Saturday, August 10, 2024

Theodicy #7 - Butterfly effect

Let’s say God allows the Holocaust to prevent an even greater Holocaust in the future. The problem with this is that God could intervene and prevent the first Holocaust and then intervene again to prevent the second one. If God allows someone to suffer third-degree burns so that 100 years later someone from a different country gets their dream job, God could prevent the burns and deliver the dream job. So if God allows an evil to achieve a greater good, the greater good must depend on that evil (or a worse or comparable evil) or else God could achieve the same good with less evil.

This unlocks a new kind of gratuitous evil not yet discussed. Comparative gratuitous evil:

God has a choice to either instantiate the column 1 scenario (An evil gives rise to a greater good) or the column 2 scenario (a good gives rise to the exact same greater good). Given that choice, God would choose column 2.

Note: the greater good in column 2 needn’t be the exact same greater good as in column 1. It could be a different greater good of comparable degree, a greater good of greater degree, or even a greater good of lesser degree depending on the balance between the good and evil giving rise to the corresponding greater goods. Also, the good in row 2 could be neutral or even evil, as long as it’s not as evil as the evil in column 1 and as long as its corresponding greater good retains the necessary superiority over the opposing greater good. Indeed, the good of column 2 could be a greater evil than the evil of column 1 as long as its greater good is that much greater than the greater good of column 1.

Comparative gratuitous evil = An evil that produces a net good, but replacing that evil with a good or a different evil would have produced a greater net good.

So this theodicy fails, revealing an additional, significant condition evils must meet to not be gratuitous. In all, when an evil E produces a good G, it must be the case, for E to not be gratuitous, that:

1) G is greater in magnitude than E.

2) It is not the case that God could prevent E and in its place instantiate a good, a lesser evil, or even a greater evil that produces an overall net good that is greater than the net good of G & E.

Theodicy #6 - Soul contracts

This is a theodicy featured in the book When Heaven Invades Hell by Josh and Rachel Rasmussen. While the book comes highly recommended, I don’t consider soul contracts to hold any weight. These are deals made between God and souls before the souls are brought to earth. Basically, the evils inflicted on the innocent are less bad if the innocent consented to the whole of their life prior to being born. But first, it’s hard to conceive of a human person making complex choices like that without having the genetic and environmental factors that play such a massive role in shaping us. Second, when you ask any person on earth whether they consented to being born, they will say no. When asked whether they are okay with the evils they have been through, they will say no again. So it’s hard to see how it could be me who consented to being born or to undergoing the suffering I did.

So this theodicy fails and unlocks a further consideration for preventing EJ’s dementia.


Anti-theodicy #4: EJ does not consent to her condition. Her situation is a violation of her consent, and is a violation of the collective consent of her community.

Side note: Christian philosopher Kenny Pearce also rejects soul contracts as a response to the problem of evil. See this interview starting at the 42 minute mark: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPneTz3zD4g.

Theodicy #5 - Being of use to each other

This is a theodicy I’ve heard from Richard Swinburne, who says the following:

But there do so often look to be lives in which the bad outweighs the good, about which we say that it would be better for such a person not to have lived. I urge however that this is a wrong assessment of many lives because it does not take into account a good which I have so far not mentioned —the good of being of use to others. It is an enormous good for anyone to be of use—whether by what they do by free choice, or by what they do involuntarily or by what happens to them, including what they suffer. Helping someone freely is clearly a great good for the helper. . . .[*3]

There are two different conversations here. The first is people being of use to others even if they live poor lives. The second is the unique good of usefulness. Let’s start with the first.

#5a - Useful lives

This theodicy fails for three reasons. The first is for a similar reason that the butterfly effect theodicy fails (see Theodicy #7). Let’s say someone dies by falling into a pool of boiling water in Yellowstone National Park. We want to know why God would allow that to happen. Saying “because their life served as a warning to others” is a nonsensical response. That would mean God allows people to fall into boiling water as a means to prevent people from falling into boiling water. If God wants to prevent an evil, then doing so by allowing that very evil, or by allowing a worse or comparable evil, is a contradictory way of going about things. 

The second reason is that at best this could only provide a silver lining, not an actual justification. If a parent’s child dies and the death of the child serves some kind of purpose, the parent will naturally prefer to save the child and lose whatever purpose that could be.

The third reason is for deontic concerns. Arguably, a loving God would care about people not as a means to an end but as an end unto themselves. It would be a gross mistreatment of someone to let them boil to death just so their life can be useful to others.

