for anyone who goes through that.

Matt Duncan on certainty

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_Odt7Mzu-4

 

32m: Duncan makes a distinction between a psychological sense of doubt and an epistemic sense of doubt. The more epistemic justification you have (whatever that is), then the less psychological doubt you should have.

 

"And I distinguish that psychological sense of doubt with this kind of epistemic sense of doubt, where it's something like you've got a very strong form of justification or something – lot of different ways to spell that out . . . 

 

Duncan goes on to discuss when we can be certain:   

 

. . . the way I prefer is that it's immune from skeptical doubt, where that means that there's no skeptical scenario consistent with the way things seems to you where the relevant thing doesn't exist."

 

34m: "[I] argue ultimately that the phenomenal properties of our experiences pass the doubt test. I mean, this is a familiar idea, you know, Descartes, I can't doubt that I exist . . . I spend a lot of Chapter 3 unpacking the epistemology there. . . there are two routes to doubt here. One is lack of acquaintance . . . But there's this other route, phenomenal indistinguishability, that still leaves room for some kind of doubt, and that's why I think acquaintance itself doesn't foreclose doubt. Now in the case of phenomenal properties, I think both routes are foreclosed. There's the acquaintance route – foreclosed – and then there's the phenomenal indistinguishability, and the reason why that route is foreclosed here is because phenomenal properties are defined and individuated by the way they seem, the way they appear. And so there couldn't be any skeptical scenario in which things appear like this and yet your different phenomenal properties are instantiated in your experience because it would just follow that things wouldn't seem like this, they would seem at least a little bit different. . . . for phenomenal properties, there really is no skeptical scenario consistent with the way things seem in which those aren't instantiated in your experience. It's really phenomenal acquaintance where we get full certainty, because both of these routes to doubt are foreclosed."

Peter Unger, "An Argument for Skepticism" – is metacertainty necessarily dogmatic?

In a previous post on certainty, I discussed Peter Unger's challenge that certainty is dogmatic. I offered a view that allows me to capture both certainty and open-mindedness. But here's a point in Unger's favor: 

 

You might argue that to assert something as being certainly true, or to assert that something certainly exists, you must also therefore assert that your analysis of what it means for something to be true is correct, or that your analysis of what it means for something to exist is correct. But you probably don't have, and shouldn't have, this further certainty, given the widespread disagreement among professionals over what it means for something to be true or to exist.

 

My solution before applies here too: by saying "I can't imagine that being false" or "I can't imagine that not existing", I am open to the possibility that it's either possible or impossible that someone could successfully imagine the truth or existence of the thing in question. If it turns out that someone can imagine the truth or existence of the thing in question, then one explanation for why they can imagine this when I can't is exactly because they have the right analysis of truth or existence when I don't.

 

But this works both ways: it may be impossible for anyone to successfully imagine the truth or existence of the thing question, and part of the explanation for this could be because the correct analysis of truth or existence entails the truth or existence of the thing in question.

Liz Jackson on Romans 1

Liz Jackson writes ("Permissivism About Religious Belief", https://philpapers.org/rec/JACPAR-11):

 

In Romans 1:20, St. Paul writes, “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—God’s eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.” Given passages like this one, those in the Christian tradition might argue that theism is not a permissive case. Paul seems to be arguing God is clearly seen from creation (and in a later passage, the moral law). From this, some conclude that theistic belief is rationally required of most or all of us, given the evidence.

 

In reply, my arguments in this chapter are consistent with a relatively straightforward reading of Paul in this passage (and similar passages). In Paul’s time, people had drastically different evidence that more clearly pointed toward theism. When Paul was writing, belief in God and/or the supernatural was extremely common and widespread (perhaps the divine hiddenness problem wouldn’t have gained much traction in the first century!) People spent much more time in nature, staring at starry skies and breathtaking sunsets; today, much more time is spent walking around concrete jungles and staring at computer screens. Furthermore, as Charles Taylor (2017) argues, the Reformation, Enlightenment, and Romanticism involved deep cultural and intellectual transformations that gave rise to a much more secular society. My arguments in this chapter regard our current evidential situation, and while I maintain that permissivism about theism is supported by the widespread historical disagreement about God’s existence, I don’t claim that permissivism about theistic belief extends to all historical periods, places, and times.

