Thursday, June 19, 2025

Quotes on pain – John Green and Jordan Peterson

John Green: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTEhBL7CetU

Jordan Peterson: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4DgBQ9N5qk 

"When people hear that their pain isn't real, they immediately disbelieve you because they know that their pain is real; it's the realist thing in the world." –John Green

YouTube: Mythical Kitchen, "John Green Eats His Last Meal", 10 June 2025, timestamp 29:27.

". . . actually, things do have meaning. The proof of that, the most direct proof, is pain. No one disbelieves in their pain. Descartes said "I think, therefore I am", but it's more of a religious statement, and you can derive this from many religions, that the fundamental truth is "I suffer, therefore I am." And I think the reason for that is because, I don't care what you don't have faith in. The one thing you believe in is your own pain. And pain is a form of meaning, and what alleviates pain therefore, and suffering, is also a form of meaning. And I would say that the primary religious injunction, along with telling the truth, is to do what you can to alleviate suffering. And I think the truth is actually a corollary of that, because untruth produces more suffering than truth." –Jordan Peterson

Duncan Trussell Family Hour Podcast, February 2017, reposted on YouTube by hihosilver, 06 Jul 2022, timestamp 1:22:28.

"That's why so many religions, like the Buddhist religion, insists that existence is suffering. The reason for that, it's a claim about what's irreducibly real. Everyone acts as if their pain is real. It doesn't matter what they say, it doesn't matter what kind of materialist they are or what they think about the human soul, or anything like that. When it comes right down to it, there's nothing more real than pain." –Jordan Peterson (Emphasis in bold is mine.) 

Duncan Trussell Family Hour Podcast, February 2017, reposted on YouTube by hihosilver, 06 Jul 2022, timestamp 1:45:50.

Bonus:

"One thing I've learned as a clinical psychologist is that you do not hit a target you don't aim for." –Jordan Peterson

Duncan Trussell Family Hour Podcast, February 2017, reposted on YouTube by hihosilver, 06 Jul 2022, timestamp 1:34:15.

Monday, June 16, 2025

Bishop Robert Barron is wrong about some things

 
1) 19:25 - "To be is to be good. Whatever is, is good." This is clearly mistaken. Imagine being a Boltzmann Brain popping into existence, experiencing constant agony, and being unable to die, forever. In that case, clearly being is not good, as being enables the bad of unending suffering. Being is not even pro tanto (to an extent) good in that case. How could it be? It's wholly bad. The idea that good and being are convertible is just a confusion of what goodness is (i.e. something phenomenally defined, like color experience).
 
2) 19:45 - Pain is certainly intrinsically bad (even if extrinsically good for survival), but ontologically positive. So evils (bad things) are not always privations.
 
To lack money is to not have money. To lack a lack of money is to have money. To lack pain is to not have pain. To lack a lack of pain is to have pain. So pain is positive, just like money. 
 
3) Evolution provides problems for religious belief for at least four reasons:
 
A) It's strange that a good God would use such horrific means to create life—the constant cycle of pain, death, and killing required of evolution.
 
B) I'm not sure how connected the Catholic church was to creationism, but certainly there was (and still is) a connection between Protestantism and creationism. But if creationism is mistaken, then it's embarrassing that Christians would be led by the Bible to false scientific beliefs. If Christians can be so wrong about something they're so confident in, despite being supposedly led by the Holy Spirit, then what other things might they be wrong about?
 
C) If Genesis 1-11 is basically myth, then what other parts of the Bible are myth or metaphor despite being traditionally taken as literal? The Eucharist, perhaps?
 
D) If evolution explains life, then we face the concern of debunking arguments. The Bible says be fruitful and multiply. Catholics reject contraception and abortion. Isn't it convenient to have exactly the pro-reproductive values we'd expect you to have were those values selected for not by truth, but by survival pressures? Why believe that those pro-reproductive beliefs / practices are true and not merely selected?
 
1:14:19 – "Religion keeps reasserting itself." But there are religions other than Christianity. How is Islam possible from a Christian perspective? A unified explanation of religion appeals to evolution. Of course religion reasserts itself; it's a pro-social system, and evolution selects for pro-social systems. Christians have to appeal to ad hoc spiritual explanations for competing religions — it's demonic activity or Satanic influence that causes other religions to arrive. But if Christians take advantage of common sense psychological, sociological, and anthropological explanations for competing religions, then how do they make Christianity an exception to these explanations? It's special pleading.
 
4) 35:20 - It's controversial to say that our being is conditional. See: "Metaphysical Rationalism" by Shamik Dasgupta, or The Case for Necessitarianism by Amy Karofsky. Klaas Kraay shows a way the theist can accept modal collapse without giving up common sense modal intuitions in "Theism and Modal Collapse", though whether an imaginable world is actually possible will depend on whether it is part of a best possible theistic multiverse.
 
5) 1:25:41 – I'm personally certain that euthanasia can be justified. You'd think that someone like Bishop Barron who emphasizes the relinquishing of the self and the refusal of "caving in" on oneself would understand how profoundly wrong it is to try to squeeze every last drop of life at all costs, as if the preservation of the self is the most important thing when it is not. The medical cases become absurd, with us spending $100,000 in medical costs to stay alive for one last week in agony or in a half-lucid state only to die in a lonely, cold, sterile hospital room. (Nevermind the exorbitant costs for longer care, money that could seriously set up the lives of the grandchildren for success. I'm not saying money is more important than life. I'm saying paying for torture is a bad deal.)
 
Common sense end of life care options are nearly non-existent in the US. It would be infinitely more humane and meaningful for us to die surrounded by loved ones, at home, awake and able to say goodbye, when we are ready. (There's the rub – who is ever ready to die? That takes a level of maturity that few people have.) Is it really God's will for us to die slow, agonizing deaths alone in hospitals? Really?
 
