Saturday, August 10, 2024

Theodicy #8 - Evil is necessary

This theodicy says God allows evils because he is forced to by metaphysical limitations. The story could go like this: God, in his creativity and beauty, must create a beautiful universe. And God, in his love, naturally wants to share his joy with others, and to relate to others in a personal way, and thus must populate the universe with creatures who can receive God’s love and delight in God’s creation. But God cannot create another perfect being, as a perfect being must exist a se and not depend on anything for its existence. So God must create an imperfect world with imperfect creatures, and that imperfection results in badness. Nature’s distance from perfection results in natural evils and the distance of persons from perfection results in moral evil.

Problems with this theodicy:


#8a - The Bible makes it sound like heaven is evil-free and yet God is able to create it. So evil is not necessary.


#8b - If God can ensoul himself into a human body like in the case of Jesus, then why not ensoul himself every time so that all humans are morally perfect? Jesus is, after all, fully human, and not identical to the Father. So there shouldn’t be any worries about having “clones” or a lack of diversity of persons. Plus there is no worry about free will unless we accept that Jesus lacks free will.


#8c - This brings up the ontological problem of evil. How could a perfect God produce imperfection? We might expect a perfect being to only be able to beget further perfection. For badness to be necessary, it can seem like it would have to be built into the foundations of things. But that would mean God would have to include badness in his essence, which is unacceptable.


#8d - Either the imperfections of the world are gratuitous or justified. If they are gratuitous, then God is forced to not create anything at all. But if they are justified, then we wonder how they are justified; that is the very question we are exploring. If you say imperfections are justified because God is forced to create by metaphysical limitations, then that’s false. As just stated, God could be forced to not create.


The above story can help us understand why God creates something rather than nothing, but it does nothing to explain how evils are justified. This theodicy fails to address the problem of evil and only restates the problem.

Theodicy #7 - Butterfly effect

Let’s say God allows the Holocaust to prevent an even greater Holocaust in the future. The problem with this is that God could intervene and prevent the first Holocaust and then intervene again to prevent the second one. If God allows someone to suffer third-degree burns so that 100 years later someone from a different country gets their dream job, God could prevent the burns and deliver the dream job. So if God allows an evil to achieve a greater good, the greater good must depend on that evil (or a worse or comparable evil) or else God could achieve the same good with less evil.

This unlocks a new kind of gratuitous evil not yet discussed. Comparative gratuitous evil:

God has a choice to either instantiate the column 1 scenario (An evil gives rise to a greater good) or the column 2 scenario (a good gives rise to the exact same greater good). Given that choice, God would choose column 2.

Note: the greater good in column 2 needn’t be the exact same greater good as in column 1. It could be a different greater good of comparable degree, a greater good of greater degree, or even a greater good of lesser degree depending on the balance between the good and evil giving rise to the corresponding greater goods. Also, the good in row 2 could be neutral or even evil, as long as it’s not as evil as the evil in column 1 and as long as its corresponding greater good retains the necessary superiority over the opposing greater good. Indeed, the good of column 2 could be a greater evil than the evil of column 1 as long as its greater good is that much greater than the greater good of column 1.

Comparative gratuitous evil = An evil that produces a net good, but replacing that evil with a good or a different evil would have produced a greater net good.

So this theodicy fails, revealing an additional, significant condition evils must meet to not be gratuitous. In all, when an evil E produces a good G, it must be the case, for E to not be gratuitous, that:

1) G is greater in magnitude than E.

2) It is not the case that God could prevent E and in its place instantiate a good, a lesser evil, or even a greater evil that produces an overall net good that is greater than the net good of G & E.

Theodicy #6 - Soul contracts

This is a theodicy featured in the book When Heaven Invades Hell by Josh and Rachel Rasmussen. While the book comes highly recommended, I don’t consider soul contracts to hold any weight. These are deals made between God and souls before the souls are brought to earth. Basically, the evils inflicted on the innocent are less bad if the innocent consented to the whole of their life prior to being born. But first, it’s hard to conceive of a human person making complex choices like that without having the genetic and environmental factors that play such a massive role in shaping us. Second, when you ask any person on earth whether they consented to being born, they will say no. When asked whether they are okay with the evils they have been through, they will say no again. So it’s hard to see how it could be me who consented to being born or to undergoing the suffering I did.

So this theodicy fails and unlocks a further consideration for preventing EJ’s dementia.


Anti-theodicy #4: EJ does not consent to her condition. Her situation is a violation of her consent, and is a violation of the collective consent of her community.