#5b - The goodness of usefulness

I think this theodicy partially succeeds, or at least has a chance to partially succeed.

Consider a boy who falls off his bike and scrapes his knee. Scared and hurt, he walks his bike home and tells his mom what happened. She patches him up.

Many goods come out of this:

1) The mom feels useful.
2) The mom gets a chance to express her love and care to her son.
3) The son experiences being loved and cared for. 
4) The son and mom bond over the experience.
5) The son is humbled by the experience. He learns that he can get hurt. It’s good to have an accurate picture of what you are.
6) At the same time, the son learns that he is strong and can survive a fall and get back up.
7) Moreover, the son, who suffers the evil, is the one who benefits from the evil (along with his mom), alleviating deontic concerns.
8) Theodical goods are cashed out almost immediately after the evil is suffered.
9) The intensity of the suffering is low; there is never a point at which the son or mother consider life to not be worth living because of the suffering.
10) The goods mentioned above uniquely depend on the badness of the boy falling off his bike and having him scrape his knee.

I’m not sure about (10). Imagine if instead the boy bakes cookies with his mom. In this case,

1) The mom feels useful teaching her son how to bake.
2) The mom gets a chance to express her love by spending time with him.
3) The son experiences being loved. 
4) The son and mom bond over the experience.
5) The son is humbled by the experience. He learns that he has much to learn from his mom.
6) At the same time, the son learns that he is good at baking, increasing his self-esteem. (We’ll say he doesn’t make any mistakes, because if he did, that would probably hurt roughly as much as a scraped knee, defeating the point of the scenario.)
7) There are no deontic concerns as the son is not undignified by an evil for someone else’s sake.
8) There is no worry about when or if theodical goods are cashed out.
9) There is never a point at which the son or mother considers life to not be worth living because of suffering.
10) The goods mentioned above uniquely depend on the mother and boy baking together.
11) Bonus: the son never experiences any sense that the world he lives in is hostile. He is more able to embrace the world he lives in as a good world.

Some of these goods are the same as in the hurt knee case, and others are of arguably equal or even greater magnitude, without the badness of the hurt knee. There is even a bonus higher-order good of not experiencing any kind of anxiety about the dangers of the world like we get in the hurt knee case.

But there is a drawback: Emotions are not as heightened and the stakes aren’t as high as in the hurt knee case. So the hurt knee case remains in my mind a plausibly justified evil, though I’m open to some of these higher-order goods in the cookie baking case to override the higher-order goods of the knee hurt case.

It’s hard to imagine a world without problems. Even if we could imagine such a world, it may be better to have problems, as they give us something to do and allow us to be useful to each other and to interact with each other in meaningful ways. If there is a successful theodicy, it will certainly incorporate these kinds of goods for these reasons.

So this theodicy plausibly succeeds, or rather plays a role in a plausibly successful theodicy. 

However, I said this theodicy can only partially succeed, and that’s because, like in #5a, this theodicy won’t apply in all cases, or will sometimes only amount to a silver lining. Dementia happens to be one of those cases.

Anti-theodicy #3: It is a great good to feel useful and to be useful to others. Dementia destroys, for the person afflicted, the possibility of both. Dementia also destroys, for the loved ones of the afflicted, the possibility of feeling or being useful, because the disease is untreatable, incurable, and only gets worse over time. Given the overwhelming desire to see the loved one healed, and the impossibility of this, an overwhelming feeling of powerlessness can emerge for anyone affected.

While there is the good of the opportunity to care for the afflicted and for the afflicted to be cared for, it’s obvious that this good is a mere silver lining, dwarfed by the evil. We would much rather have the good of the freedom from the evil than have the good of care.


*3 - Richard Swinburne, "The Problem of Evil" (1995) in (ed.) P. Koslowski, Jahrbuch für Philosophie des Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover.

Theodicy #4 - The Fall

This theodicy is related to the previous two, but in this case evil is not understood to be God directly punishing you on the basis of your sin or the sin of your ancestors. Instead, sin in general has caused the earth to fall into a cursed state and both the innocent and guilty are caught in the crossfire of that cursed state (hence Luke 13:2 and Matthew 5:45).

This theodicy is special to me because it is the one my mom would give. She would say, “It’s a sin-cursed world” as a way of explaining what was happening to her.

To help me get my bearings on the doctrine of The Fall, I’ve consulted some of William Lane Craig’s comments on the topic, from here (https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-man/doctrine-of-man-part-19) and here (https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-man/doctrine-of-man-part-20).