You'd also think that religious people who believe that death is not the end and that staying alive in this world is not all that important would be all the more accepting of an "early" death. (I put 'early' in scare quotes because 'early death' implies there was more life to live, but you can't call it living when additional "life" brings nothing but pain, incapacity, and indignity to the patient.)
 
Catholics would have us believe that Brittany Maynard was evil, corrupt, mistaken, irrational—even guilty of a mortal sin—for her choice to end her life "early" to avoid the horrors of dying from brain cancer. Nothing could be more obviously false. It takes a staggering bravery and emotional intelligence to face death head on and accept it rather than die kicking and screaming like most do. How darkly hilarious is it that the God who prohibits death with dignity would be the same God who allows brain cancer, ALS, dementia, Alzheimer's, and all manner of degenerative disease that make death with dignity morally essential?

William Lane Craig on why there aren't miracles today

 
"God has given evidence sufficient for those with an open mind and an open heart, but it's sufficiently vague so as to not compel those whose hearts are closed."
 
This claim is problematic for a number of reasons.
 
1) If someone's heart is closed, then no amount of evidence would be sufficient. For example, if there were an absolute proof that Christianity is false, many Christians would probably just ignore it or claim it's not a proof because their hearts are closed to the possibility of Christianity being false. So if God wanted to prove that non-believers have closed hearts, God should provide such an overwhelming amount of evidence for His existence such that only a person with a closed heart could reject God. But we don't see that overwhelming amount of evidence. Indeed, given the problem of evil, we see an overwhelming amount of evidence that there is no loving God.
 
2) Belief does not compel a relationship. James 2:19 says "Even the demons believe". So God could make his existence undeniable knowing that mere belief is not enough for love, desire, allyship, and so on.
 
3) While belief in existence is not sufficient for a true relationship, it is, arguably, necessary. How can you have a relationship with someone who doesn't exist? How can you have a relationship with someone who might not exist? Even some Christians admit that God might not exist. So how can you act as if God does? You can only act as if God probably exists, but doesn't relationship require certainty in the existence of the beloved? Otherwise, you are only loving the idea of God, not the person (or persons) of God. But if that's right, then not only do Christians have to argue that Christianity is true, they have to argue that it is certainly true! That God certainly exists! No Christian can come close to meeting that standard.
 
4) A popular view in philosophy is called doxastic involuntarism, which is the view that we cannot choose what we believe. We cannot choose our intelligence, our background knowledge, or what arguments make sense to us. Since what we believe is a function of those things, we cannot choose what we believe. But if that's right, then all belief is compelled belief, compelled by circumstances beyond our control. God, who knows this, knows that by keeping the evidence for his existence vague he is compelling people to conclude that God does not exist, or probably does not exist, or just as likely exists as not, or only probably exists, depending on the exact psychology and circumstances of the person.

Monday, June 9, 2025

09 June 2025 - Thoughts

  • Today I'm working on post #2 in my series on intellectual virtue. This will examine the words of Michael Huemer.
  • Yesterday I posted quotes and some responses to Joe Schmid's words on intellectual virtue. I'm basically in total agreement, especially with the idea that virtue is the foundation of critical thinking. Where does philosophy begin? It begins with psychology, with the kind of person you are. If you are the kind of person who wants answers to philosophical questions, then you are the right kind of person for doing philosophy. If you are the kind of person who wants truth, then there are certain practices and attitudes you will take on to maximize your chances of finding the truth and ensuring that you are not stuck in falsehoods. 
  • Disagreements: I will probably take a different approach to defining virtue, and I also clashed somewhat with the idea that there is always room for rational disagreement (even on complex topics). Depending on how we define rationality, rational disagreement is not possible; at least one person believes on the basis of false reasons. But you cannot blame someone for believing on the basis of false reasons, especially when the person is not believing on the basis of intellectual vices like wishful thinking or social pressure.
  • There are two senses of blame here. On the first sense, you cannot blame anyone at all ever for any of their beliefs, because you cannot blame someone for their intelligence, knowledge, and so on. We do not choose our beliefs and we do not choose what makes sense to us. On the second sense, you can "blame" someone in the sense of acknowledging that there is something this person lacks. Some kinds of believing will reveal more of a lack than others. There is rational disagreement in the sense that people can disagree without lacking anything other than knowledge, which doesn't speak badly about the person qua truthseeker. Other kinds of disagreement involve a lack of intellectual virtue, which does speak badly about the person qua truthseeker.
  • I had written some on tribalism in general and tribalism within Christianity, inspired by Joe's remarks on tribalism, but those writings have been lost. I think the gist of what I had to say was that 1) Tribalism involves us-versus-them thinking, echo chambers, socially reinforced beliefs (believing not because something makes sense, but because you will be socially punished otherwise), sophistry (saying words for the effect the words have on others, not for the truth of the words), heuristics, group psychology, ego, defensiveness, identity, group identity, doing things not because they are good or true but because they help the tribe and help your standing within the tribe, and a number of other pernicious things that I don't currently remember. 2) Tribalism thus causes intellectual vice and thus impedes truthseeking. 3) Tribalism is a problem that cannot be solved because humans depend on tribes for their survival. Even being a truthseeker runs the risk of falling into tribalist traps with "us truthseekers vs those irrational non-truthseekers" way of thinking. 4) The closest to a solution is to be radically socially independent. But this is impossible in most cases. Either you depend on family for survival, or you depend on a job. Both cases involve social structures and social structures are tribes. Survival and (philosophical) truthseeking sadly come apart in many ways, which is why humans are so overwhelmingly bad at philosophy. 5) You can try to select or procure a tribe that is the least tribalistic, but it's hard to see how tribalism can be fully eliminated. Being aware of tribalism and selecting or procuring a tribe in a strategic way can mitigate or even eliminate some of tribalism's worst effects. But how far can that go? It seems to me that tribalism is a fundamental feature of human nature. You could say that ego death is necessary to defeat tribalism. But how can someone undergo an ego death and continue living in this world as if you are concerned about your own survival? To live just is to live as a surviving thing, a thing concerned about its survival. How can you both undergo an ego death and be a thing concerned about its survival? 
  • I will discuss virtue more broadly when I get to Aristotle.
  • After this series I would like to do a brief series on Plato and Aristotle. That will be quick to put together as I've already done most of the work.
  • I have Huemer's new book on knowledge, so that's on the to-read list. I will probably go into knowledge after mistakes and autonomous facts. Some things to discuss there: a priori vs a posteriori knowledge; analyticity vs tautology; laws of logic; justification.
  • I gave a definition of justification that said a belief is justified when there are good reasons to believe it. Reasons are answers to why questions. I also said explanations are answers to why questions too, and so reasons and explanations are connected. (On one reading of 'reason', reasons are more internal, something the self is aware of. On a reading of 'explanation', explanations are external, existing independently of someone's awareness. There's an explanation for why fire is hot even if no one knows it. But there is an externalist reading of reasons too.)
  • This means there's probably some way to reconcile explanationism—the view that knowledge is when you believe something because it's true—with the view that justification is based on reasons.
  • Both explanationism and justification-by-reasons can probably be reconciled with some kind of foundationalism, and indeed might depend on some kind of foundationalism. I'm aware that Huemer is a foundationalist. I find the view attractive, as alternatives like skepticism and coherentism seem mistaken.

