A theodicy even better than the Grand Story Theodicy? The All Possible Persons theodicy

I had thought that the Grand Story theodicy was the best theodicy available. But maybe something along the following lines is even better:

• God is obligated to prevent worst possible depriving evils.
• So God is obligated to create all possible persons and to give them all fundamentally good lives. (Lives that are totally consciousness-affirming, meaning that every person loves being alive to the point of strongly preferring being alive to not, this preference is fixed and never wavers, and they always get what they want, namely, to live.)
• It would be such a shame to miss out on living a fundamentally good life. In fact, it would be a worst possible depriving evil. God knows this about you, and me, and about every possible person. So God has no choice but to create every possible person and give them a best possible life, which really is any life in which the person wants to live and gets to live. (Thus, a person on this view is minimally something that has the ability to prefer living to not living.)
• Here's the problem. The only possible way for certain persons to be created is through really complex, messy systems like our universe. In fact, all possible universes must be created across all possible levels of complexity, so that the entire range of all possible persons, from the most to the least complex, will eventually be created.
• This requires an infinite amount of time, and there will never be a time such that an infinite amount of time has passed, so there will never be a time at which all possible persons have been created, and so God has no choice but to create a potentially infinite number of persons in an unfolding manner requiring space and time. (Maybe some possible persons do not require space and time to exist.)
• But you couldn't exist without evolution being exactly the way it is, and without all the evils of the world being exactly the way they are.
• We are but one of a potentially infinite number of universes carving out person-space out of the infinite ocean of possible persons. Think of a child scooping up a cup of seawater. Our universe's job is to be that cup and scoop up its share of possible persons.
  
• So evils, even horrendous evils, are necessary to create all possible persons. Then, either all at once at some later time in a mass resurrection, or immediately after death, each person's fundamentally good life starts. God explains to that person that the reason why all the evils they faced (and/or witnessed other people face) were necessary to create them and others.
• You could even have a temporary hell where some individuals don't have their fundamentally good life starting immediately upon resurrection, but only after they've been through a rehabilitation process (or, in the case that we have free will, retributive punishment).
• For any evil whatsoever, the answer to "Why did God allow that?" is "Because if God didn't, a possible person wouldn't have been born, and that possible person would have been deprived of eventually getting to live a fundamentally good life."

This combines the "metaphysical necessity" theodicy with the "heaven" theodicy. In short, God is obligated to prevent all worst possible depriving evils, which means preventing any possible person from being deprived of the best possible good of living a fundamentally good life. But creating all possible persons requires allowing, temporarily, even horrendous evils, as you can only exist if certain physical events happen to generate the complex neurobiological system that gives rise to your exact subjective consciousness. So God is forced (by obligation) to force us a trade: experience horrendous evils in a temporary life so that we can be created (and so that other possible persons can be created), so that you can then eventually live a fundamentally good life. Being deprived of the fundamentally good life is infinitely worse than suffering finite horrendous evils. So, it's a good trade.

A few problems:

1) Usually theists want to say that before creation, reality is already perfect and maximally good, because God is maximally good. So to say that God is obligated to create to maximize value would seem to imply that God alone is not maximally good.

My response to this is that it seems self-evident that a world with more happiness is a better world than a world with less, and that a world with my happiness in it (or your happiness in it) is a world with greater happiness than a world without my happiness (or without yours), ceteris paribus. So basically, I don't understand why people say a world with only God is maximally good; that just seems self-evidently false. 

However, God himself is maximally good in the sense that God himself is the greatest possible extrinsic good, because God gives rise to all fundamentally good lives.

This is a bit tricky because I also want to say that a fundamentally good life is a best possible extrinsic good with respect to an individual.

We might distinguish between degrees of extrinsicality. A best possible extrinsic good (degree 1) is a fundamentally good life, and God is a best possible extrinsic good (degree 2). Being "deprived of God" doesn't exactly make sense, but being deprived of a fundamentally good life does. We might also say that degrees are tied to individuals versus groups. A degree 1 best possible extrinsic good is a best possible extrinsic good with respect to an individual. A degree 2 best possible good is a best possible extrinsic good with respect to a group of people.