 

I see a few issues with this response to Romans 1. First, Christians usually believe in some form of inerrancy and inspiration: Because the Bible is inspired by the Holy Spirit, anything it teaches to be true is true. (I acknowledge Randal Rauser's thesis of providential errantism and set that aside.) Combine this with the interpretation that Paul is teaching us that those with non-belief are without excuse and you arrive at the interpretation that this is an inspired and therefore inerrant teaching of the Bible.

 

Even if Paul is saying something from the point of view of his time and place, the Holy Spirit can inspire teachings that are applicable well into the future, and modern Christians usually see themselves as reading something that was in a sense meant for them. Very few Christians, in fact this is probably a heresy, see the Bible as a fossil or snapshot of a particular time and place—this would basically be a rejection of inspiration.

 

There's two aspects of the Holy Spirit view of scripture: The Holy Spirit guides the authors of the Bible to write from their own perspective in a way that includes layers of meaning and timeless truths applicable to future generations, and the Holy Spirit guides the modern Christian to the knowledge that a particular interpretation of a passage applies to the modern Christian and their life despite the gap in time and culture. Viewing the Bible as a fossil would mean to jettison both aspects of the Holy Spirit view of scripture. So a very natural and Christian way of interpreting Romans 1 is that its teaching applies for all time.

 

Second, Paul says since the creation of the world . . . from what has been made . . . This kind of language has a universality to it. We look at the time interval from the creation of the world to Paul's time; Paul says God's attributes have been obvious in that interval. It would be strange for God's attributes to be obvious for such a long interval, but suddenly change in the comparatively negligible interval of Paul's time to ours. (And sure, Paul's phrasing of "since creation" need not be literal, but this applies even if we think of it as "since human civilization" or "since humans began believing in gods".)

 

Plus, if God's attributes are made obvious by "what has been made", then there is no relevant difference from Paul's time to ours. Paul is surely citing objects of creation like the starry sky, the planets, the trees, the animals, the sun and moon, and humanity. We have all these today, but it's not at all obvious that any of this were made by a perfectly loving God. For some of us, it's painfully obvious that a perfectly loving God almost certainly does not exist because of what has been made: death, war, disease, murder, poverty, and so on. While Christians view these as accidents of sin, for some of us it's apparent that the systems of our world systematically produce these evils. This is perhaps most apparent with the evils of evolution, and the predation, starvation, parasitism, and mass amounts of death it took to create us.

 

If anything, because we have more rigorous philosophical arguments for God from fine-tuning, the inference from "what has been made" to God's existence should be more powerful than ever, and so all the more are modern humans without excuse in their non-belief in God. And yet we also have more rigorous philosophical arguments from evil, and for some of us the problem of evil trumps the argument from fine-tuning, and it's not a remotely close contest.

 

Third, what Paul says is arguably false even in his own time. For much of human history, humans believed in multiple gods, and didn't necessarily believe in a singular all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator. So it's just not true that most groups of people have clearly seen the workings of a singular God; many, maybe most, interpret creation as the workings of multiple gods.

 

Plus, even for Jewish people and Christians, who both believe in a singular God, they strongly disagree who this God is. Christians believe Jesus is God incarnate, while Jewish people strongly disagree. God's invisible qualities have been clearly seen – including the invisible qualities of begetting the Second Person of the Trinity or "spirating" the Third Person of the Trinity? Not at all.

 

Even Christians disagree among themselves, with some viewing the Holy Spirit as a person in some sense separate from the Father and Son, and others viewing the Holy Spirit as something more like a force or essence that is not separate from the Father or Son; or some viewing Jesus as purely man while others view Jesus as both man and divine. How many heresies were there in the first few centuries leading up to the Councils and Creeds?

 

Even if you extend the idea of God to the Greeks like Plato and Aristotle, it's obvious from the Greek texts that this conception of God is radically different from the God that Christians believe. So it's very misleading to say everyone in antiquity believed in God or gods as if there were anything resembling a consensus as to what that means.

 

If the conception of God or gods is radically different between cultures, and Christians are the only ones who got it right, then it's not true that since the creation of the world God's attributes have been known. It's only thanks to the events of the Old Testament and the recent events of the Gospels that we now know the most important attributes of God, namely that God incarnated and died for our sins and you must have faith in Jesus, the incarnation of the Father (if you are a binitarian) or the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity (if you are a trinitarian) or a man who is somehow special enough to die for our sins but whose righteousness only imputes to us if we have faith in him? (if you are a unitarian?). God's attributes are related to our salvation, and so the lack of consensus among Christians as to how salvation works means even Christians haven't seen God's attributes. Invisible qualities indeed. Besides, many Christians emphasize God's ineffability; no one has a mind great enough to grasp God to any serious degree, which just is to say that God's invisible qualities have not been clearly seen at all.

