I agree with Philip Goff that you can't say that there's a conceptual connection between pain and avoidance behavior and yet have exceptions where pain and avoidance behavior come apart. Like Goff says, that's like saying there are no married bachelors except sometimes there are. The reason why there are no married bachelors is because there can't be any, because by definition to be a bachelor is to not be married. So there are no exceptions. Likewise, if there is a similar conceptual connection between pain and avoidance behavior, then there won't be any exceptions where pain and affective behavior are found together.
In my model, pain is a combination of A + B where A refers to non-bad first-person properties that distinguish one pain from another and B refers to the first-person property of intrinsic badness that unites all pains as pains.
B properties can also distinguish one pain from another by intensity. A more intensely bad pain is distinguishable from a less intensely bad pain. And by quality: the dull, warbling pain of wasp venom is distinct from the hot, constant pain of a burn.
If it's true that there is intrinsic badness, then it's true that there is something worth avoiding because of its essence; pain is worth avoiding because of what it is. I don't avoid pain for some further reason; I avoid pain because pain is worth avoiding for its own sake.
So if something is intrinsically bad, it is intrinsically worth avoiding. But if someone experiences an instance of intrinsic badness, then that just is to experience an instance of that which is intrinsically worth avoiding. Such an experience will produce avoidance intentionality in the mind of the person who experiences the pain. It is, therefore, impossible to experience pain and to not, at the same time, experience avoidance intentionality.
But there are cases where it seems like humans throw themselves head-first into pain. We see this with the pains involved in self-improvement such as dieting and exercise, or undergoing difficult education or training. We often risk experiences that we know could be very painful, such as adventuring outdoors or trying exotic foods. We willingly watch scary movies, push ourselves to extremes to break records, eat foods we know will be too spicy, and undergo medical procedures we know will be painful. Perhaps in these cases we are hoping for our adventures to be pain-free, but affective behavior and pain do go together.
And yet it's always the case that we are running away from pains. Running towards the pain of a medical procedure? That's just because the procedure is necessary to avoid greater pains, or because the procedure is necessary for survival and to enjoy pleasures that will, we bet, outweigh the pains of the procedure. Dieting and exercise is painful, but being unhealthy and overweight is painful too. And so on. I predict that in every one of these cases where you have pain plus affective behavior, there is a greater pain (per the judgment of the individual) being avoided. No one runs into pain for pain. Even someone who is a masochist is not after pain, but after the pleasure that comes with it.
Brian Cutter claimed in an interview that when we have painful dreams, our bodies remain motionless, and so this shows that pain does not necessitate avoidance behavior. But that's irrelevant. Pains in my dreams do necessitate avoidance intentionality; I try to wake myself up from the nightmare, or to run away from the threat, or to destroy the threat. My dream behavior is one of avoidance.
It is exactly because of avoidance intentionality that we find affective behavior being paired with pain. The affective behavior + pain always implies avoidance intentionality + other, greater pain.
What complicates things is that you need to endure pains to get to pleasures. This is why pain does not necessitate avoidance behavior despite necessitating avoidance intentionality. Pleasures, as the opposite of pains, are intrinsically motivating.
So if something is intrinsically good, it is intrinsically
worth pursuing. But if someone experiences an instance of intrinsic goodness, then that just is to experience an instance of that which is
intrinsically worth pursuing. Such an experience will produce affective intentionality in the mind of the person who experiences the pleasure. It
is, therefore, impossible to experience pleasure and to not, at the same
time, experience affective intentionality.
So affective intentionality and avoidance intentionality clashes. We make a judgment as to which one wins out. When the pain of being overweight outweighs the pain of being hungry, the individual loses weight. When a person goes hungry for the sake of losing weight, it would be silly to think that the pain of the hunger is not intrinsically bad just because the individual chooses not to avoid the pain. Of course the pain of going hungry is intrinsically bad, hence the struggle, the calculating, the tolerating, and the display of strength and discipline.
So psychophysical disharmony where someone experiences pain and yet does not experience avoidance intentionality is as impossible as someone being a bachelor and yet married.