This theodicy fails for the following reasons:

First, it’s not obvious what exactly Christians are committed to. Is The Fall a literal event in history or a metaphor for the condition humans find themselves in? The greater the commitment, the greater the doxastic cost for the Christian.

Second, it’s not right to say the world is “sin-cursed” as if a single sin somehow casted a magical spell over the earth and caused pain and death to enter the world. It’s more accurate to say the world is “God-cursed” per the Genesis 3 passage.

Third, if we take seriously an evolutionary account of biology, then pain and death has always been around, including the pain of childbirth and of the toiling for food. God’s curses are mythological. (Presumably Dr. Craig would admit this, as he calls the Genesis creation account “mytho-history.”)

Fourth, sin is either highly problematic or not. If it is, then it’s mysterious as to why God would create at all or why God would allow sin. If it’s not, then it’s mysterious as to why God would curse the earth because of it.

Fifth, God cursing the earth seems to betray a misunderstanding on God’s part of human nature. We know that humans “sin” due to poverty, ignorance, irrationality—circumstances beyond their control. Animals kill not because they are evil, but because they must to survive. Humans act according to survival pressures as well. A king, fearing death, might wish to immortalize himself by conquest. Conscripted soldiers fearing punishment for desertion might fight on that king’s behalf. All or nearly all destructive human behaviors can be explained by biological impulses, psychological mechanisms, social pressures, and false beliefs. So if God wants humans to not sin, he should remove these things, not cause them.

Sixth, if God curses the earth and thereby allows pain, death, earthquakes, drowning, disease, and so on, then it’s really hard to see how God is not the author of evil or not responsible for (natural) evil.

Seventh, in many cases, like the SIDS case, natural evils are worse than the sins of those affected by them. If God hates sin because it’s a bad thing, it hardly makes sense for God to put more bad things into the world in response.

This theodicy is less a response to the problem of evil and more of a restatement of it.

Friday, August 9, 2024

Dementia and the Problem of Evil Part 5/6 - Theodicies Fail to Provide Counter Reasons

Part 5: The Failure of Theodicies

A theodicy is a theory as to why God allows some kind of evil. If a theodicy succeeds then it will, in this case, show that God has good reasons to allow EJ’s dementia. Remember, the categorical reasons for preventing EJ’s dementia are the following:

1 - INTRINSIC EVILS

1a - The pain EJ experiences.

1b - The pain EJ’s immediate family members experience, especially that of her husband who is the closest to her.

1c - The pain of EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc.

2 - INTRINSIC GOODS

2a - The happiness EJ would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2b - The happiness EJ’s family would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2c - The happiness EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc., would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

Theodicies are competing against this.

Theodicy #1 - Evil is necessary for us to appreciate the good

I will make a point here that I will attribute, at least the general idea of it, to Peter van Inwagen, though I don’t have the citation. The point is that God could simulate evils by giving us nightmares as a reminder of what could be but isn’t. We would always wake up from these nightmares in great relief, and thereby enjoy the unique good of gratitude without having the evils be real.

But if we die and go to heaven, then isn’t that like waking up from a nightmare? The difference is that here on earth we have to face our evils in succession without experiencing the relief we would under the above scenario. Plus, if earth is made out to be a nightmare, then it’s confusing as to why a good God would create it.

Those points besides, it’s obvious that we don’t need much evil to appreciate goodness, if we need it at all (and it’s not obvious to me that we need it at all). Clearly, there are many cases of evil where the evil is too much. We can’t appreciate the goodness of life if there is no goodness. Some evils are so great that they destroy us or leave us devastated and cynical. 

So this theodicy fails, and it unlocks a further consideration for preventing EJ’s dementia.

Anti-theodicy #1: EJ’s dementia prevents EJ’s ability to appreciate the goodness of life and to experience the unique good of gratitude. It also prevents her loved ones from appreciating life as much as they would otherwise.

Theodicy #2 - Evil is punishment for your ancestor’s sins

We see this throughout the Old Testament. The doctrine of Original Sin says Adam’s sin is inherited by the rest of humanity (Romans 5:12). Exodus 20:5 and Deuteronomy 5:9 show God threatening punishment to descendants, though this contradicts Deuteronomy 24:16, Ezekiel 18:20, and John 9:3. I take punishing descendants to be a clear violation of justice; it’s evil to punish someone for someone else’s wrongdoing.

So this theodicy fails.