Side note: Christian philosopher Kenny Pearce also rejects soul contracts as a response to the problem of evil. See this interview starting at the 42 minute mark: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPneTz3zD4g.

Theodicy #5 - Being of use to each other

This is a theodicy I’ve heard from Richard Swinburne, who says the following:

But there do so often look to be lives in which the bad outweighs the good, about which we say that it would be better for such a person not to have lived. I urge however that this is a wrong assessment of many lives because it does not take into account a good which I have so far not mentioned —the good of being of use to others. It is an enormous good for anyone to be of use—whether by what they do by free choice, or by what they do involuntarily or by what happens to them, including what they suffer. Helping someone freely is clearly a great good for the helper. . . .[*3]

There are two different conversations here. The first is people being of use to others even if they live poor lives. The second is the unique good of usefulness. Let’s start with the first.

#5a - Useful lives

This theodicy fails for three reasons. The first is for a similar reason that the butterfly effect theodicy fails (see Theodicy #7). Let’s say someone dies by falling into a pool of boiling water in Yellowstone National Park. We want to know why God would allow that to happen. Saying “because their life served as a warning to others” is a nonsensical response. That would mean God allows people to fall into boiling water as a means to prevent people from falling into boiling water. If God wants to prevent an evil, then doing so by allowing that very evil, or by allowing a worse or comparable evil, is a contradictory way of going about things. 

The second reason is that at best this could only provide a silver lining, not an actual justification. If a parent’s child dies and the death of the child serves some kind of purpose, the parent will naturally prefer to save the child and lose whatever purpose that could be.

The third reason is for deontic concerns. Arguably, a loving God would care about people not as a means to an end but as an end unto themselves. It would be a gross mistreatment of someone to let them boil to death just so their life can be useful to others.

#5b - The goodness of usefulness

I think this theodicy partially succeeds, or at least has a chance to partially succeed.

Consider a boy who falls off his bike and scrapes his knee. Scared and hurt, he walks his bike home and tells his mom what happened. She patches him up.

Many goods come out of this:

1) The mom feels useful.
2) The mom gets a chance to express her love and care to her son.
3) The son experiences being loved and cared for. 
4) The son and mom bond over the experience.
5) The son is humbled by the experience. He learns that he can get hurt. It’s good to have an accurate picture of what you are.
6) At the same time, the son learns that he is strong and can survive a fall and get back up.
7) Moreover, the son, who suffers the evil, is the one who benefits from the evil (along with his mom), alleviating deontic concerns.
8) Theodical goods are cashed out almost immediately after the evil is suffered.
9) The intensity of the suffering is low; there is never a point at which the son or mother consider life to not be worth living because of the suffering.
10) The goods mentioned above uniquely depend on the badness of the boy falling off his bike and having him scrape his knee.

I’m not sure about (10). Imagine if instead the boy bakes cookies with his mom. In this case,

1) The mom feels useful teaching her son how to bake.
2) The mom gets a chance to express her love by spending time with him.
3) The son experiences being loved. 
4) The son and mom bond over the experience.
5) The son is humbled by the experience. He learns that he has much to learn from his mom.
6) At the same time, the son learns that he is good at baking, increasing his self-esteem. (We’ll say he doesn’t make any mistakes, because if he did, that would probably hurt roughly as much as a scraped knee, defeating the point of the scenario.)
7) There are no deontic concerns as the son is not undignified by an evil for someone else’s sake.
8) There is no worry about when or if theodical goods are cashed out.
9) There is never a point at which the son or mother considers life to not be worth living because of suffering.
10) The goods mentioned above uniquely depend on the mother and boy baking together.
11) Bonus: the son never experiences any sense that the world he lives in is hostile. He is more able to embrace the world he lives in as a good world.

Some of these goods are the same as in the hurt knee case, and others are of arguably equal or even greater magnitude, without the badness of the hurt knee. There is even a bonus higher-order good of not experiencing any kind of anxiety about the dangers of the world like we get in the hurt knee case.

But there is a drawback: Emotions are not as heightened and the stakes aren’t as high as in the hurt knee case. So the hurt knee case remains in my mind a plausibly justified evil, though I’m open to some of these higher-order goods in the cookie baking case to override the higher-order goods of the knee hurt case.

It’s hard to imagine a world without problems. Even if we could imagine such a world, it may be better to have problems, as they give us something to do and allow us to be useful to each other and to interact with each other in meaningful ways. If there is a successful theodicy, it will certainly incorporate these kinds of goods for these reasons.

