Michelle Liu and Philip Goff – revelation and phenomenal definitions

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4lxt2Hhc0k

 

28m

 

Michelle Liu gives these test sentences: 

 

"I know what gold looks like but I don't know what gold really is."

 

Sounds fine. 

 

"I know what an itch feels like but I don't know what the feeling of an itch really is."

 

Sounds contradictory. 

 

"We have all seen diamonds, but do you know what a diamond really is?"

 

Sounds fine. 

 

"You have experienced toothaches, but do you really know what the feeling of a toothache really is?"

 

Sounds like a self-answering question because if we have experienced toothaches then the answer must be yes, we really know what the feeling of a toothache really is.

 

When we're talking about appearances themselves, the appearance/reality distinction collapses and you have phenomenal / noumenal collapse where the thing-as-it-appears and the thing-in-itself are one and the same.

 

So I have the intuition in favor of revelation. 

 

Revelation is the theory that just by having an experience, the nature of that experience has been revealed to you. Or as Goff puts it (4m): "A feeling is defined by how it feels, and you know how it feels when you feel it." Or, "We grasp the nature of the feeling just by attending to introspectively." (14m)

 

Goff mention's Ned Block's idea of overflow where we can be blind in the peripherals of our experience, and change blindness apparently provides some empirical evidence of this. However, "insofar as we grasp what it is like or how it feels, to that extent we grasp the essence."

 

Goff and Liu mention that while the word 'essence' or 'nature' might sound mysterious to non-philosophers, it's an entirely unproblematic notion. If you accept that words have definitions, then you accept that things have essences. A triangle is defined as a closed shape with three sides. So having more or fewer than three sides would get you kicked out of the triangle club so to speak. Being a non-shape would also get you kicked out. While being a shape helps you get into the triangle club, it's not enough by itself because you can be a shape without being a triangle, so that's a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a triangle. Having exactly three sides is also necessary but not sufficient, because you could have a square with one side removed. Only a closed shape with three sides is allowed in the triangle club.

 

Argument against physicalism:

 

Structure (modus tollens): 

 

1) If P, then Q.

2) ~Q.

3) Therefore, ~P. 

 

Argument: 

 

1) If physicalism is true, then to know the nature of a feeling is to know the physical mechanisms of that feeling.

 

2) To know the nature of a feeling is to not know the physical mechanisms of that feeling.

 

3) Therefore, physicalism is not true.

 

The controversial premise here is premise 2. So why believe premise 2 is true?

 

Structure (modus ponens):

 

1) If P, then Q.

2) P.

3) Therefore, Q.

 

1) If revelation is true, then by experiencing a feeling we know the nature of this feeling just by feeling it.

 

2) Revelation is true.

 

3) Therefore, by experiencing a feeling we know the nature of this feeling just by feeling it.

 

(Note: To know the nature of something does not require that you know the underlying cause of it. You can know that an ingot of gold is in fact gold without knowing where that ingot came from.)

 

If it's true that when we experience our feelings, we know the essence of this feeling, then it's also true that when we experience our feelings we don't know the physical mechanisms behind them, supporting premise 2 in the first argument.

 

If premise 1 of each argument is accepted, and they both seem uncontroversial, then the physicalist will have to deny either premise 2 of the first argument or premise 2 of the second argument.

 

Goff asks Liu (33m) how to respond to the demand of defining something phenomenal. What is the essence of pain? What is the essence of red?

 

The answer is that phenomenal definitions are not propositional. Liu mentions how know-how knowledge often cannot be put into words, but you still have the knowledge. Maybe know-how knowledge is a kind of phenomenal knowledge? Though I suppose know-how knowledge is also bundled up with thoughts of goals, success, and step-wise instruction.

 

A hint that you've stumbled onto a phenomenal definition is whether trying to define the thing in question leads to a circular or restated definition. What is an itch? It's that itchy feeling. What is pain? It is that painful feeling. What is red? It's that red color.