Sunday, June 8, 2025

Intellectual Virtue #1 - Joe Schmid on Intellectual Virtue

The Majesty of Reason (2020)
 
"Tribalism is the dogmatic and weaponized adherence to the principles and beliefs of a social, political, or ideological group." (7)
 
"Tribalism underpins so many of the problems plaguing humanity. The devaluation and systematic murder of religious, social, and racial groups in parts of the world is fueled by the dehumanization of those outside one's ideological tribe. Tribalism is no trivial matter; its pernicious effects are witnessed on scales ranging from interpersonal communication to systematic genocide." (7)
 
"There is no doubt that the ingrained shortcomings of human nature are partially responsible for this tribalism." (7)
 
"We have lost sight of the very purpose for which dialogue and discussion exist in the first place, the very treasure upon which we base our intellectual pursuits: truth." (8)
 
"Without a recognition that truth is our aim, we see interlocutors not as fellow explorers on a journey towards a common treasure, but as villains with whom we must compete to gain status, pride, and ego-gratification." (8)
 
"Rather than fundamentally alter human nature, then, as an antidote to this dire ideological situation, the solution is a mutual recognition that we are fellow explorers who can learn from one another and seek the beautiful treasure of truth together as an enterprise of curiosity, respect, and love. It is only through valuing and loving others, encouraging critical and reflective thought, and aiming ourselves toward truth that we can solve the polarizing problems afflicting humanity." (8)
 
"How do we, as explorers, as seekers, proceed on this journey? . . . The first step on our journey lays the foundation for the ensuing steps. It equips you with the intellectual virtues and conversational tactics necessary for critical thinking. . . . Without cultivating the dispositions of curiosity, humility, open-mindedness, a love for truth, and more, a proficiency in argumentation is groundless and without direction." (9)
 
"The foundation of critical thinking is virtue. Virtues are (i) stable traits or characteristics that (ii) one develops through acts, habits, and character formation with (iii) some intrinsically valuable telos (end, purpose, goal). A morally virtuous person consistently strives for the telos of moral perfection through continued action and habituation towards doing good and avoiding evil. An intellectually virtuous person consistently strives for truth and greater understanding through various habits of the mind – intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, and so on." (11) (Emphasis in bold is mine.)
 
"Here is a brief survey of some of the most important intellectual virtues that will serve as the foundation for the rest of the book (and, hopefully, for the rest of your life)." (11)
 
Emphasis in bold is mine in the following quotes: 
 
"Being intellectually humble involves recognizing the limitations of your knowledge and abilities. . . . intellectual humility is the willingness to say 'I don't know,' . . . and 'I might be wrong' in the appropriate circumstances." (11)
 
"Intellectual curiosity refers to the flaming passion . . . one has for discovering truths . . ." (11)
 
". . . intellectual perseverance is a committed rejection of intellectual laziness. Those with intellectual perseverance see barriers, hardships, and obstacles in their intellectual life as challenges to be overcome and opportunities for growth. Instead of giving up their pursuit of truth when it gets tough, they dig even deeper into the issues . . ." (12)
 
"Developing intellectual responsibility is a matter of taking charge of your pursuit of truth. Intellectually responsible individuals try to minimize deferring their beliefs to the hands of authority figures; instead, they seek to equip themselves with justification, arguments, evidence, and reasons." (12)
 
"Being open-minded is not a matter of believing that every single alternative position is equally probable. On the contrary, it is the willingness to examine such alternative positions in order to critically evaluate their rational and evidential merit. Being open-minded is all about a willingness to consider alternative viewpoints and to recognize, where appropriate, that one's own position might be mistaken." (12)
 
"We are all susceptible to confirmation bias – the tendency to selectively attend to . . . evidence that support[s] . . . our pre-existing beliefs and downplay . . . evidence that contravene[s] them. But a genuine love – dare I say adoration – for truth can help combat confirmation bias. Don't make defending a position your primary aim in intellectual pursuits; instead, make discovering truth your foremost goal." (12-13)
 