So this theodicy plausibly succeeds, or rather plays a role in a plausibly successful theodicy. 

However, I said this theodicy can only partially succeed, and that’s because, like in #5a, this theodicy won’t apply in all cases, or will sometimes only amount to a silver lining. Dementia happens to be one of those cases.

Anti-theodicy #3: It is a great good to feel useful and to be useful to others. Dementia destroys, for the person afflicted, the possibility of both. Dementia also destroys, for the loved ones of the afflicted, the possibility of feeling or being useful, because the disease is untreatable, incurable, and only gets worse over time. Given the overwhelming desire to see the loved one healed, and the impossibility of this, an overwhelming feeling of powerlessness can emerge for anyone affected.

While there is the good of the opportunity to care for the afflicted and for the afflicted to be cared for, it’s obvious that this good is a mere silver lining, dwarfed by the evil. We would much rather have the good of the freedom from the evil than have the good of care.


*3 - Richard Swinburne, "The Problem of Evil" (1995) in (ed.) P. Koslowski, Jahrbuch für Philosophie des Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover.

Theodicy #4 - The Fall

This theodicy is related to the previous two, but in this case evil is not understood to be God directly punishing you on the basis of your sin or the sin of your ancestors. Instead, sin in general has caused the earth to fall into a cursed state and both the innocent and guilty are caught in the crossfire of that cursed state (hence Luke 13:2 and Matthew 5:45).

This theodicy is special to me because it is the one my mom would give. She would say, “It’s a sin-cursed world” as a way of explaining what was happening to her.

To help me get my bearings on the doctrine of The Fall, I’ve consulted some of William Lane Craig’s comments on the topic, from here (https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-man/doctrine-of-man-part-19) and here (https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-man/doctrine-of-man-part-20).

This theodicy fails for the following reasons:

First, it’s not obvious what exactly Christians are committed to. Is The Fall a literal event in history or a metaphor for the condition humans find themselves in? The greater the commitment, the greater the doxastic cost for the Christian.

Second, it’s not right to say the world is “sin-cursed” as if a single sin somehow casted a magical spell over the earth and caused pain and death to enter the world. It’s more accurate to say the world is “God-cursed” per the Genesis 3 passage.

Third, if we take seriously an evolutionary account of biology, then pain and death has always been around, including the pain of childbirth and of the toiling for food. God’s curses are mythological. (Presumably Dr. Craig would admit this, as he calls the Genesis creation account “mytho-history.”)

Fourth, sin is either highly problematic or not. If it is, then it’s mysterious as to why God would create at all or why God would allow sin. If it’s not, then it’s mysterious as to why God would curse the earth because of it.

Fifth, God cursing the earth seems to betray a misunderstanding on God’s part of human nature. We know that humans “sin” due to poverty, ignorance, irrationality—circumstances beyond their control. Animals kill not because they are evil, but because they must to survive. Humans act according to survival pressures as well. A king, fearing death, might wish to immortalize himself by conquest. Conscripted soldiers fearing punishment for desertion might fight on that king’s behalf. All or nearly all destructive human behaviors can be explained by biological impulses, psychological mechanisms, social pressures, and false beliefs. So if God wants humans to not sin, he should remove these things, not cause them.

Sixth, if God curses the earth and thereby allows pain, death, earthquakes, drowning, disease, and so on, then it’s really hard to see how God is not the author of evil or not responsible for (natural) evil.

Seventh, in many cases, like the SIDS case, natural evils are worse than the sins of those affected by them. If God hates sin because it’s a bad thing, it hardly makes sense for God to put more bad things into the world in response.

This theodicy is less a response to the problem of evil and more of a restatement of it.

Friday, August 9, 2024

Dementia and the Problem of Evil Part 5/6 - Theodicies Fail to Provide Counter Reasons

Part 5: The Failure of Theodicies

A theodicy is a theory as to why God allows some kind of evil. If a theodicy succeeds then it will, in this case, show that God has good reasons to allow EJ’s dementia. Remember, the categorical reasons for preventing EJ’s dementia are the following:

1 - INTRINSIC EVILS

1a - The pain EJ experiences.

1b - The pain EJ’s immediate family members experience, especially that of her husband who is the closest to her.

1c - The pain of EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc.

2 - INTRINSIC GOODS

2a - The happiness EJ would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2b - The happiness EJ’s family would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2c - The happiness EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc., would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

Theodicies are competing against this.