Theodicy #3 - Evil is punishment for your sins

There are three problems with this: One, it leads to superstitious, “everything happens for a reason” thinking. This makes you liable to mistake an unfortunate event for karmic retribution.

Two, Jesus rejects this theodicy (John 9:3 where Jesus heals the blind man, Luke 13:2 where Jesus speaks of the Tower of Siloam, and Matthew 5:45 where rain is said to fall on the righteous and unrighteous). And in the book of Job, God allows evils to befall Job despite Job’s blamelessness.

A Christian might think that my family was punished with EJ’s dementia due to our sin. But given the above, there is no good reason to think this. And ask anyone who knows my mom and they will agree she was the least deserving person to receive such a horrendous evil. Plus, Douglas Groothuis is a Christian philosopher and theologian who had a wife, Becky, who had dementia[*1]. God never healed her. So this happens to other Christians, not just to my family. 

Furthermore, all Christians suffer eventually, so this would imply that God punishes all Christians for their sin. God lets all Christians (thus far) die. It would be far more glorious and less painful for Christians if God assumed them into heaven like he did Elijah and Jesus. But God doesn’t. So God has allowed all Christians (thus far) to befall a worse fate than necessary.

Three, and I give credit to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for this next point[*2], there are very clear cases where there is no way this theodicy applies. If a baby dies from SIDS, what were the sins of that baby?

So this theodicy fails and unlocks a further consideration for preventing EJ’s dementia.

Anti-theodicy #2: EJ’s situation is unjust. EJ does not deserve her fate, and neither do those close to her deserve to suffer due to her suffering.



*1 - Douglas Groothuis, Walking Through Twilight (2017).

*2 - YouTube. William Lane Craig vs. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong | "Do Suffering and Evil Disprove God?" - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTacpjiv8vU, 16:30.

Thursday, August 1, 2024

Dementia and the Problem of Evil Part 4/6 - God Has Millions of Reasons to Prevent Evil

 Part 4: Preliminaries

Before we get to theodicies, there are a few preliminaries I want to discuss first.

4a - Definitions:

Here are some tentative definitions to give us something to work with going forward.

Evil = badness; An evil = a bad thing.

To suffer = to endure evil, especially repeatedly or over a period of time.

Badness comes in three types: intrinsic, extrinsic, and deprivational.

Something is intrinsically bad if it’s bad in and of itself.

The only thing I can think of that is bad in and of itself is anything the badness of which is directly accessible, i.e. bad feelings, i.e. pain. 

We can see this by asking “Why” questions. Why put on a coat before going outside in the winter? Because you will be cold if you don’t. But why avoid being cold? Because being cold is bad in and of itself. Why eat healthy? Because you will feel sick if you don’t. But why avoid feeling sick? Because feeling sick is bad in and of itself.

Therefore, something is intrinsically bad if and only if its badness is experienced by a person. Intrinsic badness is phenomenal badness, or bad qualia

To be in pain is to be experiencing bad feelings. There are many different kinds of bad feelings, both physical and mental, and thus there are many different kinds of pain.

There is a subjective component and an objective component to badness. Whether something is intrinsically bad for someone depends on that person’s subjective experience. But whether someone has suffered is a question of fact. So if I say “Well, that movie was painful to watch…”, I am saying something true relative to me and not necessarily relative to anyone else. But if someone says “Ben did not have a bad experience watching that movie”, they have said something false. So while it’s subjective whether someone suffers, the fact that people suffer is objective.

This is why people are not just valuable, but objectively so. It’s a matter of fact that valuable states (states of happiness) occur because people are there to generate them. People generate value states for themselves as well as for each other. Each person is a locus of value.

An extrinsic evil is anything that causes some kind of pain for someone. Wearing too few layers in the cold is extrinsically bad. Eating unhealthy is extrinsically bad. Death is extrinsically bad because it causes the pain of grief to loved ones.

Speaking of death, if badness is ultimately cashed out in terms of experience, and we do not experience being dead, then how can death be bad for the one who dies? This is where deprivational badness comes in. The deprivation theory says death is bad because it deprives the one who dies from goods they otherwise would have experienced had they not died. The one who dies is worse off compared to how they would have been had they lived. FOMO comes from this. If we stay home instead of going to the party, we worry that we missed out on a good time. Staying home deprived you of the good vibes, drinks, and snacks you would have enjoyed had you gone. Failure to fulfill one’s potential is bad in this way too. If you had fulfilled your potential, then there are goods you and others would have enjoyed, and you and they are worse off for not getting to enjoy them.