Schmid goes on to give us tips for productive conversation. He writes,
 
"Intellectual virtues are, once again, the foundation of critical thinking. However, they provide little guidance on how to have productive, fruitful, truth-oriented conversations . . . Intellectual virtues are all about directing oneself . . . to the telos of truth. But conversations are a step beyond that, since they implicate others in the pursuit of truth. Intellectual virtues are about action; conversations are about interaction." (13)
 
He continues: 
 
"It stands to reason, then, that the intellectual virtues will be limited in their utility when it comes to conversations. For this reason, I've compiled a number of tips . . . useful in facilitating the productive exchange of ideas." (13)
 
I will briefly paraphrase the 22 tips given (note that when I give verbatim quotes I am not necessarily quoting the entire tip):
 
1) Don't judge people for being biased for their current views. Work to mitigate bias, but don't view it as a personal failing when bias is a universal feature of human nature.
 
2) Emphasize agreement over disagreement.
 
3) Recognize that you and your interlocutor are on the same team with the shared goal of getting closer to the truth.
 
Question: This is not always the case. If you suspect that a person is not a genuine truthseeker, what do you do then? Avoid conversation with them? In some cases that's impossible, such as when confronted by friends and family on issues. Folks who lack intellectual virtue are, by all appearances, not truthseekers. I suppose the only thing to do then is preach the good news of intellectual virtue. If that doesn't go anywhere then there's no point in conversation at that point.
 
4) Be prepared to learn from your interlocutor. Don't enter a conversation expecting only to show off your superior knowledge.
 
5) Say you don't know something when you don't know it.
 
I would add: It's okay to use language like: "I'm aware of X topic / idea / author / book / paper, but I still need to research it and think more about it." Or, "While such and such is not clear, these other things are clear, and we can deal with the unclear stuff later."
 
That way you don't let your ignorance just hang awkwardly in the air; you acknowledge it and acknowledge a path forward for how you can deal with that ignorance, and acknowledge the bits of knowledge you do have around the gaps. You can also refocus the conversation and say "I don't know X or such and such is not yet clear, but that's not relevant to the task at hand." 
 
6) "It's okay . . . to be certain on some positions, but it should be somewhat rare." (14)
 
I have wondered whether one could make sense of a certain view of certainty where you can be certain and yet still open to changing your mind. The default view is that if you are certain then that just means you are not open to having your mind changed. But on another view of certainty, to say I am certain of something is just to say that I currently cannot imagine being wrong about that thing. I'm willing to entertain arguments for an opposing view because maybe they will change my imagination.
 
This way you get to have it both ways: you can be both certain and open-minded. Example: I am certain that if you have two objects, and combine them with two more objects, then you will have four objects. I cannot imagine this not being the case. But if someone believes differently (say, a nominalist who believes that truthmaker maximalism is false and that there are no truthmakers for mathematical statements), then I'm willing to hear them out because they might change my imagination.
 
7) Create a respectful environment where truth and love take center stage.
 
8) Place yourself in the shoes of your interlocutor and humanize them, and try to take on their point of view to better understand why they believe as they do.
 
9) "Ditch the caricatures."(14) Don't let stereotypes affect the way you treat your interlocutor. Here I think of how Christians can be stereotyped as ignorant and irrational, and atheists can be stereotyped as selfish and evil.
 
Does this mean Christians have to reject Romans 1 when dialoguing with atheists? 
 
NRSVUE: "18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those who by their injustice suppress the truth. 19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. 20 Ever since the creation of the world God’s eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been seen and understood through the things God has made. So they are without excuse . . ."
 
How can Christians "ditch the caricature" when the Bible itself caricatures atheists? "God has made it plain to them"? "they are without excuse"? Also, it's straight up false that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those who by their injustice suppress the truth." If we take this meaning more generally, how much propaganda, lying, deception at the hands of businesses and governments has gone unpunished? There is a lot of suppression of truth out there, but I don't see one iota of God's wrath.
 
10) Avoid echo chambers and immerse yourself in varying viewpoints and ways of thinking.
 
11) Focus the conversation on exploring ideas rather than exposing the mistakes of your interlocutor's view. Your goal should be discovering what's true, not "defeating" an opponent.
 
12) Try not to score points or "win" a debate. Instead, aim for mutual understanding.
 
13) Modify your language to deescalate tension. I would add: avoid accusatory statements, which often begin with the word "you." Instead, use "I" statements and focus on what you believe and why. Try to avoid placing your interlocutor on the defensive or making them feel attacked.
 
14) Be virtuous and aim for truth and love.
 
15) "Try not to sew your worldview or position into the very fabric of your own being. Your value is not tied to the positions you take. If you can (at least temporarily) separate yourself from the position you take, arguments against the position in question won't be seen or felt as personal attacks." (16)
 
a) I can imagine keeping a distance to the odd philosophical argument or position. It's harder to imagine keeping a distance to your entire worldview. But that is exactly what's required – after all, your worldview could be mistaken, and to test your worldview you must step outside of it and subject it to critique as if an outsider.
 
However, there are some positions that cannot be separated from the self. The view that there is a self, for example, which is a (surprisingly) controversial view, cannot, as far as I can see, be separated from the self.
 
b) I would argue that your value is tied to the positions you take, which is exactly why so much is at stake in philosophy of religion discussions. Our value is at stake! If I am an immortal being who will live forever in a blissful heavenly realm, then my value is infinite. But if I am a mortal being who dies and stays dead forever, then my value is finite. [This is why there is so much at stake in metaethical discussions too! Some folks argue against value realism. –01 July 2025]
 
16) Be a good listener and be fully present and not distracted. "If the occasion is right, re-state the point made by your dialectical partner. This shows that you are genuinely listening to them, which de-escalates tribalism. Also be sure to ask, respectfully, 'Is this what you mean?'" (16)
 
17) Philosophy is best done slowly. I would add: it's okay to go over the same concepts, ideas, and arguments over and over again in philosophy. In philosophy ideas are worth revisiting time and time again. There's always something to add or correct.
 
