One objection to the all possible persons theodicy is that once a person has been created, there is no reason to allow them to experience horrendous evils, unless their experiencing horrendous evils somehow gives rise to the existence of other persons.
But the systems, mechanisms, events, and so on needed to bring you (and others) about also happen to bring about all the bad things that will happen to you.
Someone might wonder why doesn't God just appear to reassure us that the horrendous evils we witness and/or experience are necessary for our existence, and eventually we will enjoy living a fundamentally good life.
The idea is that God does appear and reassures you, just not in this universe. The entire spectrum of divine hiddenness is implemented across all possible worlds. There are worlds where not a single person believes in God, and there are worlds where every single person believes in God, and there are worlds in between covering every shade of God revealing himself.
Our world is roughly in the middle, which makes sense because the large majority of worlds will be moderate, and so it's no surprise that we find ourselves in the most probable kind of world. (Though maybe that's wrong; because there are an infinite number of possible worlds, there isn't a bell curve; it's just flat. There are an infinite number of variations of a near-heaven world, just as there are an infinite number of variations of a near-hell world, just as there are an infinite number of variations of a moderate world. But if we allow infinities of different sizes, and if the infinities in the middle are greater than the ones at the extremes because the number of moderate permutations is exponentially greater, then maybe it's coherent to say that the world distribution has a bell curve.)
That means there is a nearby possible world that is an actual world in which a person arbitrarily similar to you, but not exactly you, exists, and in that world this person lives a life identical to yours except God does reveal himself to that person and reassures him.
This multiverse picture of the world is undignifying to the individual, because for every individual there are endless clones of this person. These clones are not exactly like you—they are, after all, their own person—but they are so similar to you that any other human would easily mistake you for them.
Call this the 'cloning problem.'
On one hand, God may wish to (or even be obligated to) create all possible persons as a way to maximize goodness and to minimize worst possible depriving evils (assuming that non-existent-but-possible persons are truly deprived of goods if they are not created).
On the other hand, it might be unloving to reduce someone's uniqueness to zero by creating an endless number of clones of them.
But that's not fair; each "clone" is in fact unique; they have their own unique soul / self / first-person subject. It is this uniqueness that makes the happiness of one person incommensurable with the happiness of another person, and it is in this sense that we are all equal (though in another real sense, some people are more valuable than others because they generate more happiness in both quantity and quality).
So I don't see how the cloning problem is a real problem for the theodicy. Maybe it's creepy that there are an endless number of clones of you out there, but what's the alternative? The alternative would be all those people missing out on (eventually) living a fundamentally good life.
A much worse problem is the following:
There are possible worlds that involve horrendous evils that take unimaginable amounts of time. So someone might suffer for trillions of years just so that they, or someone else, are born.
The promise of an infinite good of heaven is not enough to justify just any evil, even when heaven depends on that evil.
But is there a non-arbitrary stopping point between when an existence is too horrible for too long before it's not worth the eventual benefit of living a fundamentally good life?
A variation on this problem is that we could imagine that there are certain persons who could not be born without the very specific input of God himself performing heinous actions. But God cannot perform these actions, and so God is constrained when creating all possible persons (rather, those persons are not possible after all).
Another problem is that we could imagine there being an infinite number of people who could be created by people who are already living a fundamentally good life. So why not just opt for those infinities? We might say it's impossible for an actual infinity of persons to be created, so the next best thing is to create a potential infinite of persons. As long as there are more and more persons being created, ad infinitum, then the best possible world has been created. There are other best possible worlds with other sets of potentially infinite persons, but given that intrinsic values are incommensurably good across unique persons, one potential infinite is not better, or worse, than another. When choosing between which set of potentially infinite persons to create, you might as well start with the set where everyone begins and retains, at all times, a fundamentally good existence; that is, to start with the set that does not include unbearable suffering. The set of potentially infinite persons that doesn't include unbearable suffering is the least arbitrary set.
But there's an even more fundamental problem: if it's true that my ensoulment depends on this exact sequence of physical events leading to the exact brain that gives rise to my soul or that enables my ensoulment, then how could God recreate me after my death?
If I can't trust God to create me de novo with the exact specifications of my brain needed for my ensoulment without all the physical events leading up to my existence, then how could I trust God to create me with the exact specifications of my brain needed for my ensoulment in the afterlife?
If God can create me in heaven, then by that same power God should be able to create me without horrendous evils.
What is it about the actual events of our world that makes them necessary to create us? And if there is an answer, then how could I be recreated after my death without those events taking place all over again?
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