So when I say something is bad, I am saying that it’s a pain, a source of pain, or something that deprives one of goods they otherwise would enjoy. The categories of evils then are:

INTRINSIC EVIL - Anything the badness of which is directly accessible.

Ex. touching a hot pan, loneliness, boredom, hunger, feeling sick, feeling upset because your car is damaged, feeling frustrated because of technical issues.

EXTRINSIC EVIL - Anything that causes an intrinsic or deprivational evil.

Ex. Forgetting the pan is hot, not having a good social life, not having meaningful projects to work on, not having enough food, illness, bad hail storms, not understanding technology.

DEPRIVATIONAL EVIL - Anything that prevents, ruins, or lessens an intrinsic good.

Ex. Death, poverty, coma, illness.

Conversely:

Happiness = intrinsically good feelings. (Usually “pleasure” is used here, but due to negative connotations surrounding carnal pleasures I will use “happiness”.)

To be happy is to be experiencing good feelings. There are many different kinds of good feelings, both physical and mental, and thus there are many different kinds of happiness.

Happiness (contrasted with “sadness”) can also refer to an emotion of elation, relief, excitement, or satisfaction. She felt so happy when she saw her sister at the airport.

Happiness (contrasted with “misery”) can also refer to a state of contentment. He was happy with his job / He was miserable at his job.

To flourish = to enjoy goods, especially repeatedly or over a period of time. 

(I think of flourishing as involving a moral component where not only the one who flourishes is happy, but is happy for the right reasons and is connected to others in the right way. While in one sense violent criminals can flourish, in another sense they are failing to be happy for the right reasons and to connect to others in the right way.)

The categories of goods:

INTRINSIC GOOD - Anything the goodness of which is directly accessible.

Ex. Taste of delicious food, the feeling of a hot shower, the satisfying feeling of sleeping in a comfy bed.

EXTRINSIC GOOD - Anything that causes an intrinsic or saving good.

Ex. Delicious food, hot showers, comfy beds.

SAVING GOOD - Anything which prevents, cures, or alleviates an intrinsic evil.

Ex. Pain medicine, surgery, a peace treaty between two warring nations.

Often, things are a complicated mix of good and bad. Pain can be intrinsically bad while extrinsically good as it alerts you to a bigger problem your body has. The intrinsic pain of guilt can be extrinsically good by alerting you to the need to change your ways. One person’s happiness can cause others to be happy, and thus be both intrinsically and extrinsically good. Death is deprivationally bad for the one who dies (and deprivationally bad for those who would have enjoyed moments of happiness caused by the one who died) and extrinsically bad because it causes the pain of grief. A good can turn into an evil if getting it causes you to miss out on a greater good.

4b - Reasons-Value Principle:

The Reasons-Value Principle says that the badness of an evil provides the reason to prevent that evil. Likewise, the goodness of a good provides the reason to cause that good.

You might wonder how this connects to God. Our pain might give us reason to prevent it, but why would that give God reason to prevent our pain?

There are a few options:

For God’s Sake: Because of God’s empathy and love, God suffers when we suffer. God has direct access to the badness of his suffering, and thus understands the cause of his suffering, our suffering, to be bad.

For Our Sake: You might want to maintain God’s impassibility and thus reject the notion that our suffering causes God to suffer. But God, in his love for us, can still desire for us to be free of suffering; God himself does not suffer, but because of his omniscience he understands our suffering perfectly, and by his love is moved to minimize it.

Rationality: The objectively smart thing to do is to maximize as much flourishing and minimize as much suffering in the world as possible. God understands the badness of the suffering of sentient creatures and the goodness of their flourishing and by that understanding sees the reasons to promote flourishing and minimize suffering.

So the Reasons-Value Principle applies not only to us, but to God as well. For each instance of evil that a sentient creature faces, the badness of that evil gives God a reason to prevent it, and for each instance of goodness a sentient creature might enjoy, the goodness of that good gives God a reason to cause it.

With these tools in hand, we can get an idea of the reasons God has for preventing EJ’s dementia.

4c - Reasons to prevent the evil:

4c1: Because goods and evils ultimately cash out in terms of experience, we can categorize everything under intrinsic goods and intrinsic evils like the following:

1 - INTRINSIC EVILS

1a - The pain EJ experiences.

1b - The pain EJ’s immediate family members experience, especially that of her husband who is the closest to her.

1c - The pain of EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc.