 

Because Christians made up a tiny minority in Paul's time, Paul must have had a broader understanding of God when orating what became Romans 1. But if that's right, then Paul is not speaking from this local perspective, but is speaking universally; God's eternal power and divine nature have been seen by everyone, so that everyone is without excuse. Why assume that Paul is making an exception for future generations? And if you're not assuming this, then you grant that Paul could be, for all you know, applying what he's saying to future generations too, and so you should at least be agnostic with respect to whether Romans 1 is committing Christians to impermissivism.

 

Regardless, because of the problem of evil, God's eternal power and divine nature, even in some broad sense, haven't been seen by everyone. If anything, what has been seen by everyone is either God's non-existence or God's permitting of evils that for the life of us we cannot figure out why he'd permit. And when Christians, or even ex-Christians like me, try to come up with plausible theodical goods, we fail, and in my case I'm more convinced than ever that there are evils—unbearable suffering—for which there could not possibly be justifying theodical goods.

 

But putting Paul's mistakes aside, the question is whether Romans 1 commits Christians for all time to an impermissivistic attitude about the rationality of belief in God, and there's an interpretation where yes, it does, and this interpretation appears at least as solid as any other.

A proof against God's existence from evil would explain the sociological data

I heard the recent story of Noelia Castillo, a woman who died in Spain at 25 years old from euthanasia. She was sexually assaulted multiple times, and became paralyzed after a suicide attempt. (https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/26/europe/euthanasia-spain-noelia-castillo-latam-intl)

My argument from unbearable suffering is a suggested proof against God's existence. Proofs either for or against God's existence do not fare well in the history of ideas; they always fail to generate any kind of consensus among experts that God either must or must not exist. So chasing after proofs about God might seem like a wild goose chase.

And yet here is reason to chase after proofs. There is a strong, deep, global intuition that there is a tension between God and the evils we see.

Someone might be tempted to cite global statistics on belief in God and show that this tension must not be that strong, because a significant percentage of humans believe in God. But this statistic does not show how many of these believers are nominal, how many will come to lose faith, how many are struggling with doubts caused by evil, how many are engaging in self-deception or believe because of the comfort these beliefs bring in the face of evil.

Plus, we see religiosity dying in Western countries, and we see an inverse relationship between level of education and religiosity. This is what we expect to see if it were the case that God does not exist and if belief in God were ultimately a superstition sustained by a lack of awareness of facts about our world, and a lack of careful, critical thought – things cured by education.

When we look to the intellectual world, we see much more widespread disbelief in God. Within the intellectual world, but also very much outside of it, we see this deep and encompassing force, like a gravity, that the problem of evil exudes, pushing down belief in God.

The question is: Why does this broad, deep, powerful intuition that God and evil are incompatible exist? There are two general answers: Either this force comes from a place of widespread confusion, or comes from the truth.

I doubt this Zeitgeist comes from a place of widespread confusion. One reason why is because of how intimately familiar we are of pain and happiness. We have vivid experiences of pain and happiness. Goodness and badness are constant, everyday, familiar concepts. Another sociological fact is found in the perceived failure of theodicies and the failure of responses to evil. Even theists often remark about how poor the responses to evil and divine hiddenness are, and acknowledge how there are evils that are resistant to go-to theodicies of free will and soul-making.

Why are things like this? Why is the problem of evil so compelling? Why are responses to the problem of evil so embarrassing?

Here's an explanation: Because the problem of evil proves that God does not exist, and this wide and deep gravity that pervades everything has as its source this proof, whatever and wherever it is.

Peter Unger, "An Argument for Skepticism"

Unger's general strategy in this paper is the following:

 

Knowledge > Certainty > Severe characterization > Unreasonable.

 

That is, knowledge claims are claims of certainty, and under the severe characterization of certainty, certainty is dogmatic and unreasonable. So knowledge claims are always unreasonable.