18) Steelman, don't strawman. I would add: this is what it means to place yourself in your interlocutor's shoes and try to see things from their point of view. This is also known as charity, where you interpret your interlocutor's position in the best of lights. Defeating a strawman means nothing. It's only when a view, in its best form, is shown to be mistaken that you can rationally reject it.
 
19) Speaking of charity, be charitable! How extremely frustrating is it when someone construes your words to mean something horrible that you didn't mean? Don't do that.
 
20) Maintain civility and respect. If this cannot be done, then walk away from the conversation.
 
21) Do not psychologize your interlocutor. 'Psychologizing' refers to when you try to explain why someone believes what they do by psychoanalysis. This involves dismissing the reason and evidence given for their view.
 
Recently I saw an example of this mistake made by Lee Strobel, where in an interview he talked about how famous atheists had poor relationships with their fathers, suggesting that we can psychologize atheism away as a result of "daddy issues". This is a mistake because it ignores the very real arguments that atheists, and naturalists more broadly, have offered for atheism and naturalism, arguments that Lee Strobel certainly has not come close to defeating.
 
I think psychologizing is perfectly fine, and even necessary for explaining human behavior and belief. Where it becomes a "fallacy" is when the psychoanalysis is just straight up wrong. If an atheist is convinced that the problem of evil succeeds, then the correct psychoanalysis will involve the intellectual experience provided by an argument from evil.
 
Atheists make this mistake too: they will say that Christians believe what they do because of wishful thinking. That fails to account for the fact that at least some Christians believe Christianity is true because they read the New Testament and are convinced that what they are reading is true history, that Jesus really did die and raise from the dead, that Paul really was visited by God on the road to Damascus, and that the authors of the New Testament accurately recorded what happened, at least accurately enough to justify a general Christian belief that God exists, sent Jesus to die for our sins, and resurrected Jesus as a sign of the resurrection to come for those who place their faith in Jesus. [In fact, you could accuse atheists of wishful thinking – wishing that they would not be judged by God for their moral failings. -01 July 2025]
 
I would add: one of the worst mistakes you can make as an interlocutor is, sadly, one of the most common mistakes, known as 'mindreading' or 'gaslighting' (this applies to psychologizing too), which is when you assume you know someone's inner mental life better than they do, or you assert yourself as a greater authority of someone's feelings and beliefs than they are. It can be a form of gaslighting because it involves trying to make someone appear confused about their own mental states; it basically amounts to an accusation of self-deception or failure of self-understanding. It's similar to "putting words in someone's mouth".
 
Christians can make this mistake because of Romans 1, which suggests that non-believers either really believe there is a God, as creation makes it obvious that God exists such that there is no excuse for non-belief, and that non-believers are somehow deceiving themselves or failing to be honest about why they really reject God, or non-believers are just really stupid (somehow in a way that morally implicates them).
 
Again, we see how the Bible gets in the way of being intellectually virtuous. This verse in particular is problematic. It appears to commit the Christian to engage in the worst mistake you can make in informal reasoning where you assume to know your interlocutor better than they know themselves.
 
22) "Arguments are not weapons and are rarely knock-down. Recognize room for rational disagreement." (17)
 
I agree that 1) you should never use arguments as weapons to attack someone or bully them or insult them, and 2) that arguments are rarely so strong that they guarantee the truth of the conclusion, because the premises can almost always be challenged. But I'm not sure there is always room for rational disagreement, depending on our definition of 'rational.'
 
Let's say I become convinced that arguments from evil succeed in showing that it's incredibly unlikely that a perfect God exists. It would be very strange for me to admit both that 1) God very likely doesn't exist and 2) There is no mistake in believing in God. If God likely doesn't exist then of course there is a mistake in believing in God.
 
If I believed in God and then stopped believing because of arguments and evidence, then clearly I am saying to myself that there are good reasons to doubt God's existence such that it would be irrational for me to continue believing. The "for me" caveat is key. Maybe it's consistent to say that it would be irrational for me to believe in God given what I believe about arguments from evil, but I don't have to believe that it's irrational for other people to believe in God because their beliefs don't commit them to the same conclusions as mine do.
 
However, surely I believe that the reasons why I have the beliefs I do, and thus the commitments I do, are good reasons, reasons worth having. Good reasons are, perhaps among other things, true. If someone says "I believe in God because God is necessary to make sense of the origin of consciousness, the universe, and biological life", those are only good reasons to believe if it is in fact true that God is necessary to make sense of those things. If those claims turn out to be false, then they turn out to not be good reasons.
 
Whether someone is rational, on one interpretation, comes down to whether that person has actually good reasons, and thus true reasons, for why they believe as they do. If we believe philosophy allows us to discover truth, then we should be prepared to say that philosophy allows us to discover which reasons were good or bad all along, and thus which positions were reasonable or unreasonable all along. If I change my mind on God's existence, then I am admitting that the reasons for believing in God were not good even while I believed. Those reasons turned out to not be good after all, which is why I later changed my mind and lost belief in God. It just sounds to me like a straight contradiction to say both that there are no good reasons to believe in God and that belief in God is rational.
 