Theodicy #1 - Evil is necessary for us to appreciate the good

I will make a point here that I will attribute, at least the general idea of it, to Peter van Inwagen, though I don’t have the citation. The point is that God could simulate evils by giving us nightmares as a reminder of what could be but isn’t. We would always wake up from these nightmares in great relief, and thereby enjoy the unique good of gratitude without having the evils be real.

But if we die and go to heaven, then isn’t that like waking up from a nightmare? The difference is that here on earth we have to face our evils in succession without experiencing the relief we would under the above scenario. Plus, if earth is made out to be a nightmare, then it’s confusing as to why a good God would create it.

Those points besides, it’s obvious that we don’t need much evil to appreciate goodness, if we need it at all (and it’s not obvious to me that we need it at all). Clearly, there are many cases of evil where the evil is too much. We can’t appreciate the goodness of life if there is no goodness. Some evils are so great that they destroy us or leave us devastated and cynical. 

So this theodicy fails, and it unlocks a further consideration for preventing EJ’s dementia.

Anti-theodicy #1: EJ’s dementia prevents EJ’s ability to appreciate the goodness of life and to experience the unique good of gratitude. It also prevents her loved ones from appreciating life as much as they would otherwise.

Theodicy #2 - Evil is punishment for your ancestor’s sins

We see this throughout the Old Testament. The doctrine of Original Sin says Adam’s sin is inherited by the rest of humanity (Romans 5:12). Exodus 20:5 and Deuteronomy 5:9 show God threatening punishment to descendants, though this contradicts Deuteronomy 24:16, Ezekiel 18:20, and John 9:3. I take punishing descendants to be a clear violation of justice; it’s evil to punish someone for someone else’s wrongdoing.

So this theodicy fails.

Theodicy #3 - Evil is punishment for your sins

There are three problems with this: One, it leads to superstitious, “everything happens for a reason” thinking. This makes you liable to mistake an unfortunate event for karmic retribution.

Two, Jesus rejects this theodicy (John 9:3 where Jesus heals the blind man, Luke 13:2 where Jesus speaks of the Tower of Siloam, and Matthew 5:45 where rain is said to fall on the righteous and unrighteous). And in the book of Job, God allows evils to befall Job despite Job’s blamelessness.

A Christian might think that my family was punished with EJ’s dementia due to our sin. But given the above, there is no good reason to think this. And ask anyone who knows my mom and they will agree she was the least deserving person to receive such a horrendous evil. Plus, Douglas Groothuis is a Christian philosopher and theologian who had a wife, Becky, who had dementia[*1]. God never healed her. So this happens to other Christians, not just to my family. 

Furthermore, all Christians suffer eventually, so this would imply that God punishes all Christians for their sin. God lets all Christians (thus far) die. It would be far more glorious and less painful for Christians if God assumed them into heaven like he did Elijah and Jesus. But God doesn’t. So God has allowed all Christians (thus far) to befall a worse fate than necessary.

Three, and I give credit to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for this next point[*2], there are very clear cases where there is no way this theodicy applies. If a baby dies from SIDS, what were the sins of that baby?

So this theodicy fails and unlocks a further consideration for preventing EJ’s dementia.

Anti-theodicy #2: EJ’s situation is unjust. EJ does not deserve her fate, and neither do those close to her deserve to suffer due to her suffering.



*1 - Douglas Groothuis, Walking Through Twilight (2017).

*2 - YouTube. William Lane Craig vs. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong | "Do Suffering and Evil Disprove God?" - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTacpjiv8vU, 16:30.

Thursday, August 1, 2024

Dementia and the Problem of Evil Part 4/6 - God Has Millions of Reasons to Prevent Evil

 Part 4: Preliminaries

Before we get to theodicies, there are a few preliminaries I want to discuss first.

4a - Definitions:

Here are some tentative definitions to give us something to work with going forward.

Evil = badness; An evil = a bad thing.

To suffer = to endure evil, especially repeatedly or over a period of time.

Badness comes in three types: intrinsic, extrinsic, and deprivational.

Something is intrinsically bad if it’s bad in and of itself.

The only thing I can think of that is bad in and of itself is anything the badness of which is directly accessible, i.e. bad feelings, i.e. pain. 

We can see this by asking “Why” questions. Why put on a coat before going outside in the winter? Because you will be cold if you don’t. But why avoid being cold? Because being cold is bad in and of itself. Why eat healthy? Because you will feel sick if you don’t. But why avoid feeling sick? Because feeling sick is bad in and of itself.