There is a conceptual connection between pain and avoidance intentionality

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9ZuXmpod0Q

 

I agree with Philip Goff that you can't say that there's a conceptual connection between pain and avoidance behavior and yet have exceptions where pain and avoidance behavior come apart. Like Goff says, that's like saying there are no married bachelors except sometimes there are. The reason why there are no married bachelors is because there can't be any, because by definition to be a bachelor is to not be married. So there are no exceptions. Likewise, if there is a similar conceptual connection between pain and avoidance behavior, then there won't be any exceptions where pain and affective behavior are found together.

 

In my model, pain is a combination of A + B where A refers to non-bad first-person properties that distinguish one pain from another and B refers to the first-person property of intrinsic badness that unites all pains as pains.

 

B properties can also distinguish one pain from another by intensity. A more intensely bad pain is distinguishable from a less intensely bad pain. And by quality: the dull, warbling pain of wasp venom is distinct from the hot, constant pain of a burn.

 

If it's true that there is intrinsic badness, then it's true that there is something worth avoiding because of its essence; pain is worth avoiding because of what it is. I don't avoid pain for some further reason; I avoid pain because pain is worth avoiding for its own sake. 

 

So if something is intrinsically bad, it is intrinsically worth avoiding. But if someone experiences an instance of intrinsic badness, then that just is to experience an instance of that which is intrinsically worth avoiding. Such an experience will produce avoidance intentionality in the mind of the person who experiences the pain. It is, therefore, impossible to experience pain and to not, at the same time, experience avoidance intentionality.

 

But there are cases where it seems like humans throw themselves head-first into pain. We see this with the pains involved in self-improvement such as dieting and exercise, or undergoing difficult education or training. We often risk experiences that we know could be very painful, such as adventuring outdoors or trying exotic foods. We willingly watch scary movies, push ourselves to extremes to break records, eat foods we know will be too spicy, and undergo medical procedures we know will be painful. Perhaps in these cases we are hoping for our adventures to be pain-free, but affective behavior and pain do go together.

 

And yet it's always the case that we are running away from pains. Running towards the pain of a medical procedure? That's just because the procedure is necessary to avoid greater pains, or because the procedure is necessary for survival and to enjoy pleasures that will, we bet, outweigh the pains of the procedure. Dieting and exercise is painful, but being unhealthy and overweight is painful too. And so on. I predict that in every one of these cases where you have pain plus affective behavior, there is a greater pain (per the judgment of the individual) being avoided. No one runs into pain for pain. Even someone who is a masochist is not after pain, but after the pleasure that comes with it (credit to Sharon Rawlette for this point).

 

Brian Cutter claimed in an interview that when we have painful dreams, our bodies remain motionless, and so this shows that pain does not necessitate avoidance behavior. But that's irrelevant. Pains in my dreams do necessitate avoidance intentionality; I intend to wake myself up from the nightmare, or to run away from the threat, or to destroy the threat. My dream behavior is one of avoidance.

 

It is exactly because of avoidance intentionality that we find affective behavior being paired with pain. The affective behavior + pain always implies avoidance intentionality + other, greater pain.

 

What complicates things is that you need to endure pains to get to pleasures. This is why pain does not necessitate avoidance behavior despite necessitating avoidance intentionality. Pleasures, as the opposite of pains, are intrinsically motivating.

 

So if something is intrinsically good, it is intrinsically worth pursuing. But if someone experiences an instance of intrinsic goodness, then that just is to experience an instance of that which is intrinsically worth pursuing. Such an experience will produce affective intentionality in the mind of the person who experiences the pleasure. It is, therefore, impossible to experience pleasure and to not, at the same time, experience affective intentionality.

 

So affective intentionality and avoidance intentionality clashes. We make a judgment as to which one wins out. When the pain of being overweight outweighs the pain of being hungry, the individual loses weight. When a person goes hungry for the sake of losing weight, it would be silly to think that the pain of the hunger is not intrinsically bad just because the individual chooses not to avoid the pain. Of course the pain of going hungry is intrinsically bad, hence the struggle, the calculating, the tolerating, and the display of strength and discipline.

 

So psychophysical disharmony where someone experiences pain and yet does not experience avoidance intentionality is as impossible as someone being a bachelor and yet married.