 

I might be inclined to accept that knowledge claims are claims of certainty, and to accept that certainty under the severe characterization is unreasonable. And yet I think knowledge claims are fine. So I must give something up, and one place to look is whether the severe characterization is accurate. Unger states:

 

". . . one's being absolutely certain of something involves one in having a certain severely negative attitude in the matter of whether that thing is so: the attitude that no new information, evidence or experience which one might ever have will be seriously considered by one to be at all relevant to any possible change in one's thinking in the matter."

 

There are two separate questions here: what certainty is and when it's okay to be certain. To the latter, we might say that if the denial of p entails p, then it's okay to be certain that p. And we might say that if p is necessarily true, then it's okay to be certain that p. But this doesn't answer the first question of what does it look like to be certain of something.

 

(I've heard the distinction made between 'epistemic certainty' and 'psychological certainty', but I'll set that aside. I'll also set aside questions about what it means to believe or to have credence.) 

 

Here's a less severe characterization of certainty: I am certain that p just in case I cannot imagine p being false. This doesn't entail a dogmatic attitude, because I am open to the idea that you could change my imagination regarding p if it's really the case that you can imagine p being false. In other words, I am open to my imagination becoming like yours.

 

Now, Unger has something to say in response to this: That I basically just admitted that I'm not absolutely certain of p. After all, if I were absolutely certain of p, then I should say that there's no chance of my imagination being changed such that I come to believe differently about p. If I say there is a possibility that my imagination could be transformed such that I now see that p is false, then I admit that there is some possibility of p being false, which is to admit that I'm not absolutely certain that p is true.

 

And this exposes the commonsense definition of certainty: to be certain that p is to believe that there is a zero percent chance of p being false, or P(~p) = 0.00.

 

But the idea of psychological probability feels vague in my mind. "There is a zero percent chance of p being false to me" – What does this mean? Maybe it means, among other things: I cannot imagine p being false.

 

My response is that there are many beliefs where apparently not only can I not imagine them being false, but no one can. So if my imagination were to be changed to be like that of anyone else's, I still would not be able to imagine p being false. So this gives me the best of both worlds: I keep both my certainty and my open-mindedness. By being certain that p, I admit nothing more than that I cannot imagine p being false, but I can be open to my imagination being changed if you can imagine p being false. If you can't, then it turns out that it's not possible for my imagination to change such that I now see that p is false, at least with respect to your imagination. If no one can imagine p being false, then it turns out that it's not possible for my imagination to change such that I now see that p is false with respect to anyone's imagination.

 

The key is that I'm not assuming that there really is a chance that p is false, and that someone out there sees that p is possibly false; for all I know, no one can, has, or ever will see that p is false exactly because p cannot be false. You can't know what's not true. So if it's not true that p is possibly false, then you can't know that p is possibly false. And if you can't know that p is possibly false, then you can't see that p is possibly false. And if you can't see that p is possibly false, then you can't imagine p being false. So if p cannot be false, then you cannot imagine p being false.

 

Side note:

 

***

 

I would apply this to belief in God. We might say, initially, that we can imagine both God existing and God not existing. But if we buy the logic of ontological arguments, it will turn out either that God must exist or cannot exist. So it will turn out that p cannot be false where p is either "God exists" or "God does not exist".

 

My response is that we cannot imagine God existing if God cannot exist, or we cannot imagine God not existing if God must exist. This is not strange; many people claim to know God on a personal level, or claim to know that God exists. If it turns out that God cannot exist, then these claims will be retrospectively mistaken, just like claims about the imaginability of God will be retrospectively mistaken if God turns out to be an impossible being.

 

To give an illustration of this, let's say there's a race of beings who think they can imagine a square circle existing or not existing, and without reason to believe one side over the other, they are agnostic about square circles. One day they realize that square circles are impossible, and so they realize that they actually weren't successfully imagining square circles existing; they just couldn't yet see the impossibility of them.

 

This is where the distinction between 'epistemic possibility' and 'metaphysical possibility' is brought up: the existence of a square circle was epistemically possible to these people even while metaphysically impossible. Likewise, God's existence or non-existence can be impossible without our epistemic access to that impossibility.

 

This suggests that imagination is a success term: it's not enough to take oneself to be imagining something; you have to succeed in imagining it in some sense.

 

And maybe this implies that there are layers of imaginability, because if God turns out to be impossible and thus unimaginable, then what were believers doing while believing in and thinking about God? Either they were imagining something that is possible and incorrectly calling that God, or they were imagining something impossible, but in some superficial sense.