Therefore, something is intrinsically bad if and only if its badness is experienced by a person. Intrinsic badness is phenomenal badness, or bad qualia

To be in pain is to be experiencing bad feelings. There are many different kinds of bad feelings, both physical and mental, and thus there are many different kinds of pain.

There is a subjective component and an objective component to badness. Whether something is intrinsically bad for someone depends on that person’s subjective experience. But whether someone has suffered is a question of fact. So if I say “Well, that movie was painful to watch…”, I am saying something true relative to me and not necessarily relative to anyone else. But if someone says “Ben did not have a bad experience watching that movie”, they have said something false. So while it’s subjective whether someone suffers, the fact that people suffer is objective.

This is why people are not just valuable, but objectively so. It’s a matter of fact that valuable states (states of happiness) occur because people are there to generate them. People generate value states for themselves as well as for each other. Each person is a locus of value.

An extrinsic evil is anything that causes some kind of pain for someone. Wearing too few layers in the cold is extrinsically bad. Eating unhealthy is extrinsically bad. Death is extrinsically bad because it causes the pain of grief to loved ones.

Speaking of death, if badness is ultimately cashed out in terms of experience, and we do not experience being dead, then how can death be bad for the one who dies? This is where deprivational badness comes in. The deprivation theory says death is bad because it deprives the one who dies from goods they otherwise would have experienced had they not died. The one who dies is worse off compared to how they would have been had they lived. FOMO comes from this. If we stay home instead of going to the party, we worry that we missed out on a good time. Staying home deprived you of the good vibes, drinks, and snacks you would have enjoyed had you gone. Failure to fulfill one’s potential is bad in this way too. If you had fulfilled your potential, then there are goods you and others would have enjoyed, and you and they are worse off for not getting to enjoy them.

So when I say something is bad, I am saying that it’s a pain, a source of pain, or something that deprives one of goods they otherwise would enjoy. The categories of evils then are:

INTRINSIC EVIL - Anything the badness of which is directly accessible.

Ex. touching a hot pan, loneliness, boredom, hunger, feeling sick, feeling upset because your car is damaged, feeling frustrated because of technical issues.

EXTRINSIC EVIL - Anything that causes an intrinsic or deprivational evil.

Ex. Forgetting the pan is hot, not having a good social life, not having meaningful projects to work on, not having enough food, illness, bad hail storms, not understanding technology.

DEPRIVATIONAL EVIL - Anything that prevents, ruins, or lessens an intrinsic good.

Ex. Death, poverty, coma, illness.

Conversely:

Happiness = intrinsically good feelings. (Usually “pleasure” is used here, but due to negative connotations surrounding carnal pleasures I will use “happiness”.)

To be happy is to be experiencing good feelings. There are many different kinds of good feelings, both physical and mental, and thus there are many different kinds of happiness.

Happiness (contrasted with “sadness”) can also refer to an emotion of elation, relief, excitement, or satisfaction. She felt so happy when she saw her sister at the airport.

Happiness (contrasted with “misery”) can also refer to a state of contentment. He was happy with his job / He was miserable at his job.

To flourish = to enjoy goods, especially repeatedly or over a period of time. 

(I think of flourishing as involving a moral component where not only the one who flourishes is happy, but is happy for the right reasons and is connected to others in the right way. While in one sense violent criminals can flourish, in another sense they are failing to be happy for the right reasons and to connect to others in the right way.)

The categories of goods:

INTRINSIC GOOD - Anything the goodness of which is directly accessible.

Ex. Taste of delicious food, the feeling of a hot shower, the satisfying feeling of sleeping in a comfy bed.

EXTRINSIC GOOD - Anything that causes an intrinsic or saving good.

Ex. Delicious food, hot showers, comfy beds.

SAVING GOOD - Anything which prevents, cures, or alleviates an intrinsic evil.

Ex. Pain medicine, surgery, a peace treaty between two warring nations.

Often, things are a complicated mix of good and bad. Pain can be intrinsically bad while extrinsically good as it alerts you to a bigger problem your body has. The intrinsic pain of guilt can be extrinsically good by alerting you to the need to change your ways. One person’s happiness can cause others to be happy, and thus be both intrinsically and extrinsically good. Death is deprivationally bad for the one who dies (and deprivationally bad for those who would have enjoyed moments of happiness caused by the one who died) and extrinsically bad because it causes the pain of grief. A good can turn into an evil if getting it causes you to miss out on a greater good.