2 - INTRINSIC GOODS

2a - The happiness EJ would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2b - The happiness EJ’s family would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2c - The happiness EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc., would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

4c2 - Almost all evils are apparently gratuitous: God has at least six layers of reasons to prevent EJ’s dementia. If I had healing powers, or if we had the technology to cure dementia, we would cure EJ without hesitation, and these reasons explain why.

Indeed, this is how we can know there are apparent gratuitous evils. For any evil, if you would be inclined to prevent or cure that evil had you the power to do so, then this tells you the evil is apparently gratuitous to you.

A similar test is the “prayer test”. If you believed in the power of prayer and were inclined to pray for God to resolve an evil, then that evil is apparently gratuitous to you. Why would you try to pray away an evil unless it seemed to you that its badness outweighed its goodness?

If the prayer test shows us which evils are apparently gratuitous, then nearly all evils we encounter are apparently gratuitous, as nearly all evils we encounter we would be inclined to pray away if we believed in the power of prayer.

Christians will even pray to God to help find their car keys. It sounds funny, because if God is willing to allow the Holocaust then certainly he is willing to allow you to lose your car keys, or lose your life in a car accident for that matter. Still, losing your keys is a pain in the butt. A gratuitous evil needn’t be a massive evil. As long as the badness outweighs the goodness, it’s gratuitous, no matter how small the badness is. So yes, even losing your keys is an apparently gratuitous evil.

4c3 - Getting a rough idea of the number of reasons God has to prevent EJ’s dementia:

For the sake of simplicity, let’s say the following:

-A moment is a 5 second interval.

-A day is a 16 hour period. So each day contains 11,520 moments.

-A year is 360 days. So a year contains 4,147,200 moments.

-Let’s say EJ’s symptoms started 12 years ago (I’m not exactly sure when they started, but it was at least 12 years ago). 12 years is 49,766,400 moments.

In one way or another, all of those moments are corrupted, either because they become moments of suffering because of the disease (layer 1a), or because moments of flourishing would have occurred without the disease (layer 2a). So there are basically up to 50 million reasons to prevent EJ’s dementia, and that’s not even counting the unknown millions of reasons that fall under 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c.

Of course, I’m simplifying massively. There are many complexities that emerge when trying to quantify reasons. The point is to get a general feel for the reasons there are to prevent EJ’s suffering. We are so familiar with suffering that it’s easy to miss just how many reasons there are to prevent it. While it’s impossible for us to quantify the exact number and weight of the reasons to prevent any evil, in EJ’s case the reasons are clearly in the tens of millions and beyond. Keeping these reasons in mind will give us an intuitive feel for the weight that theodicies are up against.

Friday, July 19, 2024

Dementia and the Problem of Evil Parts 1 - 3/6 - God is Incompatible With Gratuitous Evil

Part 1: The first argument

1) God is a perfect being. That is, God is unlimited in all great-making aspects; God is maximally great. (Premise 1)

2) Love is a great-making property. (Premise 2)

3) Therefore, God is maximally loving. (From 1,2)

4) With love comes compassion, which is the desire to help others when you see them hurting. In some cases, it may be that suffering produces goods which outweigh the badness of the suffering. A compassionate person can allow those instances of suffering, but that won’t apply to gratuitous suffering (suffering where the badness outweighs the goodness it produces). (Premise 3)

In other words, God can allow an evil if doing so entails a greater expression of love than preventing the evil would. In addition to the above definition, a gratuitous evil then is an evil the allowing of which fails to express a greater degree of love than preventing that evil would.

5) Therefore, God maximally desires to prevent gratuitous suffering. (From 3,4)

6) God is all-knowing and fully aware of the suffering of others. (Premise 4)

7) God is all-powerful and can prevent any instance of gratuitous suffering. (Premise 5)

8) Therefore, there is no one who experiences suffering where the badness of the suffering outweighs the goodness it produces. (From 5,6,7)

9) There are tons of people who experience gratuitous suffering. (Premise 6)

Contradiction. Therefore, one of the premises must be false.

I take steps 4 and 9 (premises 3 and 6) to be the ones worth challenging. Step 4 can be challenged on the basis that God has a more sophisticated kind of love than we do. Step 9 can be challenged using theodicies and skeptical theism.

Part 2: Defending Step 4

2a: Michael Rea suggests that human love is devotion, and so if God were to have a maximized version of human love, God would have to be fully devoted to humans, which would mean to worship us.[*1] But humans aren’t worthy of worship; it would be inappropriate for God to show us that kind of devotion. God, being transcendent, has a deeper, more sophisticated kind of love than we do, so it’s no surprise that God would seem unloving to us by our simplistic notion of love.