 

I suspect that all objects of imagination are impossible, but this comes out of my suspicion that necessitarianism is true. Only objects of experience, which are actual, are possible. Even if you imagine something and it comes to pass, what you imagine is only a rough approximation of what really comes to pass; it never could be that your vision exactly comes to pass. Same with imagining things that you know happened but weren't there to see yourself, or even with things you remember. If you remember perfectly, then it's not an object of imagination, but of experience. If you remember imperfectly, then the imperfections are products of your imagination, and thus that past event didn't happen exactly like that.

 

One thing that pulls my intuition in this direction is the fact that our imagination never has the perfect fidelity that reality has, and so for reality to truly match perfectly with our imagination, it would have to be just as fuzzy and missing in the details, which is impossible. But if this is right, then while imagination might succeed in the sense of approximating reality, it never truly succeeds. But I guess imagination as a success term was never about accurately representing reality, but rather successfully combining properties in the mind. Incoherent things can never be successfully imagined exactly because the presence of one property means the lack of the other, so the two can never be combined in the mind. So imagination can be plenty successful in this way while still producing impossible objects and events. Incoherence needn't be the only source of impossibility; nomological impossibility is another. But even if all impossibility ends up being incoherence, incompatible properties could be successfully combined in the mind due to a failure to grasp the incompatibility. Right, it's not like God's impossibility is easy to see, lest the epistemic environment be completely different to what we see. The incompatibility is only visible, the failure of imagination only occurs, when the properties are explicitly contradictory. 

 

But doesn't belief depend on imagination? Are all our beliefs technically false in this case? No, because if we allow degrees of truth, then many beliefs of ours will be practically true. Setting degrees of truth to the side, propositional beliefs that contain nothing but first-person data would still be certainly true, as they are beliefs that map perfectly onto experience. If you say that beliefs that contain nothing but first-person properties must be non-propositional, and if you allow  non-propositional beliefs, then these beliefs would still be certainly true. 

 

Side note 2:

 

Because p's being false's being impossible entails that it cannot be imagined, my inability to imagine p being false is evidence that p cannot be false. This gets tricky if I have epistemic peers who say they can imagine p being false. If these peers are nowhere to be found, then quickly the best explanation for why we cannot imagine p being false becomes because p cannot be false.

 

*** 

 

I'm just giving a simple conditional: If there really is someone who can truly imagine p being false, then, and only then, could my imagination in theory become like theirs and I have a change of mind; but even then I will remain unable to imagine p being false until my imagination has been so changed. But if it turns out that no one can truly imagine p being false, then the antecedent isn't true, and we are all stuck unable to imagine p being false. I'm being no more dogmatic than everyone else in that case.

 

This then hinges on what it means to imagine a proposition being true or false. For example, could someone imagine...

 

p = at least one thing exists.

 

...being false?

 

Let's say someone says, "Yes, I can imagine it turning out that nothing at all exists, not even one thing. I can imagine that I am guilty of a verbal mistake and confused about the verb 'exists', and it turns out that nothing does it. So I can imagine p being false."

 

Either this person is lying, mistaken, or telling the truth. I cannot imagine p being false here, so I'm stuck with my certainty that p is true. This means I also cannot imagine it being the case that this person is telling the truth.

 

But if this person is right, and they really can imagine p being false, then I grant the possibility of my imagination becoming like theirs and me having a change of mind. But if they are lying or mistaken, then there might be no such possibility, and if it's the case that anyone who similarly claims to be able to imagine p being false is also lying or mistaken, then there is no such possibility at all.

 

This way I keep both my certainty and open-mindedness. If anything, this appears less dogmatic than skepticism because it's open to certainty.

Matthew Shea: God and Happiness (Cambridge Elements, 2024) – 1.2

Note 1: Shea defines happiness as follows (pg 3):

The concept of happiness that I will use throughout this Element is the classical one that corresponds to what contemporary philosophers often call “well-being,” “welfare,” or “flourishing.” It does not mean being happy in the sense of having a cheerful personality or feeling subjectively content. Instead, it means leading a happy life. It is not an emotion or mood, but a state or way of living.

