https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXDrHcGd_Jc
I disagree. First, I'm not sure how 'moral value' is meant to differ from 'value.'
Here's one idea: Suppose a man commits adultery, and brags about it to his wife because he delights in her suffering. This man derives value from his evil actions, but he does not derive any moral value.
So we might say happiness is always valuable, but not always morally valuable, as in the case of evil happiness.
But this still leaves it mysterious as to what exactly moral value is. Are some kinds of happiness magically (inexplicably) better than other kinds?
I think we can explain why some kinds of happiness are better than others. We see how some kinds of happiness are evil because they are extrinsic evils.
Maybe Almeida is a Kantian? He might have in mind the Kantian idea that the only actions that have any moral value are those that come from a good will (which requires autonomy). I reject Kantianism for a variety of reasons, some of which I explain here: https://benstowell.blogspot.com/2024/11/four-problems-with-kants-ethics.html.
So on my no free will view, our actions certainly can have value, and they can have moral value in the sense of lacking the extrinsic evils attached to evil actions.
Moral value could also refer to things that produce value pertaining to the enabling of moral actions. So rationality is morally valuable, because rationality is essential for the enabling of moral actions. Actions that build one's character are morally valuable, because having a virtuous character is essential for the enabling of moral actions. All of this is compatible on a no free will view.
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