In the question of the week #889 (https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/evil-worlds-and-the-ontological-argument), Craig shares the following argument from Rasmussen, defending the possibility of God’s existence. For some context: The ontological argument proves that to demonstrate the metaphysical possibility of God’s existence just is to demonstrate God’s existence.(1) So an argument in favor of God’s metaphysical possibility is pretty serious. The Value Argument goes like this:
1) Some degree of value can be instantiated.
2) If some degree of value can be instantiated, then each degree of value can be instantiated.
3) Therefore each degree of value can be instantiated.
4) Maximal greatness is a degree of value.
5) Therefore, maximal greatness can be instantiated.
Steps 3 and 5 logically follow, so they are unassailable. I take premise 1 to be unassailable too; any moment of happiness I’ve had was some degree of instantiated value. So the only premises to attack are 2 and 4.
2 is easy to defeat. Generating a great deal of happiness is much harder than generating a small deal of happiness. The marginal cost of instantiating greater and greater degrees of value could make it impossible to instantiate the higher degrees of value. Compare: “If some amount of money can be made, then any amount of money can be made.”
4 is easy to defeat. Leibniz argued that our world must be the best possible world given the fact that God made it. Others have argued against this, saying that God could always add another happy person to the world, increasing the world’s overall value. So it’s impossible for there to be a maximally great world; you can always make it better. Likewise, you could argue that it’s impossible to be maximally great. God’s love could be made greater by loving an additional person. God’s creativity, majesty, power, and control could always be made greater by creating an additional universe. If this works, then maximal greatness is an impossible degree of value.
So I don’t find the argument nearly as persuasive as Craig does.
Knowing Rasmussen, I wouldn’t be surprised if he anticipated these responses and addressed them. If I get around to reading the original article, I’ll find out! I happen to have a preprint of Oppy, Rasmussen, and Schmid’s new entry on ontological arguments for the SEP. So I might just give that a read and see if this value argument is on there.
(1) See How Reason Can Lead to God, 183-185.
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