When I use the term ‘happiness’, I am referring to intrinsic goodness, which is a positive (as in ontologically positive, but also positively valenced), felt experience. So on my view, one cannot be happy while unconscious. But one can be flourishing while unconscious. A good night’s rest, or an opportune nap, is part of flourishing, and yet often entails unconsciousness. Often the word ‘pleasure’ is used where I use ‘happiness’, but I feel like ‘pleasure’ is too tangled up with notions of carnal pleasure. It doesn’t help that the view I hold—that happiness is the sole intrinsic good—is referred to in the literature as ‘hedonism’, a word tangled up with debauchery. Even though happiness is the sole intrinsic good, there are many different kinds of intrinsically good experiences, and so there are many different kinds of happiness.

Note 2: Shea says (pg 3) that his notion of happiness is a normative concept. What makes it normative? Apparently because happiness evaluates a person’s life as good or bad.

I do not view goodness or badness as normative. To me, normativity applies to oughts and shoulds. But whether something ought to be the case always, in my view, depends on a goal. And because different intrinsic goods can further different goals, there is no conceptual connection between goodness/badness and ‘should’, and so goodness and badness are not normative concepts.

For example, if a man is made happy by acting violently, then while it’s true that this happiness is intrinsically good, it doesn’t follow that this happiness ought to be. If someone’s goal is to maximize happiness, then happiness that depends on the suffering of others might fail to further this goal. And if someone’s goal is to maximize virtuous happiness, with the understanding that happiness that depends on the pointless suffering of others is not virtuous, then this sort of evil happiness clearly fails to further this goal.

Note 3: Shea writes (pg 3):

A different and popular sense of happiness takes it to be a state of mind like subjective satisfaction or positive emotions and feelings, a purely descriptive psychological condition that is not value laden. By contrast, happiness in my sense is a good: something that has positive value and is desirable and worthy of pursuit, promotion, and protection.

It appears that there’s a difference here in how I use the term ‘value’. Taking after Nevin Climenhaga, I use ‘value’ and ‘goodness’ interchangeably. I’m not sure what ‘value laden’ means here, but happiness, as I use the term, is a state of consciousness (not necessarily a state of mind if states of mind include non-conscious or subconscious states; happiness is an active conscious state in my view), and a feeling or experience, and is absolutely “value laden” in the sense of, well, being valuable, or good.

The “by contrast” bit seems to imply that the view that happiness is something felt somehow precludes happiness from being a good. Just the opposite: happiness’s being felt is what allows it to be intrinsically good.

So far, there are differences in how I understand the terms happiness, normativity, value, and good.

I remember that ‘eudaimonia’ is sometimes translated as ‘happiness’ in Plato, and so that could be where Shea is getting this usage from, but I think this is confusing. Eudaimonia is better translated as ‘flourishing’, and so what Shea calls ‘happiness’ I would call ‘flourishing’, and even then I’m sure that my preferred conception of flourishing would differ in some ways. To signify this, I will replace ‘happiness’ when Shea uses it with [flourishing] in brackets.

Note 4: Shea writes that [flourishing] is intrinsically good (pg 4). But on my view, flourishing is extrinsically good. To flourish is something like: to live as part of a system that maximizes good happiness and good pain and minimizes evil happiness and evil pain. Only happiness is intrinsically good, and flourishing is a state of optimized happiness.

 

We can also refer to good happiness as ‘virtuous happiness’, good pain as ‘virtuous pain’, evil happiness as ‘vicious happiness’, and evil pain as ‘vicious pain’. The idea is that the kind of happiness that leads to greater long-term happiness for yourself and those around you is virtuous – it doesn’t compromise your character, and is the kind of happiness of which a virtuous person would approve.

Note 5: Apparently Richard Taylor defines [flourishing] as:

“having achieved fulfillment or having been blessed with the highest personal good . . . the kind of good that normally takes a lifetime to attain.”

But on my view ataraxia, a deep sense of existential peace and contentment, is the highest personal good. Ataraxia is difficult to achieve, but, the idea goes, the longer someone spends in eudaimonia, or something close to eudaimonia, the more likely it is that they will achieve it. And so while eudaimonia is a great good, it is ultimately subservient to the even greater goal of achieving ataraxia for as many people as possible.

Note 6: Shea makes a distinction between something being intrinsically good for someone versus something being intrinsically good period. Something can make “the world a better place even if it has no relation to any individual.” This is impossible on my view. The concept of ‘better’ is ultimately phenomenal, just like the concept of goodness more generally. So it’s impossible for something to be better without being better for someone. Nothing is magically good; all good things are good for a reason. To say that something can be good in a vacuum sounds to me like saying that it’s good for no reason. The phrase “good for nothing” applies here. If something is good for nothing then it’s not good.

