Four avenues into free will

It seems to me that there are four ways to approach free will:

1) From modality. This is the standard approach to free will. We investigate whether determinism or indeterminism is true, and then we investigate whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible or incompatible with free will.

I don't like this approach, certainly not by itself. As far as I'm concerned, free will should be defined as the control over our actions necessary for fair praise and blame of the person per se. I find it hard to care about morally neutral actions, and I wonder whether there are any morally neutral actions (even something as mundane as tying your shoelaces could be thought of as morally positive because doing so enables you to play with your school friends which maximizes your flourishing, and maximizing flourishing is the moral thing to do).

Immediately that calls for disambiguations of 'praise', 'blame', and 'person,' and 'moral responsibility.' Moral responsibility is the test for free will. If we have free will, then we will have moral responsibility. Thus, if we do not have moral responsibility, we don't have free will. I'm aware that Derk Pereboom and John Martin Fischer say that moral responsibility and blameworthiness can come apart. I cannot make sense of that, unless you are using 'moral responsibility' to mean something like 'Acting in such a way so as to reveal your lack of quality in a morally relevant respect' which really means 'Acting in such a way so as to reveal your irrationality and/or ignorance of moral facts.' I'm happy to grant we have that moral responsibility, which we can call critical blame, but I do not grant that we choose to have the lack (or presence) of quality we do; we do not choose our rationality or knowledge. We simply have the qualities we do, and it's never up to us whether we have those qualities.

Put bluntly, blaming someone for being morally stupid is as mistaken as blaming someone for being stupid. Certainly, we critically blame people for their stupidity, but it's not fair to morally blame them. Put another way, we can certainly attribute badness to someone's stupidity, but we cannot attribute choice to the person for their stupidity. No one chooses to be the way they are, they simply are that way, and our choices come from the way we are. We choose our choices, but only in a way that speaks to the luck of the subject, not the quality of the subject (i.e., subjects are victims of their quality).

2) From personhood. This is where we explore what it means to be a person. If we are to blame persons, then obviously we need to get clear on what it is exactly that we are blaming.

3) From metaethics. This is where we explore what it means to be a good person. If we are to blame persons, then obviously we need to get clear on exactly what it means to blame something. What are we talking about when we are talking about moral responsibility? I identify different ways in which we use 'blame':

Causal blame = X caused Y.

Moral blame = X caused Y in such a way that X's causing Y says something meaningful about X per se and not just X's circumstances.

Desert blame = X caused Y in such a way that X per se deserves to be punished, rewarded, praised, or blamed for causing Y. [Likely subsumed within moral blame]

Critical blame = Just as we might praise something for having good qualities it did not choose (e.g., praising someone for having good genetics), we blame (or criticize) things for having bad qualities they did not choose.

4) From science. For example, the Benjamin Libet experiment has been used to try to show that we lack free will. I vaguely recall one experimenter saying that we do not have free will (the ability to control our initial desires), but we do have 'free won't', which is the ability to veto our initial desires.