Oppy, Graham. Atheism and Agnosticism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Oppy defines the following terms as such (my paraphrase):
Atheist: A person who believes that there are no gods.
Note: I take 'gods' to include both lesser gods and God.
Atheism: The belief that there are no gods.
Note: 'belief', 'view', 'position', and 'stance' are often used interchangeably.
Theist: A person who believes that there is at least one god.
Theism: The belief that there is at least one god.
Agnostic: A person who, having considered the issue, lacks both belief in any god and the belief that there are no gods.
Agnosticism: The (considered) suspension of belief as to whether there are any gods.
Innocent: A person who has never considered the issue of whether there are gods.
Innocence: The (non-considered) suspension of belief as to whether there are any gods.
Note: If we consider personhood to exist wherever first-person properties exist, and if we consider animals to have first-person properties, and if we consider those entities that we ascribe first-person properties to to be persons, then we consider animals to be persons. Animals, which presumably have not considered whether there are any gods, would therefore fall under the category of 'innocents'. You could also simply stipulate that any sentient creature that has never considered the issue of whether there are gods is an innocent.
Oppy helpfully points out many other different attitudes one can discuss surrounding these terms. Following Oppy's lead, I would put it like so:
Expertise: How well-considered is this person's atheism / agnosticism / theism? How well-informed, educated, smart, intellectually virtuous, rational, or thoughtful is this person's atheism/agnosticism/theism? How many hours has this person spent reading, writing, and thinking about arguments for and against their atheism / agnosticism / theism?
Confidence: How confident is this person in the truth (or rationality) of atheism / agnosticism / theism – zero, low, moderate, high, or maximal?
Knowledge: Does this person claim to know that atheism / agnosticism / theism is true (and therefore claim to know that the other two positions are false)?
Open-mindedness: How willing is this person to engage with arguments against the truth (or rationality) of their atheism / agnosticism / theism? How willing is this person to change their mind on the truth (or rationality) of their atheism / agnosticism / theism?
Interest: Does this person find debates surrounding the existence and nature of God exciting or boring?
Conation: Does this person desire for any gods to be real?
Rationality:
(a) Does this person claim that their atheism / agnosticism / theism is rational (whatever they take 'rational' to mean)? (Presumably: yes. But what does this rationality consist in?)
(b) Does this person claim that their atheism / agnosticism / theism is more rational than the other two positions?
Put another way, in Oppy's words, does this person believe that: "all thoughtful, reflective, sufficiently intelligent, sufficiently well-informed people who give serious attention to the matter" believe in atheism / agnosticism / theism? Or can there be reasonable disagreement?
(c) Does this person claim that the other two positions are irrational – that being a thoughtful, reflective, sufficiently intelligent, sufficiently well-informed person who has given serious attention to the matter precludes one adhering to the other two positions? What does this irrationality consist in, exactly?
(d) Does this person claim that while belief in the other two positions is rational, other attitudes are irrational? E.g. An atheist might think that while belief in theism is rational, certainty in theism is irrational; an agnostic might think that while belief in atheism is rational, wanting God to not exist, or even lacking a want for God, is irrational.
Oppy says on pgs 9-10:
"Naturalism is the view that (a) there are none but natural entities with none but natural causal powers, and (b) well-established science is the touchstone for identifying causal entities and causal powers. . . .
Physicalism is the view that (a) there are none but physical entities with none but physical causal powers, and (b) well-established science is the touchstone for identifying causal entities and causal powers. Materialism is the view that (a) there are none but material entities with none but material causal powers, and (b) well-established science is the touchstone for identifying causal entities and causal powers."
I don't find anything objectionable to these definitions, though I do wonder about the meaning of and difference between 'physical' and 'material'. Similarly, this definition of naturalism demands the question of the meaning of 'natural' in contrast to 'non-natural' or 'supernatural'. Before getting into a discussion on the meaning of 'natural', it's faster to say naturalism is the view that all religions are false. This quickly communicates the core idea: "I have a belief system that doesn't include any religious claims."
Religious apologists might complain that this definition lacks any positive content – it doesn't say anything about what the naturalist actively believes. But this is silly, and I suspect this comes out of ignorance from not having seen any well-articulated naturalist worldviews. But a good naturalist worldview will have a well-articulated epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory, the same as any good worldview, and that set of epistemic, metaphysical, and value theory claims that makes up that naturalist worldview is the set of positive beliefs of that worldview. So the positivity is there, the apologist just isn't aware of it.
Atheists will turn rabid if you call atheism a worldview. I've always found this bizarre. It's obvious to me that when apologists use language like "According to the atheist worldview...", what they mean is something like "According to the worldview apparent of those kinds of people who introduce themselves as atheists...".
The trouble is that Christians introduce themselves as Christians and there is a Christian worldview, Muslims introduce themselves as Muslim and there is a Muslim (Islamic) worldview, and so on. And so it's no wonder that people would follow this pattern where terms of identity correspond to terms of worldview. If atheism is not your worldview, then why are you introducing yourself as an atheist? Why is that your identity term of choice? (In fact, that is part of why I would not call myself an atheist, instead calling myself an ex-Christian and naturalist, as those are better identifiers as to where I am coming from.)
Certainly, atheists have worldviews, and certainly those worldviews are atheistic. So there's no problem in complaining about atheistic worldviews, which is, charitably, what Christians are doing when they complain about "the atheist worldview". But it's true that if we're being careful, we would instead use the term "atheistic worldview". The problem with calling atheism a worldview is that worldviews are complex sets of many theories, and atheism is just one theory, even if it's a core theory of atheistic worldviews.
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