2b: The common sense notion of love I have in mind is not a kind of devotion. Love, it seems to me, is a regarding of someone as valuable or good. This is to regard the person as valuable and not something incidental about the person such as their money or good looks. When you regard someone as valuable, many things happen. You feel happy when you see them (like a kid running to the door when dad’s home), you want to make them happy, to be around them, to connect to them, for them to like you, and you desire for them to flourish (you will their good, as Aquinas said). You accept and celebrate them. You wish to see them preserved and protected. You perform behaviors that show your love, such as sacrificing for their benefit. Most important to our discussion today, you feel pain when something bad happens to them and feel happy when something good happens to them.[*2]

An intuition boost for this view is to look at the reverse of love. When we are hated, we feel as though we are being viewed as worthless, or even as worse than worthless – as having negative value. So we might say to hate is to see something as a source or wellspring of disvalue, while to love is to see something as a wellspring of value.[*3]

2c: One immediate problem I see with “love as devotion” is that God, by showing the bare minimum of help by answering a prayer here or sending a prophet there, would not be showing the level of excessive devotion needed to count as worshiping us. Sure, if God were to send a legion of angels to sing the praises of a common person who has not done anything to deserve such attention, then this would be ridiculous and inappropriate. But if a child prays for his sick mom to get better, would God be worshiping the child, or his mom, by granting the request? Of course not.

2d: Another problem is that the problem of evil uses a common sense notion of love. If this common sense notion is false or misleading, then theological problems emerge. First, if our love is not at least analogous to God’s, then in what sense are we made in the image of God? God is called God the Father, suggesting an analogy between parental love and God’s love for us. If the common sense notion of love is misleading, then isn’t this metaphor misleading too? Maybe God should be called Master, or Artist, or King, and never Father? This would make God out to be far less loving, but it would fit better with God being transcendent. Why would God be called Father if that’s a misleading metaphor?

Second, this common sense notion of love is biblical. In James we read that faith without deeds is dead. If you love someone, your actions will show it. Jesus tells us that if you love him, you will follow his commands. Where are God’s deeds? If God loves us, what actions, in our day to day lives, does God take to show his love for us? Jesus healed people, and even raised Lazarus from the dead. Why? If this life doesn’t matter, why would God send Jesus to earth? Why would Jesus bother to heal people? But if this life does matter, then why doesn’t Jesus heal people now? Presumably, Jesus healed because he saw people’s pain and became overwhelmed with compassion. Where did that compassion go? Why don’t miracle healings work today? Why aren’t sick folks rushing to churches instead of hospitals? Why would God allow the Bible to convey a misleading sense of love?

Third, if our common sense notion of love is mistaken, then how can we preach the gospel? Christians say “God loves you” and “Jesus loves you”. The gospel says that “For God so loved the world . . .” and “God demonstrated his love for us in this . . .” This message relies on the basic notion of love that humans come equipped with. If that notion is wrong, then Christians should say “God loves you, but in his own mysterious way, and if you use the ordinary human notion of love it might seem like God doesn’t love you.” That’s not very comforting. It’s confusing.

Fourth, why would God allow us to evolve a notion of love that leads to the problem of evil? Why wouldn’t God have us evolve with God’s notion of love, or send special revelation letting us know how love really works?

2e: Given the problems that emerge from challenging the common sense notion of love, it seems fair, and even unavoidable, to continue to use the common sense notion. But if love more or less works according to the common sense notion, and if God is maximally loving, then it follows that God maximally wills the good of all persons. But it’s never good for a person to suffer from an evil where the badness of that evil ultimately outweighs the goodness it produces. So God maximally wills for all persons to be free of gratuitous evil.

With step 4 defended, we can move onto step 9.

Part 3: The second argument

To defend the claim that there are gratuitous evils, I will first introduce a version of the argument from evil that uses a specific instance of horrendous evil. I will take a page from David Wood’s book, or really his dissertation, and relate to the problem of evil using a personal example.[*4] My mom, Elizabeth Jane, suffers from late-stage dementia. We can call her EJ. The argument goes like this:

1) If the reasons to prevent EJ’s dementia far outweigh the reasons not to, and yet God does not prevent EJ’s dementia, then God does not exist.

2) The reasons to prevent EJ’s dementia far outweigh the reasons not to, and yet God does not prevent EJ’s dementia.

