Friday, November 28, 2025
Anti-anti-philosophy proved in five seconds
Sunday, November 23, 2025
Evan Fales on problems with the Bible
"so shall my word be that goes out from my mouth;
it shall not return to me empty,
but it shall accomplish that which I purpose
and succeed in the thing for which I sent it."
Craig on the problem of evil
Thursday, November 20, 2025
Dual economy system
Friday, November 14, 2025
On the criteria of best philosopher
Per the book A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, by Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis, JJC Smart was a Christian when he was appointed at the University of Adelaide, but became a thoroughgoing atheist materialist at some point. He would have been at least 29 years old, potentially indicating a deep change of mind. But I don't know how deep Smart's Christian worldview was prior to converting, or how difficult the conversion was.
If I'm not mistaken, William Rowe had a similar late-and-thorough conversion from Christianity to atheism, and so did contemporary philosopher Felipe Leon.
Because philosophy is, at its core, the love for truth above all else, I feel like those philosophers that represent philosophy the best are those who most painstakingly give up prior beliefs for the sake of truth. Camus says in The Myth that "Beginning to think is beginning to be undermined." There's something special about that person who is willing to undermine themselves and sacrifice their deepest self-conception and their most desired beliefs for the truth, committing a sort of metaphysical death and rebirth in the process. So if you especially weigh this criterion, then these philosophers are the best.
But this criterion has at least two problems: One, as already mentioned, it's difficult to know which philosophers changed their minds and how thorough and painstaking was the change. Two, the virtue works both ways: an atheist who painstakingly becomes a Christian would too be a best philosopher. I think that fairly characterizes C. S. Lewis. But I wouldn't consider C. S. Lewis to be a good philosopher at all, mainly because he got just about everything wrong. More specifically, C. S. Lewis a) Did not create a systematic philosophy; b) Left many important philosophical problems unaddressed; c) Of the philosophical problems he did address, did not address them in a comprehensive or sophisticated way (like arguments for and against the existence of God, for example); d) Failed to address serious challenges to Christian belief; e) Especially failed to solve the problem of evil, not that any theist ever could.
Wednesday, November 12, 2025
The intellectual virtues of lifespace and access to resources
One of the most important intellectual virtues is lifespace. Consider a Muslim teenager who becomes an atheist. If his Muslim parents were to find out, it would be awkward or worse. To build out his new naturalistic worldview, he wants to write public blogposts and post public YouTube videos expressing his views and working through the philosophical puzzles he’s struggling with. This practice of talking out loud and connecting to other philosophically inclined folks across the internet is essential to him for processing information and developing his philosophical skills. He also wishes he could major in Philosophy at university. But he’s scared to express his views publicly in fear of his family and community finding out. Because he relies on his parents for education funding, and because of the economic non-viability of philosophy, he’s scared to pursue a Philosophy major. So instead of focusing on expressing himself, developing his worldview, and engaging with like-minded individuals, he focuses instead on trying to achieve financial independence. The teenager focuses on another career that can pay the bills. But that career has nothing to do with developing one’s intellectual virtue and philosophical knowledge. Many careers stifle one’s intellectual virtue and retard one’s philosophical development. Plus, the teenager wants more than anything to pursue philosophy, and so being deprived of this pursuit leads to chronic stress, and chronic stress is known to severely hurt one’s mental health and brain health, which in turn hurts one’s intellectual virtue. So we can see how a lack of lifespace leads to a loss of intellectual virtue, and indeed a lack of lifespace is perhaps the single greatest cause of the extreme lacuna of intellectual virtue we see in society. We also see how social structures tend to be anti-intellectual in nature, because maintaining one's status in a social structure requires going along with established narratives no matter how absurd and clearly false they may be.
Lifespace alone is not enough, though. Another intellectual virtue is access to philosophy resources. That means: 1) Reading materials, 2) Mentorship & training, and 3) Participation in philosophical communities and extended conversations across a wide variety of topics with a wide variety of people. Considering how rare it is to have the lifespace and access to resources needed, it’s no wonder that intellectual virtue is rare. Because becoming rich and powerful often has nothing to do with virtue, and indeed often has more to do with a lack of virtue, it's no surprise that intellectual virtue is especially rare among the rich and powerful. In a metaphorical sense then, what Jesus says is true when he says that it's harder for a rich man to go to heaven than for a camel to fit in the eye of a needle.
Monday, November 3, 2025
Inseparable subjectivity - Part 3: Inseparable subjectivity
E.g. The experiences of being stung by a wasp, jumping into cold water, and biting into a chocolate chip cookie all have something in common: the fact that these experiences are happening to you. There is a youness, a subjectivity, that these experiences have in common.