There is this sense in which I wasn't irrational for believing in God: When I believed in God, I wasn't believing out of wishful thinking (actually, I think that was a part of it, but not the whole story), but I was believing out of what makes sense and what I thought must be true. I thought that the idea of the world being a total accident didn't make sense and that therefore there had to be a creator. That is, in a sense, a reasonable view. I was believing on the basis of arguments, in an intellectually virtuous way, which made it more likely that I would be believing what's true or at least capable of uncovering and correcting my false beliefs.
 
I agree that there is room for rational disagreement in this sense, in the sense that you can't blame someone for believing as they do. More specifically, you can acknowledge problematic, intellectually vicious ways of believing (these are, in a sense, blameworthy) in contrast to reliable, intellectually virtuous (blameless) ways of believing. You can acknowledge that there are intellectually virtuous (blameless) people on opposing sides of a debate. But that doesn't mean one side isn't more reasonable at the end of the day. What we are trying to discover is exactly that: which side is the one with better reasons to believe. Just because you are blameless doesn't mean you are not ignorant or mistaken.
 
The problem is that 'irrational' is so often used as an insult. So for the sake of productive conversations, it's best to never accuse someone of being irrational, or to accuse someone's view as an irrational view. Instead it's best to focus on reasons: I believe such and such because... and "What reasons do you have for thinking that that must be true?" 