We might think of it this way: When we ask what is the best possible thing that could happen to a person, it would be strange to say, "The best possible thing that could happen to you is God," because that demands an immediate question, why is God the best possible thing that could happen to you? The obvious answer: because God will give you a fundamentally good life. So while technically God is the ultimate greatest possible extrinsic good, that's only because of how value is ultimately cashed out, which is through maximizing intrinsically positive states (both in quality and quantity). And so we can trace God's value, just as we can trace our own value (or the value of anything), to the phenomenal value that that thing produces.

In fact, due to considerations of eudaimonia, what counts as a fundamentally good life for an individual might not allow for the best possible life for a group of people. So we might say that there are further and further degrees of best possible goods as we zoom out to cover larger and larger groups of individuals. This brings us to problem 2 below:

2) There are possible individuals for whom living a fundamentally good life (you always prefer to live and you always do) entails living a profoundly evil (or mediocre) life. It stands to reason that God would not want to sustain these lives despite the fact that they are fundamentally good. Consider a person who lives all by themselves, and their psychology is such that they are happy to live alone and do nothing but watch obscene images and videos (fill in the blank). No one else exists in this world but them, so it's not like they are hurting anyone. But it seems clear that this is a massively impoverished life, and one with no virtue. It's hardly a good life despite this individual strongly preferring to live over not living and getting to live forever. In fact, the fact that their disturbing existence goes on forever seems to just add to the problem. So it cannot be the case that consciousness-affirmation is the only meaningful consideration.

Here's a potential solution to this problem: There is a distinction to be made between someone's subjectivity and the quality of their consciousness. The example I like to give is the math genius who sustains a brain injury and loses their math skills. They remain the same person after the injury; they have the same first-person subjective experience. But the quality of that experience, what it is like to be them, has changed. So when we go to heaven, we retain our subjectivity, and thus our personhood, but the quality of that subjectivity is significantly enhanced.

This might require a stint in hell or purgatory for rehabilitation purposes. The renewal of one's mind needn't be an instantaneous, pain-free experience. In fact, the increasing of the quality of one's consciousness could take place over an infinite amount of time; we are always improving the quality of our consciousness.

What matters is not only what we affirm, but what we would affirm were our consciousness to be of high quality. The man who is happy to live alone doing nothing but watching obscene material would not be happy for long. Once his mind had been renewed to an extent, he would be profoundly unhappy with his existence, in which case God would again be obligated to move him to a better world. (And so God would perhaps move him to heaven from the beginning, anticipating this change of heart and mind. Or we might say that these bad worlds that include solitary disturbed individuals (or whatever disturbing features) are the exact hells and purgatories people exist in until their minds have been renewed to the point that they can now fit in heaven.)

This also provides an important resource when it comes to disability theology. It seems cruel of God to keep someone's severe mental disability forever in heaven. And yet, at the same time, it seems cruel to just annihilate these persons out of existence. The solution is to keep their souls, but improve them over time (or all at once; or to improve them to a degree all at once (an initial boost) and then improve them thereafter slowly over time).

So we must modify our understanding of a fundamentally good life. Consciousness-affirmation alone is not enough; it's something more like: consciousness-affirmation when the quality of your consciousness is high (or ever-improving). This makes sense, because if happiness is how value is cashed out, then the quality of that happiness matters greatly. Greater quality of happiness is a greater degree of happiness. So God could never settle for creatures living lives of diminished quality of happiness, as that would fail to maximize happiness.

So if someone could experience eternal consciousness-affirmation without living a fundamentally good life, does this imply that someone could experience eternal consciousness-denial without living a fundamentally bad life?

I don't think so, and here's why. In the former case, you need higher degrees of consciousness in order to maximize happiness. God is disturbed by the happy evil individual (which, incidentally, makes God unable to maximize his own happiness) because God knows how this person would feel about their own choices were the quality of their consciousness leveled up. God knows that this person would be horrified and ashamed, exactly because a deeper understanding of things comes with a recognition of what is good and what is bad. Only a fully recognition of what is good and bad can result in a full appreciation of good and bad, right and wrong, and thus a full instantiation of phenomenal value.