Person(2b) = The other properties of first-person properties that accompany the pure subjectivity by which all first-person properties are unified.
E.g. The experiences of being stung by a wasp, jumping into cold water, and biting into a chocolate chip cookie have differences between them. That which distinguishes one experience from the other—the pain of venom in your veins versus the pain of the initial shock of cold water versus the happiness of the taste of melted chocolate—these differences show that these experiences cannot be the same, despite having a sameness to them, specifically the same subjectivity.
You(2a) is the ‘you’ referred to in the following sentence: You do not choose to be what you are. You do not choose to have the intelligence, rationality, or knowledge that you have. So you do not choose for your decision-making process to be what it is. So you do not choose for your choices to come out as they do. The badness (or goodness) of your choices reflects the badness (or goodness) of your inputs, but not the badness (or goodness) of you.
But you(2b) is the 'you' referred to in the following sentence: The choices you made were good / bad / praiseworthy / critique-worthy. I.e. the causal properties accompanying the pure subjectivity of first-person properties had good / bad / praiseworthy / critique-worthy effects.”
Two thoughts:
One, even if we allow a distinction between Person(2a) and Person(2b), it’s not clear that 2a is as non-causal as I claimed. If I have stressful experiences, and those stressful first-person properties cause my body to produce stress hormones like cortisol and adrenaline, then the “pure subjectivity” of being on the receiving end of experience actually does play a role in causal relationships. Plus, presumably pure experiences cause me to remember having those experiences. So pure subjectivity causes memory. Furthermore, memories reveal patterns that affect future actions. By remembering the pain of touching a hot stove, I avoid touching hot stoves in the future. So by causing memories, not only does pure subjectivity play a causal role, but a causal role with respect to our actions.
Two, it’s not clear that the distinction between 2a and 2b makes sense. If I treat subjectivity as a consistent property that survives through time (to explain how a person survives through time), then it sounds like I’m sneaking in the idea of a mental substance, of a subjectivity that exists independently from everything else and is subject to qualia. That’s a problem for bundle theory, which says that there are no substances, only properties. If instead I say that wherever there is a subjective property, there is personhood, and paint this picture that there is no stable, persistent, substantial, mysterious self – and that instead there is a succession of subjective properties and a directly observable, unmysterious self – then it seems like I must consider subjectivity not something separate from the subjective properties. If your subjective properties are you, then your subjective properties involved in your choices and feelings are you. So the pure subjectivity of 2a cannot be separated from the other properties, 2b, that accompany 2a.
By abstracting out my subjectivity in common with all my subjective properties, I am beholding my subjective property not as something particular and concrete, but universal and abstract. But persons are concrete, not abstract! The self is as particular and concrete as it gets. So to avoid the mistake of talking about the concept of myself when I should be talking about myself, I must avoid abstracting out subjectivity.
It seems that I have been assuming that the subjectivity of a property can be separated from ugly (or admirable) aspects of that property. For example, if someone makes the conscious, unconstrained decision to kill someone out of spite, there’s a subjectivity to that choice. But this subjectivity is replete throughout the property such that the entire property is subjective. We cannot separate the subjectivity from the rest of the property. So the ugliness of the subjectivity just is the ugliness of the entire subjective property, and thus the person.
Imagine the feeling of being judged. It's a sharp pain, which makes it vivid and easy to imagine. Is it possible to separate the feeling of being judged from the subjectivity? No. The experience is necessarily experiential. There is no pain floating around out there without a person to feel it. Pain is by its essence felt. Likewise, there is no subjectivity floating around out there without other properties characterizing that experience. Subjectivity is by its essence a particular kind of experience. So for a painful feeling, like being judged, you can't have the pain without the subjectivity, and you can't have the subjectivity without the pain. The subjectivity is replete and inseparable.
But if a person per se is identical to their subjective properties (the person per se of the moment is identical to the subjective property of that moment), then any criticism or praise directed to the ugly or admirable aspects of the subjective property are directed to the person per se (at the moment of that property).
If this is right, and if our choices come with a subjective property (the quale of making a choice), then we are our choices, just as we are our pains and pleasures and any other subjective property. If by ‘person’ we mean a collection of subjective properties that all have the same subjectivity in common, then our experiences (including experiences of making choices) are straightforwardly part of us.
Far from eliminating free will, this might provide the very resources to build an account of how free will works! Namely, that because a) our choices accompany phenomenal choice, and because b) wherever there is phenomenology there is personhood, therefore c) to criticize or praise a choice just is to criticize or praise the phenomenology, which just is to criticize or praise the person with that personhood.