4b - Reasons-Value Principle:

The Reasons-Value Principle says that the badness of an evil provides the reason to prevent that evil. Likewise, the goodness of a good provides the reason to cause that good.

You might wonder how this connects to God. Our pain might give us reason to prevent it, but why would that give God reason to prevent our pain?

There are a few options:

For God’s Sake: Because of God’s empathy and love, God suffers when we suffer. God has direct access to the badness of his suffering, and thus understands the cause of his suffering, our suffering, to be bad.

For Our Sake: You might want to maintain God’s impassibility and thus reject the notion that our suffering causes God to suffer. But God, in his love for us, can still desire for us to be free of suffering; God himself does not suffer, but because of his omniscience he understands our suffering perfectly, and by his love is moved to minimize it.

Rationality: The objectively smart thing to do is to maximize as much flourishing and minimize as much suffering in the world as possible. God understands the badness of the suffering of sentient creatures and the goodness of their flourishing and by that understanding sees the reasons to promote flourishing and minimize suffering.

So the Reasons-Value Principle applies not only to us, but to God as well. For each instance of evil that a sentient creature faces, the badness of that evil gives God a reason to prevent it, and for each instance of goodness a sentient creature might enjoy, the goodness of that good gives God a reason to cause it.

With these tools in hand, we can get an idea of the reasons God has for preventing EJ’s dementia.

4c - Reasons to prevent the evil:

4c1: Because goods and evils ultimately cash out in terms of experience, we can categorize everything under intrinsic goods and intrinsic evils like the following:

1 - INTRINSIC EVILS

1a - The pain EJ experiences.

1b - The pain EJ’s immediate family members experience, especially that of her husband who is the closest to her.

1c - The pain of EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc.

2 - INTRINSIC GOODS

2a - The happiness EJ would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2b - The happiness EJ’s family would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

2c - The happiness EJ’s friends, neighbors, churchgoers, extended family members, etc., would have experienced had the disease been prevented.

4c2 - Almost all evils are apparently gratuitous: God has at least six layers of reasons to prevent EJ’s dementia. If I had healing powers, or if we had the technology to cure dementia, we would cure EJ without hesitation, and these reasons explain why.

Indeed, this is how we can know there are apparent gratuitous evils. For any evil, if you would be inclined to prevent or cure that evil had you the power to do so, then this tells you the evil is apparently gratuitous to you.

A similar test is the “prayer test”. If you believed in the power of prayer and were inclined to pray for God to resolve an evil, then that evil is apparently gratuitous to you. Why would you try to pray away an evil unless it seemed to you that its badness outweighed its goodness?

If the prayer test shows us which evils are apparently gratuitous, then nearly all evils we encounter are apparently gratuitous, as nearly all evils we encounter we would be inclined to pray away if we believed in the power of prayer.

Christians will even pray to God to help find their car keys. It sounds funny, because if God is willing to allow the Holocaust then certainly he is willing to allow you to lose your car keys, or lose your life in a car accident for that matter. Still, losing your keys is a pain in the butt. A gratuitous evil needn’t be a massive evil. As long as the badness outweighs the goodness, it’s gratuitous, no matter how small the badness is. So yes, even losing your keys is an apparently gratuitous evil.

4c3 - Getting a rough idea of the number of reasons God has to prevent EJ’s dementia:

For the sake of simplicity, let’s say the following:

-A moment is a 5 second interval.

-A day is a 16 hour period. So each day contains 11,520 moments.

-A year is 360 days. So a year contains 4,147,200 moments.

-Let’s say EJ’s symptoms started 12 years ago (I’m not exactly sure when they started, but it was at least 12 years ago). 12 years is 49,766,400 moments.

In one way or another, all of those moments are corrupted, either because they become moments of suffering because of the disease (layer 1a), or because moments of flourishing would have occurred without the disease (layer 2a). So there are basically up to 50 million reasons to prevent EJ’s dementia, and that’s not even counting the unknown millions of reasons that fall under 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c.

Of course, I’m simplifying massively. There are many complexities that emerge when trying to quantify reasons. The point is to get a general feel for the reasons there are to prevent EJ’s suffering. We are so familiar with suffering that it’s easy to miss just how many reasons there are to prevent it. While it’s impossible for us to quantify the exact number and weight of the reasons to prevent any evil, in EJ’s case the reasons are clearly in the tens of millions and beyond. Keeping these reasons in mind will give us an intuitive feel for the weight that theodicies are up against.