Note 7: Because there are four types of goodness on my view (intrinsic, extrinsic, saving, and success), a person’s life can be good in different ways. But I imagine the child in the story of Omelas, the one being tortured so that the city’s inhabitants can flourish. This child does not live a good life. No sane person wants to live this child’s life. And yet the child’s life does, in the magical context of the story, produce a great deal of goodness for others. The child’s life is not good for the child, but it is good for others. So the child has a useful life, though not a good life. This tells me that, for me, a good life and a useful life are not the same thing. The basic notion of ‘good life’ thus requires that the life be good for the person who lives it. If your life is painful enough, it’s perfectly rational to reject your own life even if your life is highly useful for others. 

Note 8: Moral goodness, on my view, refers to the goodness of someone’s character and moral reasoning. Moral goodness does not occupy some additional category of goodness, but is a particular type of extrinsic good, good because good character and good reasoning leads to greater and better happiness and less suffering.

Note 9: Shea shares this quote from Julia Annas:

“As we bring up our children, what we aim for is not that they have episodes of smiley-face feeling, but that their lives go well as wholes: we come to think happiness as the way a life as a whole goes well, and see that episodes of happiness are not what we build our lives around.”

I observe that we build our lives around running away from pain, especially unbearable pain: pain so great that it makes us wish we weren’t alive. Pains we run away from include the pain of boredom, the pain of disappointing a parent or mentor, the pain of the judgment of others, the pain of poverty, the pain of low self-esteem, and so on.

But I want to turn to this notion of “life as a whole going well.” I’m not sure what to make of this. Very simply, a life with more happiness than pain can be said to be at least technically a happy life, a life that has gone well, even if only barely. But some kinds of happiness are more prized than others. A life filled with more happiness than pain might be worse off on the whole compared to a life with more pain than happiness, if the latter contains more of these prized forms of happiness. A boring-but-decent life is arguably less desirable than a troubled-but-magnificent life. Put another way, higher-order happiness is so great that a life filled with only lower pains and pleasures where the pleasures slightly outweigh the pains is not as worth living as a life with higher-order pains and pleasures where the pains slightly outweigh the pleasures.

 

So when comparing the magnitude of pains versus pleasures, we take into account the context of the pain or pleasure. We don't want to play with children's toys forever, even if that meant freedom from the greater pains of life; we want to take part in greater narratives, in projects that go beyond ourselves and have a broader and deeper impact on the world, and we are willing to sacrifice much comfort for that opportunity. 

 

This idea of “smiley-face feeling” – like the pleasures of entertainment and food and traveling and so on – seems to speak to a kind of shallow happiness. We don’t want that for our children. We want our children to experience deep, profound happiness. That’s where ataraxia comes in. I don’t want to go to a soulless job, go home, eat dinner, listen to a podcast or watch some mildly entertaining show, go to bed, and repeat until I die. That sounds bland, shallow, pointless, stupid, disgusting – a waste of life. What I want is to do the kind of work I find most urgent – work so urgent, and so important, that it’s worth suffering for, even dying for – work so meaningful that if I managed to complete it, at least to a decent enough degree, the self-satisfaction I would feel would be so great that I would no longer find myself raging against death and suffering, but accepting it, because I’m grateful to have had the chance to do the work even if it meant being forced to live in a world that’s in many ways deeply bad.

Note 10: Because flourishing is an extrinsic good, and a saving good, I understand what makes it good. So I can explain why flourishing is good. Shea on the other hand has not yet explained why flourishing is good, or what it means for something to be good in the first place, or what flourishing looks like. On his view, flourishing is intrinsically good, which is a departure from my view. On my view the only thing that can be intrinsically good is something of which one cannot seriously ask why someone would want it without failing to grasp its essence. The only thing that fits the bill is conscious, positive, felt experience, and I call this sort of experience happiness. (As GE Moore pointed out, you can always ask, “But why is that thing good?” This is why I believe that the reason why something is good must terminate in an essence fact: intrinsic goodness is good by its essence. No one who grasps the essence of happiness can seriously ask why it's good.) Plus, I see that nothing would be good in a universe that forever was empty of conscious subjects, and this tells me that whatever goodness is, it must cash out in conscious experience.