This does suggest that the feeling of ought-to-be-ness that comes with phenomenal value is highly misleading; we might never know whether our happiness is the kind of happiness we would approve of were our consciousness of a higher quality (unless God tells us).

But in the case of living a fundamentally bad life, quality of consciousness doesn't seem relevant. Someone could experience unbearable suffering for a time, as long as it's required for this person to eventually live a fundamentally good life (either due to necessity or rehabilitation). But no one could ever experience consciousness-denial forever without that person's existence being unjustified. So while living a fundamentally good life requires high (or ever-increasing) quality of consciousness, living a fundamentally bad life remains a worst possible evil regardless of the quality of your consciousness. 

This is a categorical worst possible evil; we can imagine God increasing one's capacity for pain, thus causing their torture to be ever-increasing. This high-fidelity fundamentally bad life would be far worse than a low-fidelity fundamentally bad life. So we might be tempted to say it's really the high (or ever-increasing) fidelity bad life that is the worst possible extrinsic evil, but any fundamentally bad life is a categorically worst possible extrinsic evil.

An analogy would be this: Imagine being overdrafted is a worst possible evil. In that case, it makes no difference if someone overdrafts by a dollar or by a thousand dollars; either way, a worst possible evil has occurred, and the fact that one is a greater degree doesn't make a relevant difference to the permissibility of the lesser degree worst possible evil. (It does sound strange to speak of degrees of worst possible evils. But again, if we allow 'worst possible evil' to be categorical, then degrees shouldn't be problematic.)

If consciousness-denial is what makes life not worth living, then maximal consciousness-denial is what makes life maximally not worth living. Not-worth-living-ness is thus the measure of badness that can befall an individual. Once that measure has crossed a threshold where life is officially not worth living for the individual, then it's not relevant (as far as justification is concerned) to what degree beyond that threshold that life is not worth living.

If maximizing phenomenal value depends on quality of consciousness, then the maximizing of phenomenal disvalue depends on the quality of consciousness. But when it comes to whether evils are justifiable or not, there is an asymmetry between living a fundamentally good life, which requires consciousness-affirmation of a high or ever-increasing degree, and living a fundamentally bad life, which requires eternal unbearable suffering regardless of the quality of that suffering.

So perhaps more simply we could just say that a life not worth living in the long run is a categorical worst possible evil (regardless of the details of its not-worth-living-ness), which generates a categorical best possible saving good with respect to that evil, and so God cannot allow for anyone to live a life not worth living in the long run, as that would be to allow an unjustifiable evil (an evil which cannot possibly generate outweighing good). The best possible good grounded by such an evil would be to be fully saved from that evil, either by annihilation, by being sent to a fundamentally good life, or by being sent to a fundamentally neutral life.

But because God is obligated to give us fundamentally good lives anyway, it follows that God could not allow worst possible evils anyway.

3) Another problem is a matter of power. Why would God be limited to creating us only by specific physical inputs? Why couldn't God create us wholecloth out of nothing? The question of how God could create a person at all, or how a person could possibly exist in the first place, is one of the deepest questions in philosophy. It may be that God does in fact create all possible persons he can ex-nihilo or de novo. Presumably, in Christianity the angels are like this. But if God is obligated to create all possible persons, then again it's hard for us to wrap our minds around the fact that this involves God creating trillions upon trillions upon trillions (really, approaching infinity) of persons. It's all possible persons, after all. This would involve any coherent account of person-generation, and that just so happens to include persons that are created through a DNA, RNA, evolution, biological process brought about by the laws of chemistry and physics we observe in our universe. Maybe there are countless persons God can create that don't require all these things, but that doesn't change the fact that we require these things to exist, and God must create us lest we are deprived of a best possible good, which would indict God on charges of allowing worst possible depriving evils.