Wednesday, June 4, 2025

04 June 2025 - Thoughts

  • Today I'm working on my post "Intellectual Virtue #1 - Joe Schmid on Intellectual Virtue", part of a series on intellectual virtue.
  • Intellectual virtue is part of a broader topic – critical thinking, and informal reasoning. It's part of the preliminaries to truthseeking, the foundations of truthseeking, and the universal truths that will not be denied by any rational person whose goal is to believe what's true. It's a good place to start for doing philosophy, since everything else depends on it.
  • Critical thinking can be defined very simply: Critical thinking is asking 'why' questions. By asking why questions, one is trying to understand the fundamental principles behind the truth of something. Critical thinking involves principles surrounding problem solving, which itself relates to goals.
  • This topic transitions nicely into the topic of mistakes. Mistakes are related to goals. So if you have a goal of maximizing your true philosophical beliefs, then anything that makes it less likely for you to get rid of false philosophical beliefs or to adopt true philosophical beliefs is a mistake relative to that goal.
  • This also transitions into the broader topic of reasoning, critical thinking, methodology,  justification, and knowledge.
  • As part of the topic of mistakes and intellectual virtue, the "threat" of normativity presents itself. You should be passionate about truth, you should be intellectually brave, you should be intellectually disciplined, etc. This is what intellectual virtue reveals. But then are we committed to true 'should' statements? If yes, then doesn't that mean there is an irreducible epistemic normative property? If yes, then doesn't that mean there is normativity? If yes, then doesn't that mean that epistemic normativity can be applied to ethical contexts to arrive at moral normativity? If yes, then doesn't that mean moral realism is true?
  • Actually, if we can analyze 'should' as not a basic, essence fact, and thus as an irreducible normative property, but instead can analyze 'should' as involving mistakes and goals, then there is no need to posit an irreducible normative property. 'Should' statements are true relative to goals.
  • This solves the is-ought gap by analyzing 'oughts' in terms of 'is'. Everything is descriptive. This is because 'oughts' are analyzed in terms of mistakes and mistakes are descriptive. There is no irreducible 'ought', at least not necessarily, not yet.
  • While I totally get the idea that there are judgment-independent value facts that are phenomenally grounded, I don't get Sharon Rawlette's idea that there are judgment-independent moral facts that are phenomenally grounded. In other words, I don't see how intrinsic goods ought to be. Intrinsic goods ought to be relative to the goal of being happy, but you still have relativism there. Intrinsic goods don't have a "built-in" ought-to-be-ness, it seems to me, because some intrinsic goods are not worth it, and thus you shouldn't pursue those intrinsic goods given the goal of being happy. [Here Rawlette would distinguish between pro tanto ought-to-be-ness and pro toto ought-to-be-ness. But if 'oughts' are analyzed in terms of mistakes and goals, then there is no such thing as pro tanto ought-to-be-ness. Though if you admit there are value facts, which I do, then you have to admit that some things are better than others in terms of producing value. So that still leaves us with some kind of moral realism, even if there technically is no irreducible normative property.]
  • Why prefer the analysis of 'should' in terms of goals and mistakes over the analysis of essence? First, maybe I'm wrong and the latter analysis is preferable. I'd need to study the Shafer / Cuneo paper.
  • Second, the reason is because we can analyze 'should' in terms of goals and mistakes, and so it's worth pursuing.
  • Third, you might think such an analysis couldn't be possible were it the case that there were an irreducible normative property. So the fact that we can analyze 'should' in terms of goals is evidence in favor of that analysis.
  • Fourth, if there is an irreducible normative property, it's hard to see how we could ever come to learn it. There's a problem of moral knowledge. You'd have to go for some kind of moral intuitionism. That view clashes with moral disagreement. People have wildly different moral intuitions. So I find intuitionism to be a very unattractive view. I also don't like the idea of anything being "magically" right or wrong, meaning the rightness or wrongness of something is just a brute fact. Example: Why is it wrong to torture babies for fun? If the intuitionist can only say that this is an invalid question because it's an autonomous fact that torturing babies for fun is wrong, then I'm not sure that this doesn't face the problem of a failure to explain moral data. It seems like the intuitionist is forced to say that it's simply an analytic truth; someone who grasps the concepts of 'torture' and 'for fun', 'baby', etc., will, purely by virtue of grasping, come to see that the statement is true. But 1) this doesn't remotely work for controversial moral debates, hence the problem of moral disagreement, and 2) it just seems obvious to me that we can explain why it's wrong to torture a baby for fun; it's simply not an analytic truth. And so it's not an autonomous fact and so the question "why is it wrong to torture babies for fun" is a perfectly legitimate question with an answer. That answer is something like: it's a value fact that torturing babies for fun fails to maximize value (i.e., fails to avoid causing pointless pain, fails to cultivate virtues which are necessary to maximize value, fails to generate extrinsically valuable happiness, etc.), and thus it's a fact that relative to the goal of maximizing value, you should not torture babies for fun. Maybe the question "Should you have such and such goal" is a nonsensical question given that the concept of 'should' depends on there being a goal. So the question could only make sense if you are asking about a subgoal in service to a larger goal. Given a larger (more fundamental) goal it makes perfect sense to ask whether one should or should not have a certain sub-goal. Arguably, goals terminate into a final, ultimate goal, and the reason for having that goal is because you cannot not have it.
  • This idea of a fundamental goal relates to autonomous facts. If you want to arrive at true philosophical beliefs, or least maximize your chances of having arrived at true philosophical beliefs, then you want your beliefs to be justified. But what does it mean to have justified beliefs?
  • One answer is to have good reasons for why you believe what you do.
  • What are reasons? One answer: reasons are answers to why questions.
  • But what is a good reason for believing in something? One answer: a good reason is an answer to a why question that is 1) your answer and not someone else's, and thus is something you actually believe; 2) true; 3) justified (the truth of the answer cannot be accidental); 4) relevant to the question; the answer actually answers the why question.
  • So a good reason is a relevant bit of knowledge. But hang on, doesn't this lead to a regress? To justify my belief, I need a good reason. But to have a good reason, I need justified belief, which means I need a further good reason. So good reasons require good reasons all the way down. 
  • Analogy: Let's say I want to transport some furniture using a truck. I'll need to strap the furniture down or else it will fall off the truck when I drive off. Imagine I strap the furniture to another piece of furniture, but the second piece is itself not strapped down to the truck. Is the first piece of furniture secure? No. It, along with the second piece, will fly off as soon as I start driving. What if I attached both pieces of furniture to a third unsecured piece of furniture. Now is my first piece of furniture secure? Nope. All three pieces will just fly off. If I had an infinite number of pieces of furniture, would that do the trick? After all, if you ask "What's securing this piece of furniture?", you always have an answer: the next piece of furniture. Since this is a feature of every single piece of furniture, doesn't it follow that every piece of furniture is secure? Put another way, going back to the three pieces of furniture, the lack of security of the third piece transfers to the second, which transfers to the first, which is why the first piece is unsecured. But in the infinite chain, there's never a piece of furniture that lacks security; each is secured by a subsequent piece. So there's never a transfer of a lack of security to ascending pieces of furniture. No piece of furniture in the infinite chain gets a chance to lack security.
  • Maybe there's a way to argue against this, to say that deferred security doesn't count, or that the entire chain is left insecure such that driving away would result in an infinite number of pieces of furniture flying off given the fact that the infinite chain itself is not tied down.
  • I'm open to that idea, but another idea is to grant the logic as a peculiar consequence when chains of dependent items become infinite (infinity tends to have strange consequences). The problem is more basic and more obvious: you can't have an infinite number of pieces of furniture. (This move is inspired by what Amy Karofsky says on page 60 of The Case for Necessitarianism.)
  • This generalizes across both epistemology and metaphysics. If you were to have an infinite chain of reasons, then each member of that chain would in fact be justified. But it's impossible to have an infinite chain of reasons. So inevitably you must either arrive at a belief that itself does not require justification, or arrive at a reason that is a good reason without requiring a further reason. So either there must be beliefs that do not require justification, or a second kind of justification for basic beliefs, or a second kind of good reason.
  • This applies to metaphysics: The 'why' question for why something exists must terminate in something whose existence is not apt for explanation.
  • This applies to value theory: The 'why' question for why something is wanted must terminate in something that is wanted for its own sake. Or, why something is perceived as good must terminate in something that is good in and of itself – something that is good in a non-derivative way – something whose goodness is not derived from the goodness of something more basic.
  • This also relates to explanation, understanding, and grounding. While explanations are answers to why questions pertaining to why something exists, or has the properties it does, reasons are answers to why questions pertaining to why someone believes or behaves the way they do. So reasons are a kind of explanation. (Or, reason and explanation are basically synonyms; hence, the Principle of Sufficient Reason.) [Given the fact that reasons and explanations are both answers to why questions, perhaps there is a way to synthesize the reason view of justification with explanationism; explanationism says that you are justified in your belief when the truth of the belief is what explains your belief.]
  • So basic beliefs, basic facts, and basic goods—these are key to understanding the foundations of epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory. 

Sunday, June 1, 2025

What is critical thinking?

Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker. Critical Thinking, 10th ed. New York: Mcgraw-Hill (2012). 