3) Therefore, God does not exist. (modus ponens)

Premise 1 is the incompatibility premise, which corresponds to steps 1 - 8 of the first argument, except now the argument is phrased in terms of reasons. Premise 2 is the gratuitous evil premise, which corresponds to step 9 of the first argument.

This is a common evidential type argument from evil, inspired by William Rowe, where we take a single instance of evil and from it conclude that God probably does not exist.[*5] While Rowe focused on whether there are goods outweighing the evil in question, my formulation here focuses on reasons similar to Louise Antony’s approach.[*6] Typically, the incompatibility premise is admitted even by theists and the gratuitous evil premise is challenged instead.[*7]

The incompatibility premise in terms of reasons:

Here is a simplified, modus tollens version of the argument, which gives another way to see why gratuitous evils entail the non-existence of God:

1) If God exists, then God is the kind of being such that gratuitous evils do not exist.

2) Gratuitous evils do exist.

3) Therefore, God does not exist (or does exist but is not that kind of being).

I supported the incompatibility premise in Part 1 and Part 2, but now I will expand that support to include the reasons-based approach: if God exists, then God will be the kind of being that is 

a) Perfectly rational, and therefore always has good reasons for his actions, and 

b) Perfectly loving, and therefore considers reasons pertaining to minimizing the suffering of others to be good reasons to act, and thus 

c) God prevents suffering when the reasons to do so outweigh the reasons not to.

Therefore, Premise 1 of the second argument follows: if we encounter an instance of suffering for which the reasons to prevent outweigh the reasons not to, then God, as specified, does not exist.[*8]

It's important to keep in mind, as Rowe points out, that we needn't prove there are gratuitous evils. As long as gratuitous evils are probable, and the incompatibility premise holds, then God's non-existence is probable.

So we end up with three definitions of gratuitous evil, all compatible with (and even entailing) each other:

Gratuitous evil 1 = An instance of badness where the badness outweighs the goodness it produces.

Gratuitous evil 2 = An instance of badness where preventing the badness expresses a greater degree of love than allowing it expresses.

Gratuitous evil 3 = An instance of badness where the reasons to prevent it outweigh the reasons to allow it. (And thus, preventing it expresses a greater degree of rationality than allowing it expresses.)

By my lights it is certain, or close enough, that God is incompatible with gratuitous evil. So with the incompatibility premise thoroughly defended, and with a specific evil in mind, we can now explore the reasons God might have for preventing or allowing evils.


*1 - Parker’s Pensees #59: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3WnuhHOsmfg;

2017 Gilford Lecture 3: https://gifford.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/watch-the-2017-lectures/. 

*2 - By this definition, non-human animals love each other, though differently than we love. They regard their children as valuable as evidenced by their actions, but it’s a non-propositional and possibly non-emotional kind of love, whereas our love very much accompanies both propositions and emotions. There are certainly times where our loving behaviors run contrary to our emotions, but we perform those behaviors anyway out of devotion or loyalty or a sense of duty or of regarding the other as worth the sacrifice. Someone might say true love is exactly the behaviors that stay when the “lovey” emotions aren’t present.

*3 - You might think of pity as being a counterexample. With pity you don’t love the person exactly, but you still feel compassion for them. I would say that pity is a low degree of love, hence the compassion. It feels bad to be pitied because we wish to be valued more than that. With paradigmatic love, not only do you see the person as valuable, but extremely so. This suggests that God needn’t be all-loving to get the argument from evil up and running, just enough to pity us, as even pity will motivate stepping in and preventing gratuitous evils.

*4 - David Wood, Surprised By Suffering: Hume, Draper, and the Bayesian Argument From Evil (2013), pg 4.

*5 - William Rowe, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism (1979).

*6 - Louise Antony, No Good Reason—Exploring the Problem of Evil, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (2018), pg 36-45.

*7 - Cf. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael Bergmann, and William Rowe, “An exchange on the problem of evil” (2001). 

Some people do challenge the incompatibility premise. See Kirk MacGregor, The Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil (2008). But MacGregor seems to have a confused definition of gratuitous evil. See response: Ross Inman, “Gratuitous Evil Unmotivated: A Reply to MacGregor” (2013).

For another challenge to the incompatibility premise, see Justin Mooney, “How to Solve the Problem of Evil: A Deontological Strategy” (2020).

*8 - For the sake of the argument at hand, we can leave open whether reasons internalism or externalism is true. On internalism, God is maximally motivated to prevent gratuitous evils by his compassion. On externalism, God is maximally aware of the real reasons to prevent gratuitous evils and, being perfectly rational, will act according to those reasons.