". . . on the one hand there is good, old-fashioned thinking. That’s what we do when we form opinions or judgments, make decisions, arrive at conclusions, and the like. On the other hand, there’s critical thinking. That’s what we do when we critique the first kind of thinking—subject it to rational evaluation. You might say that critical thinking involves thinking about thinking; we engage in it when we consider whether our thinking (or someone else’s) abides by the criteria of good sense and logic." (2)
 
". . . the purpose of thinking critically is to come to correct conclusions; the method used to achieve this objective is to evaluate our thinking by the standards of rationality." (4)
 
The book quotes and affirms the AACU's (American Association of Colleges and Universities) list of critical thinking characteristics:
 
"How well does the student
determine what information is or is not pertinent;
distinguish between rational claims and emotional ones;
separate fact from opinion;
recognize the ways in which evidence might be limited or compromised;
spot deception and holes in the arguments of others;
present his / her own analysis of the data or information;
recognize logical flaws in arguments;
draw connections between discrete sources of data and information;
attend to contradictory, inadequate, or ambiguous information;
construct cogent arguments rooted in data rather than opinion; 
select the strongest set of supporting data;
avoid overstated conclusions; 
identify holes in the evidence and suggest additional information to collect;
recognize that a problem may have no clear answer or single solution; 
propose other options and weigh them in the decision;
consider all stakeholders or affected parties in suggesting a course of action; 
articulate the argument and the context for that argument; 
correctly and precisely use evidence to defend the argument; 
logically and cohesively organize the argument;
avoid extraneous elements in an argument’s development; 
present evidence in an order that contributes to a persuasive argument?"
 
I would highlight two things: the first is the distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion'. I'm aware that there are philosophers who take issue with this distinction, but I don't remember why. The distinction may be implying that 'opinion' refers to a baseless claim, speculation, or a subjective statement presented as objective. But we often value the opinions of experts, like your doctor's opinion. A better distinction may simply be: supported claims versus unsupported claims.
 
Oh, Critical Thinking contains a section on this:
 
"Sometimes people talk about the difference between “fact” and “opinion,” having in mind the notion that all opinions are subjective. But some opinions are not subjective, because their truth or falsity is independent of what people think. Again, in this book “opinion” is just another word for “belief.” If you believe that Portland, Oregon, is closer to the North Pole than to the Equator, your opinion happens to be true, and would continue to be true even if you change your mind. You can refer to objective opinions as factual opinions or beliefs, if you want—but that doesn’t mean factual opinions are all true. “Portland, Oregon, is closer to the Equator than to the North Pole” is a factual opinion that is false." (6)
 
The second thing I would highlight is that the distinction between rational and emotional claims is problematic.
 
(1) First, I'd agree with feminist writers that dichotomizing rationality and emotion contains a suspicious subtext of misogyny.
 
(2) Second, logic and emotion don't necessarily come apart. If something traumatic happens, it's rational to have an emotional response, and indeed we would call not having an emotional response in those cases psychopathic. You can just as easily argue that the cultivated indifference, apathy, nonchalance, numbness, of everyday life is a convenient survival strategy to protect us from the reality of the horrors of the injustice and suffering of our world, and has no basis in truth. In other words, if we were truly attuned to the everyday realities right in front of us, we would be far more emotional than we are, not less. (Though, you could argue that such a survival strategy is perfectly rational exactly because it's a survival strategy. Still, it's worth noting that there may be a tradeoff here between survival and truth, or accuracy of attitude. 
 
(3) Grasping the truth of something, and really grasping it, often generates within us an emotional response. Philosophy is all about trying to grasp the truth. Grasping the truth is thus connected to both rationality and emotion.
 
(4) Being a good philosopher requires having a strong imagination. Often a strong imagination leads to strong feelings of empathy, which lead to an overwhelming emotional response when witnessing the distress of others. Empathy is deeply tied to what it means to be a good person, and being a good person is never irrational. But if being empathetic is tied to both being a good and thus rational person, and to being emotional, then again we see how emotionality and logic actually go together.
 
(5) You could also argue that intuitions are something like intellectual feelings, which means emotionality is foundational to philosophizing.
 
(6) Emotionality is foundational to philosophy in another way: the emotion of frustration is a common driver for philosophers. Philosophers are frustrated by bad philosophy, or when they hear something that isn't true and yet confidently believed. Alleviating this frustration by writing things down and setting the record straight is an essential part of the psychological motivation for philosophers to engage in philosophy. (And, coming full circle, hearing people talk about rationality and emotion as if they come apart, when they largely do not, is frustrating.)
 
With all of that said, there is a kernel of truth to contrasting emotionality with rationality: Often people feel very strongly about things they don't understand, or are mistaken about. But the problem isn't the emotion, the problem is the fact that the beliefs causing the emotion aren't justified. So we can do away with the contrast between emotionality and rationality and just focus on whether beliefs are justified or not. If they aren't, then of course any matching emotion will not be justified, and if they are then any matching emotion will be justified.
 
With that said, Aristotle would say that a person who lacks virtue is a person who feels too much. The coward feels too much fear; the ill-tempered person feels too much anger. So it's possible for someone's emotions to not match the situation. We might say the rational person is the virtuous person who feels the right kind and degree of emotion, whereas the emotional person is the vicious person who feels the wrong kind and/or wrong degree of emotion. But the contrast to rationality isn't emotion even in this case, but, obviously, irrationality!

The link the authors cite for this list is dead. Looking up critical thinking on the website today reveals a critical thinking rubric:
 
"Explanation of Issues: Issue/problem to be considered critically is stated clearly and described comprehensively, delivering all relevant information necessary for full understanding.

Evidence: Information is taken from source(s) with enough interpretation/evaluation to develop a comprehensive analysis or synthesis. Viewpoints of experts are questioned thoroughly.

Influence of Context and Assumptions: Thoroughly (systematically and methodically) analyzes own and others’ assumptions and carefully evaluates the relevance of contexts when presenting a position.

Student’s Position: Specific position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis) is imaginative,
taking into account the complexities of an issue. Limits of position (perspective, thesis/ hypothesis) are acknowledged. Others’ points of view are synthesized within position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis).

Conclusions and Related Outcomes: Conclusions and related outcomes (consequences and implications) are logical and reflect student’s informed evaluation and ability to place evidence and perspectives discussed in priority order."

source: https://www.aacu.org/initiatives/value-initiative/value-rubrics/value-rubrics-critical-thinking